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Preface 
Cooperation is a powerful tool to reach Pareto improvements compared to pure 
self-serving behavior. How to achieve cooperation is therefore a key question for 
everybody who is interested in promoting the general welfare. 
This dissertation presents several institutional arrangements to improve 
cooperation in experimental settings. The work is based on the now standard public 
goods game: Subjects are matched into a group and get an initial endowment. Each 
individual can allocate the endowment either to his own private account or to the public 
account. Allocations to the public account are multiplied by a factor larger than 1 and 
the public account is subsequently distributed equally to all group members. This setup 
creates a social dilemma: each individual maximizes his payoff by contributing 
nothing, even though full contribution by all group members would maximize the total 
payoff for all group members. The three chapters of the dissertation present different 
institutional arrangements to alleviate this dilemma. The first chapter introduces an 
additional costly mandatory contribution mechanism, the second chapter discusses the 
effect of giving one group member allocation power over the group account and the 
third chapter discusses the introduction of religious and pro-social primes before the 
allocation decision. 
For the analysis I mainly use the frameworks developed by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002). Both are based on the insight that individuals 
do not care solely about their own payoff but also take the payoffs of the other group 
members into account. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) emphasize a general distaste for 
inequality. Individuals like neither being better off nor being worse off than other 
group members. Charness and Rabin (2002) assume that subjects care about their own 
payoff and, additionally, the minimum payoff in their group and the sum of all payoffs. 
The results in this dissertation are approximated quite well by predictions from these 
two frameworks. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows:   
The first chapter “Tax or trust: a public goods game with enforceable and 
voluntary contributions” presents a modified public goods game. In the modified game, 
there are two funding mechanisms for a public account – a costly tax mechanism and a 
Preface 
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cost-free voluntary contribution mechanism. The tax mechanism is controlled by a 
voting of all group members. After the tax payment is established, each group member 
can voluntarily contribute to the public account. The public account is multiplied by an 
efficiency factor larger than one and distributed equally among all group members. 
I provide four main empirical results: First, the additional funding mechanism 
leads to higher average profits than in the appropriate control treatments in which there 
is only one funding mechanism each. Second, the negative time trend that occurs in the 
standard voluntary contribution mechanism also exists in the modified game with two 
funding mechanisms. Third, the voting and contribution decisions are strongly 
influenced both by the behavior of group members in the current period and the 
experience with different group members in earlier periods. Fourth, subjects who cast 
the decisive vote in the first stage contribute more in the second stage. 
The second chapter “The team allocator game: allocation power in public goods 
games” is joint work with Martin Kocher and Dominik Matzat. The chapter also 
presents a modified public goods game. In our team allocator game, each team member 
can contribute to a public account. The sum of contributions is multiplied by an 
efficiency factor larger than one, but – in contrast to the standard public goods game – 
the public account is not distributed equally among all team members. Rather, the team 
allocator receives the entire amount and has full discretionary power over the allocation 
of the revenues from the account within the team. 
We provide three main empirical results: First, we find that the level of 
contributions in the team allocator game is significantly higher than in an appropriate 
control treatment in which there is no team allocator, but one team member is forced to 
contribute her entire endowment. Second, we find that it is the team allocator’s 
distribution behavior that influences together with the time horizon of the team 
interaction the development of contributions. Contributions increase in the returned 
amount, i.e. the reward channel is most effective in sustaining high levels of 
cooperation. Third, although there is some heterogeneity among the team allocators, on 
average, team allocators return remarkably high amounts to ordinary team members 
that invest into the public account. Non-contributors, however, are excluded from the 
benefits from cooperation. Hence, team allocators generate strong contribution 
incentives. 
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The third chapter “How to make people generous and credulous: religious and pro-
social primes in a public goods game” presents a classic public goods game with 
religious, pro-social and neutral primes. Participants solve a scrambled sentence task – 
they have to form a four-word sentence out of five given words – filled with religious, 
pro-social or neutral keywords, before making decisions in a standard public goods 
game. 
I provide three main empirical results: First, both the religious and the pro-social 
prime increase the average contribution in the public goods game. Second, the 
subjective importance of the other group members’ payoff and the expectation of the 
other group members’ contribution positively influence the own contribution. Third, 
both the religious and the pro-social prime increase the subjective importance of the 
other group members’ payoff, the pro-social prime also increases the expectation of the 
other group members’ contribution. 
Each of the three chapters has its own introduction and appendix. You can 
therefore read each chapter independently from the other chapters. 
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Chapter 1: Tax or trust: A public goods 
game with enforceable and voluntary 
contributions 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Consider a group setting in which a public good is funded by a combination of two 
different mechanisms. The first mechanism can enforce identical contributions by all group 
members but its implementation is costly. The second mechanism is costless, but the 
contributions are entirely voluntary without enforcement. The mechanisms are organized 
sequentially, first the group members determine the forced contribution and then every 
group member decides on his voluntary contribution. The group faces the classic social 
dilemma in the second mechanism: it is individually rational for a selfish group member to 
contribute nothing, even though full contribution by all group members would be socially 
optimal. Additionally, the group members face a further dilemma when they decide about 
the forced contribution. They can implement a large forced contribution to hedge against 
free-riding. However, such a decision might actually crowd out exactly these voluntary 
contributions, resulting in a welfare loss due to the costs of the first mechanism. 
There are two interpretations of this setting, both are equally valid. First, you can 
consider this as a community that has the ability to tax1 its members, who can also 
voluntarily contribute to the public good. In real life, a large scale example for this is the 
funding of universities – a combination of public funds raised by taxation and private 
donations. For a small scale example you can think of a tennis club that has to keep its 
courts in good shape, by a combination of costly outside workers paid by the membership 
fees and a reliance on its members to keep the courts in good shape – a cheap but voluntary 
mechanism. 
Second, you can consider this a team production, in which individual effort levels in 
the team are easily observable, but the verification of them is costly. This can be 
represented by a small work team that works on a joint project and whose team members 
                                                 
1 This can also mean the ability to determine a membership fee. 
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can document their individual contribution only with a lot of time and effort. The work 
team can choose a high level of documentation – thus ensuring contributions but creating 
additional costly activities – or a low level of documentation – thereby freeing resources 
but making individual contributions effectively voluntary.  
To my best knowledge, this is the first work providing a rigorous empirical test of the 
(behavioral) incentive effects of such a group structure. I analyze a modified public goods 
game theoretically and implement it experimentally in the laboratory. In the main 
treatment, called TAX/VCM2, group members vote for a forced contribution – basically a 
tax payment – in stage 1. The total tax payment minus the taxation costs goes to the public 
account. The marginal tax costs increase with the tax payment.3 In stage 2, each group 
member can make an additional voluntary contribution to a public account. The sum of 
contributions from both stages is multiplied by an efficiency factor larger than one, and 
distributed equally among all group members.  
It is straightforward to show that in such a setting, group members with standard 
preferences have no incentive whatsoever to contribute to the public account in stage 2, 
and will therefore agree on a large tax payment that ensures maximum profit in absence of 
voluntary contributions. The experimental results, however, show that groups typically 
choose lower tax payments and voluntarily contribute substantial amounts. I show that 
contribution levels depend on individual preferences, observed past action of the other 
group members and separately formed expectations about future action of the other group 
members. I provide theoretical evidence that such behavior could be caused by other-
regarding preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or a combination 
of maximin-preference and general efficiency concern (Charness and Rabin, 2002). 
In addition to the main treatment, I analyze two control treatments. The first control 
treatment – called TAX – implements only the forced contribution mechanism. The second 
control treatment – called VCM – implements only the voluntary contribution mechanism. 
There are several studies analyzing the effects of tax schemes and institutional 
arrangements in public goods settings. This chapter sheds light on some additional and 
previously unanswered questions: (i) Does an endogenously chosen tax amount result in 
                                                 
2 In this treatment, both a tax mechanism and a voluntary contribution mechanism are implemented, hence 
TAX/VCM. 
3 This modelling choice is motivated by disproportionately increasing tax evasion and monitoring costs in 
applicable real world situations. 
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full, partial or no crowding out of voluntary contributions? (ii) Will the “optimal tax rate” 
be chosen if a) there is an additional VCM or b) only the tax mechanism is available? 
In the 1980’s several high-profile papers theoretically explored the relationship 
between taxation and voluntary contributions to public goods. Warr (1982) and Roberts 
(1984) postulate that costless lump-sum taxation financing of public goods crowds out 
voluntary contribution dollar for dollar. Consequently, financing public goods via taxation 
can only increase provision of the public good after crowding out all voluntary 
contributions. Bergstrom et. al. (1986) argue that if taxed individuals differ in their 
propensity to contribute to a public good, the average crowding out effect will be less than 
dollar for dollar. Even if taxation crowds out contributions of voluntary contributors dollar 
for dollar, people who do not contribute voluntarily are forced to contribute via taxation. 
Bernheim (1986) argues that a generalized version of these results would mean that 
virtually all government taxes and transfers would be neutral. He concludes that the 
underlying assumption that individuals are only interested in the aggregate supply of the 
public good should be scrutinized. Andreoni (1990) does just that and offers the theory of 
warm-glow giving: Voluntary contributions to a public good offer utility (a warm glow) to 
the contributor, the size of the effect is positive in the size of the voluntary contribution. 
This additional assumption leads to only partial crowding out of the tax financed 
contributions of the public good.  
It was also Andreoni (1993) who did the first experimental test of the relationship 
between tax financed contributions and voluntary contributions for public goods. Building 
on his warm-glow model he develops a public goods game with an endowment of seven 
tokens in which both the Pareto optimal contribution – six tokens – and the 
Nashequilibrium contribution – three tokens – are interior solutions. Andreoni compares 
the result of a simple voluntary contribution mechanism to a treatment that implements an 
exogenously forced contribution of two tokens. He finds that the implementation of the tax 
does partially crowd out contributions – in other words: it increases the sum of forced and 
voluntary contributions. However, his results should be taken with a grain of salt, because 
his observed average contribution in the no-tax treatment is below even the 
Nashequilibrium contribution.   
 Chan et. al. (2002) as well as Gronberg et. al. (2012) vary the payoff functions but 
keep the general framework of Andreoni (1993): A public goods game with an interior 
Nashequilibrium as control treatment and a main treatment with an additional exogenously 
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implemented tax or forced contribution below the Nashequilibrium. Both articles report 
incomplete crowding out or rather increased total contributions in the main treatment. 
To my knowledge, the work of Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2004) is the only 
previous experiment that implements an endogenous choice about a tax prior to a voluntary 
contribution mechanism public goods game. The paper replicates the setup of Andreoni 
(1993) and adds a third treatment in which subjects decide via a simple majority vote 
whether to implement the tax of two tokens or not. Differing from Andreoni’s paper, Sutter 
and Weck-Hannemann do not find a difference in total contributions between the no-tax 
and the exogenous-tax treatments. The total contributions in the endogenous-tax treatments 
are significantly lower than in the exogenous-tax treatment. This stems from significantly 
lower contribution in groups that reject the implementation of a tax. The vote in the first 
stage has predictive value for the contribution in the second stage, subjects who vote ‘No’ 
contribute less whether the tax is implemented or not. 
While the experimental literature on taxes and voluntary contribution in public good 
games has followed in Andreoni’s warm glow footsteps, the general discussion about 
causes of cooperative behavior in public goods settings has broadened. Fehr and Gächter 
(2000a) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) argue that people act reciprocal and mimic the 
intentions of other people. Kind actions are rewarded and unkind actions are punished. 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that people prefer equal outcomes and are willing to alter 
behavior to avoid inequality, especially if they get less than other people. Charness and 
Rabin (2002) argue that besides their own well-being people care about general efficiency 
and about the least well-off in society.  
Another related topic is endogenous institutional choice. Sutter et al. (2010) run an 
experiment in which group members can vote on supplementing their public goods game 
with a reward or punishment mechanism. They find that endogenous choice of the 
additional mechanism leads to significantly higher contribution in the VCM phase. 
Although the subjects in my setting do not decide on the existence of a tax mechanism, 
there is a clear similarity. The group members jointly decide on the institutional 
environment of the voluntary contribution setting. 
My work adds to the existing literature in two main ways. First, I expand the analysis 
of taxes and voluntary contributions to other-regarding preferences. The focus is especially 
on the models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002). Second, prior 
experiments had to implicitly impose an exogenous limit to the feasible taxation to avoid 
Tax or trust: A public goods game with enforceable and 
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the trivial solution of just implementing the Pareto optimal tax rate. I introduce a 
distinction between costly financing through taxes and costless financing through 
voluntary contributions. This creates an endogenous limit to the positive effects of 
taxation.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2 I present the 
experimental design and describe the procedures of the experiment. Section 3 derives 
theoretical predictions for all treatments. Section 4 reports the experimental results and 
compares them to the theoretical predictions, and Section 5 discusses my findings and 
concludes the chapter. 
 
1.2. Experimental design and procedures 
In this section I describe the basic experimental setup (Section 2.1) and the details of 
the experimental procedure (Section 2.2). 
 
1.2.1 Basic setup of the game 
Let 𝐼 = {1, 2, … , 𝑛} denote 𝑛 subjects who interact in 𝑇 periods. Each period 𝑡 ∈{1, 2, … ,𝑇} consists of three stages. In stage 0, each individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 receives an 
endowment 𝐸. In stage 1 the endowment can be allocated via a tax mechanism to the 
public account. The tax payment of individual 𝑖 to the public account in period 𝑡, denoted 
𝑝𝑖,𝑡, must satisfy 0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐸, and must be equal for all members  (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑡). Let 𝑃𝑡 be 
the sum of all group members’ tax payment in period 𝑡 (i.e. 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑡) and 𝐾𝑡 the convex 
cost function of implementing the tax mechanism. In stage 2, each individual can allocate 
the remaining endowment either to his own private account or to the public account. The 
contribution of individual 𝑖 to the public account in period 𝑡, denoted 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, must satisfy 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐸 −  𝑝𝑡. Let 𝐶𝑡 be the sum of all group members’ contributions in period 𝑡 (i.e. 
𝐶𝑡 = ∑ 𝑐𝑗,𝑡𝑛𝑗=1 ). Let 𝑅𝑡 be the revenue for the public account in period 𝑡 (i.e. 𝑅𝑡 =(𝑃𝑡 − 𝐾𝑡) +  𝐶𝑡). In order to retain the public goods nature 𝑅𝑡 is multiplied by a factor 𝛾, 
which satisfies 1 < 𝛾 < 𝑛.  
At the end of each period the amount 𝛾𝑅𝑡 is automatically distributed evenly among 
the group members. Formally, the returned amount is denoted by 𝑑𝑡 =  𝛾𝑅𝑡 / 𝑛. 
Tax or trust: A public goods game with enforceable and 
voluntary contributions 
9 
Individual group member 𝑖’s payoff in period 𝑡,  𝜋𝑖,𝑡, is then given by the sum of his 
remaining endowment and his share of the public good                                                                𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸 − 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡.                                                    (1) 
 
1.2.2 Experimental procedures 
24 subjects participated in each experimental session. At the start of each 
experimental session, the subjects were divided into four matching groups of six subjects 
each. All subjects only interacted with subjects of their own matching group during the 
experiment. To ensure that they would treat each period as a (quasi) one-shot game, the 
subjects were not informed that there were four matching groups per session. 
The experiment implements three treatments: (i) treatment TAX/VCM, (ii) treatment 
TAX and (iii) treatment VCM. TAX/VCM is a treatment according to the setup laid out in 
Section 2.1 with the following parameters: number of subjects 𝑛 = 3, number of periods 
𝑇 = 15, number of groups 𝐺 = 2, endowment per period 𝐸 = 25 points (the experimental 
currency unit)4, and revenue multiplier 𝛾 = 2.  
The tax payment 𝑝𝑡 is chosen separately for each period 𝑡 by each group via a median 
voting mechanism. All members of the group are asked to vote for their preferred tax 
payment 𝑣𝑖,𝑡, the implemented tax payment 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the median of all (three) 𝑣𝑖,𝑡. I will refer 
to 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 as the vote and to 𝑝𝑡 as the tax in the remaining chapter. 
TAX and VCM are two control treatments for TAX/VCM. Both implement just one of 
the stages 1 and 2. TAX implements only stage 1, so there is only the tax mechanism but 
no voluntary contribution. VCM is a standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Both 
TAX and VCM are otherwise identical to TAX/VCM. 
Information conditions are as follows: After stage 1, each individual is informed about 
the vote 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 of the other two members within his group and the resulting tax 𝑝𝑖,𝑡. After 
stage 2, each individual is informed about the contribution 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 of the other two members 
within his group. At the end of each period, each individual is informed about his 
remaining endowment 𝐸 − 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, his returned amount from the public good 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 and 
his payoff 𝜋𝑖,𝑡. No further information about decisions of other players or results of other 
groups is given. 
                                                 
4 At the end of the experiment earned points from all periods are summed up and converted into euro using 
the following exchange rate: 40 points = 1 euro. 
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The experimental sessions started with instructions on the experiments (the full text is 
in Appendix A). The instructions gave complete information about the basic setup of the 
game and the relevant parameters.5 Instructions were read aloud to ensure common 
knowledge of the rules, and subjects were given plenty of time to ask questions in private 
before the start of the first period. 
The computer-based sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory 
MELESSA of the University of Munich in August 2009 using the experimental software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004). A total of 
144 subjects, mostly undergraduate students from all disciplines, participated in six 
sessions with 24 participants each. Two sessions each implemented treatments TAX/VCM, 
TAX and VCM. The six sessions provide 8 statistically independent observations 
(matching groups) for each of the three treatments. The sessions lasted up to 90 minutes 
including everything from the instructions to final payments, and the average earnings 
were 16.80 EUR, including a show-up payment of 4.00 EUR. No participant was allowed 
to take part in more than one session, and the assignment of subjects into treatments was 
random. Decisions were taken anonymously in cubicles, and communication among 
participants was prohibited. 
 
1.3. Theoretical predictions 
In this section, I present theoretical predictions for all treatments. First, we look at 
predictions given by the homo oeconomicus model with the assumptions of purely selfish 
and rational decision makers (“standard preferences”). Second, I present theoretical 
predictions for two well-known models that include other-regarding preferences, namely 
models based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002). Finally, I 
present a simplified model of the TAX/VCM game. 
In the rest of this section, I will discuss different equilibria based on the three 
mentioned models. For the voting behavior in stage 1 the term “equilibrium” will refer to a 
trembling hand perfect equilibrium based on Selten (1975).6  
                                                 
5 With the exception described at the beginning of this sub-section. 
6 The trembling hand perfect equilibrium takes into account that there is a small chance that other group 
members might make mistakes – defined as choosing an unintended strategy. In my setting this is necessary 
to avoid equilibria with dominated voting behavior. Example: If all group members strictly prefer a desired 
tax d, then 𝑣3 = 𝑟 is an equilibrium for all 𝑟 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … ,𝐸} if 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = 𝑑, although subject 3 strictly 
prefers 𝑝 = 𝑑 over all other outcomes. However, 𝑣3 = 𝑑 is the only trembling hand perfect equilibrium, 
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1.3.1 Predictions based on standard preferences (homo oeconomicus model) 
We can look at all three treatments as (almost pure7) repeated one-shot experiments. 
First, let us look at the treatments with one decision stage. In the VCM, each participant 
will always contribute zero to the public account, because an increase of the contribution 
by 1 will lower his remaining endowment by 1 and will increase his share of the public 
good by just 2/3, resulting in a net loss of 1/3. In the TAX, each participant will always 
vote for 16. As you can see in Table 1, a tax of 16 maximizes the payoff for each 
participant. The relationship of the tax and the payoff has a single peak at 16. Combined 
with the median voting mechanism this ensures that a vote of 16 is optimal regardless of 
the votes of the other group members.8 
Now we can look at TAX/VCM and the two decision stages in this treatment. 
Assuming common knowledge of rationality and selfishness and using backward 
induction, each participant will vote for 16 in the first stage and contribute nothing in the 
second stage: 
In the second stage, the logic used in the discussion of the VCM holds regardless of 
the tax in the first stage, resulting in a contribution of zero. Therefore, the first stage can be 
treated like the TAX treatment above, resulting in a vote of 16. 
 
Proposition 1. Under standard preferences, participants a) contribute zero in the VCM 
and the second stage of TAX/VCM and b) vote for 16 in the TAX and the first stage of 
TAX/VCM. 
                                                                                                                                                    
because now subject 3 assigns a small probability to the outcome were subjects 1 or 2 mistakenly do not vote 
for 𝑑. Assuming that mistakes are possible in this setting also makes sense in practice because subjects type 
their choices into keyboards. 
7 See also Fehr and Gächter (2000a), footnote 3. Even if future periods play a role in the decision making, the 
predictions are unchanged. 
8 We can proof this by looking at all possible combinations of the votes of the other two group members: 
a) If at least one of the other two group members votes 16, a vote of 16 implements the optimal tax of 
16.  
b) If one of the two members has a vote strictly higher than 16 and the other member has a vote strictly 
lower than 16, a vote of 16 implements the optimal tax of 16.  
c) If both other group members have a vote strictly below 16, a vote of 16 implements the tax that 
equals the higher vote of the other group members. Because the payoff is strictly increasing in the 
tax as long as the tax is below 16, this is the best result that is achievable given the other votes. 
d) If both other group members have a vote strictly above 16, a vote of 16 implements the tax that 
equals the lower vote of the other group members. Because the payoff is strictly decreasing in the 
tax as long as the tax is above 16, this is the best result that is achievable given the other votes. 
Tax or trust: A public goods game with enforceable and 
voluntary contributions 
12 
Table 1: Tax payments, taxation costs, public good payments and remaining 
endowments in stage 1 
Tax 
payment 
(p) 
Total tax 
payments 
(P) 
Marginal 
costs per 
subject 
Total costs of 
taxation (K) 
R = P 
- K 
d Remaining 
endowment 
Payoff 
d + 
RE 
0 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 
1 3 0.03 0.09 2.91 1.94 24 25.94 
2 6 0.06 0.27 5.73 3.82 23 26.82 
3 9 0.09 0.54 8.46 5.64 22 27.64 
4 12 0.12 0.90 11.10 7.40 21 28.40 
5 15 0.15 1.35 13.65 9.10 20 29.10 
6 18 0.18 1.89 16.11 10.74 19 29.74 
7 21 0.21 2.52 18.48 12.32 18 30.32 
8 24 0.24 3.24 20.76 13.84 17 30.84 
9 27 0.27 4.05 22.95 15.30 16 31.30 
10 30 0.30 4.95 25.05 16.70 15 31.70 
11 33 0.33 5.94 27.06 18.04 14 32.04 
12 36 0.36 7.02 28.98 19.32 13 32.32 
13 39 0.39 8.19 30.81 20.54 12 32.54 
14 42 0.42 9.45 32.55 21.70 11 32.70 
15 45 0.45 10.80 34.20 22.80 10 32.80 
16 48 0.48 12.24 35.76 23.84 9 32.84 
17 51 0.51 13.77 37.23 24.82 8 32.82 
18 54 0.54 15.39 38.61 25.74 7 32.74 
19 57 0.57 17.10 39.90 26.60 6 32.60 
20 60 0.60 18.90 41.10 27.40 5 32.40 
21 63 0.63 20.79 42.21 28.14 4 32.14 
22 66 0.66 22.77 43.23 28.82 3 31.82 
23 69 0.69 24.84 44.16 29.44 2 31.44 
24 72 0.72 27.00 45.00 30.00 1 31.00 
25 75 0.75 29.25 45.75 30.50 0 30.50 
 
Tax or trust: A public goods game with enforceable and 
voluntary contributions 
13 
1.3.2 Predictions based on other-regarding preferences 
We focus on two prominent models that both belong to the class of outcome-based 
social preference models: the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) and the welfare-oriented model by Charness and Rabin (Charness and 
Rabin, 2002). 
 
1.3.2.1 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences 
The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumes that subjects suffer from inequity 
within their reference group. More precisely, a subject 𝑖 benefits from his own payoff 𝜋𝑖 
but compares it with the payoff of the 𝑛 − 1 other members in his reference group. The 
corresponding utility function is the following:         𝑈𝑖(𝜋) = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 1𝑛 − 1�max�𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖 , 0�
𝑗≠𝑖
− 𝛽𝑖
1
𝑛 − 1�max�𝜋𝑖 − 𝜋𝑗 , 0�          (2)
𝑗≠𝑖
 
The vector 𝜋 = (𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) denotes the monetary payoffs and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent 
subject 𝑖’s individual attitude towards inequity. The two weights are restricted to 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 
and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. They control for the impact of utility losses from disadvantageous 
inequity (𝛼𝑖) and advantageous inequity (𝛽𝑖), respectively.
9  
In the VCM, for given j and k, the utility maximizing contribution is (𝑐𝑖) =(min�𝑐𝑗 , 𝑐𝑘�) if 1/3 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 and (𝑐𝑖) = 0 if 𝛽𝑖 < 1/3. The monetary loss of a positive 
contribution is 1/3 per contributed point. If the maximum utility loss by advantageous 
inequality represented by 𝛽𝑖 is below this threshold, a contribution of zero is maximizing 
utility – subject 𝑖 is a free-rider. If this utility loss is above the threshold, subject 𝑖 can 
increase his utility by contributing positive amounts up to the minimum contribution of the 
other group members. In this case, subject 𝑖 is a weak conditional cooperator. However, he 
will never want to contribute more than this minimum, because the gain of decreasing 
advantageous inequality with the high contributor will at least be canceled out by the loss 
of increasing disadvantageous inequality with the low contributor (𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖).  
 There are two types of equilibria: If  1/3 ≤ 𝛽𝑖  holds for all group members, then 
every combination of identical contributions (𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all i) is an equilibrium. If 𝛽𝑖 <1/3 holds for at least one group member, the only equilibrium is the contribution of zero 
(𝑐𝑖 = 0 for all i) by all group members. 
                                                 
9 Note that for 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 = 0 the model collapses into the case of standard preferences. 
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In the TAX, the Fehr and Schmidt preferences case collapses into the standard 
preferences case with an optimal vote of 16. There is no inequality, because by design all 
group members pay the same tax and get the same payoff. Therefore, payoff maximization 
is the optimal strategy. Consequently, the only equilibrium is 𝑣𝑖 = 16 for all group 
members. 
Now we get to the TAX/VCM. For any given tax in stage 1, the discussion above 
about the VCM holds for stage 2. If  1/3 ≤ 𝛽𝑖  holds for all group members, then every 
combination of identical positive contributions (𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all i) and identical votes up to 
2310 (𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣 ≤ 23 for all i) is an equilibrium, as long as the payoff for each subject is 
above the threshold of 32.84 (tax of 16, no contributions). If 𝛽𝑖 < 1/3 for at least one 
group member, all group members contribute nothing in the VCM stage as shown above. 
Therefore, the first stage can be played as if there is no second stage. By backwards 
induction, the only equilibrium is the contribution of zero (𝑐𝑖 = 0 for all i) and identical 
vote of 16 (𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣 = 16) for all i) by all group members. 
 
Proposition 2. With Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences, subject i is willing to contribute 
positive amounts in the VCM if 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 1/3. If 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 1/3 for all group members identical 
contributions (𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all i) is an equilibrium, else (𝑐𝑖 = 0 for all i) is the only 
equilibrium. In the TAX (𝑣𝑖 = 16 for all i) is the only equilibrium. In the TAX/VCM there 
are multiple equilibria. 
 
1.3.2.2 Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences 
Charness and Rabin (2002) assume that subjects care about their own individual well-
being and about social welfare. Their model includes a subject’s own payoff and, 
additionally, two components of social welfare: the minimum payoff in a group (the 
“Rawlsian” motive) and the sum of all group members’ payoffs (the efficiency concern). 
More precisely, the utility function in their general model (see their Appendix 1) with only 
outcome-based components looks as follows:11         𝑈𝑖(𝜋) = (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜋𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖[𝛿𝑖 min(𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) + (1 − 𝛿𝑖)(𝜋1 + 𝜋2 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝑛)]         (3) 
                                                 
10 𝑣 > 16 can be considered an impractical equilibrium, because it requires that a welfare loss in stage 1 is 
compensated by an increasing contribution in stage 2. 
11 Note that we consider here only the outcome-based version of the model and neglect the role of intentions 
as the more complex model with intentions does not seem suitable for deriving specific predictions in my 
setup. 
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The vector 𝜋 = (𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) denotes the monetary payoffs within the group of 𝑛 
subjects and 𝜆𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖 are individual weights (i.e. 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛿𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]). The first weight, 𝜆𝑖, 
captures how much an individual cares for social welfare relative to his own payoff.12 The 
second weight, 𝛿𝑖, controls for the influence of the “maximin”-aspect relative to the 
general efficiency concern. 
As in the previous part, I start with a look at the treatments with one decision stage. In 
the VCM the optimal contribution for subject 𝑖 depends on 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖. If subject 𝑖 strongly 
cares about general efficiency and 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿𝑖) he wants to contribute everything. I 
refer to these subjects as strong cooperators. If subject 𝑖 strongly cares about the maximin-
aspects and 1/(4 − 4 𝛿𝑖) >  𝜆𝑖 ≥ 1/(4 −  𝛿𝑖) he wants to contribute as much as the higher 
contribution of the other two group members. These subjects are strong conditional 
cooperators. If subject 𝑖 cares mostly about his own payoff and 1/(4 −  𝛿𝑖) >  𝜆𝑖, he wants 
to contribute nothing and is labeled as a free-rider. 
Intuitively, an increase of 𝑐𝑖 by 1 decreases 𝜋𝑖 by 1/3, increases (𝜋1 + 𝜋2 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝑛) 
by 1, and increases min(𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) by 2/3 if another group members contributes more but 
decreases min(𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) by 1/3 if no other group member contributes more. 
As a result, there are different equilibria based on the distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖. All 
possible equilibria are shown in Table 2.  
In the TAX, the Charness and Rabin preferences case collapses into the standard 
preferences case with an optimal vote of 16. There is no inequality, because by design all 
group members pay the same tax and get the same payoff. As a result, the “maximin”-
aspect does not matter. Since the general efficiency concern is perfectly correlated with the 
individual payoff, individual payoff maximization is the optimal strategy. Consequently, 
the only equilibrium is 𝑣𝑖 = 16 for all group members. 
In the TAX/VCM it is obvious via backwards induction that for any given tax in stage 
1, the discussion above about the VCM holds for stage 2. Different distributions of  
𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖 lead to a wide variety of equilibria in stage 1: 
 
                                                 
12 For 𝜆𝑖 = 0, the Charness and Rabin (2002) model nests standard preferences. 
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Table 2: Distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖 and resulting equilibria in VCM with Charness and 
Rabin (2002) preferences 
Distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖 Resulting equilibria 
𝜆1 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿1),  𝜆2 ≥ 1/(4 − 𝛿2), 
𝜆3 ≥ 1/(4 −  𝛿3) 𝑐1 = 𝐸, 𝑐2 = 𝐸, 𝑐3 = 𝐸 
𝜆1 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿1),  𝜆2 ≥ 1/(4 − 𝛿2),  1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 𝑐1 = 𝐸, 𝑐2 = 𝐸, 𝑐3 = 0 
𝜆1 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿1),  1/(4 − 𝛿2) >  𝜆2,  1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 𝑐1 = 𝐸, 𝑐2 = 0, 𝑐3 = 0  1/(4 − 𝛿1) >  𝜆1,  1/(4 − 𝛿2) >  𝜆2,  1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 𝑐1 = 0, 𝑐2 = 0, 𝑐3 = 0  1/(4 − 4 𝛿1) >  𝜆1 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿1),  1/(4 − 4 𝛿2) >  𝜆2 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿2),   1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 
𝑐1 = 𝑐2,  𝑐3 = 0 
 1/(4 − 4 𝛿1) >  𝜆1 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿1),  1/(4 − 4 𝛿2) >  𝜆2 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿2),   1/(4 − 4 𝛿3) >  𝜆3 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿3),   
𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3  
 
First, if all group members care enough about maxi-min and general efficiency 
consideration to be strong cooperators, they will contribute their entire remaining 
endowment in stage 2. Because contributions in stage 2 are more efficient than tax 
payments in stage 1 (due to the costs of implementing the tax mechanism), the resulting 
equilibrium is  𝑣𝑖 = 0 for all group members (Table 3, line 1). 
Second, if individual preferences within groups are polarized – meaning that some 
group members are free-riders who contribute nothing and some group members are strong 
cooperators who contribute the entire remaining endowment in stage 2 – this will be 
reflected in the votes. In Line 2 you can see the case in which the first two group members 
contribute everything. The third group member now prefers a tax rate of zero, because he 
wants to profit from the full contribution of the first two group members in stage 2. 
However, the first two group members prefer a non-zero tax rate because they want to 
force subject 3 to at least pay some taxes. Line 3 shows the case in which only the first 
group member contributes the full remaining endowment. Similar to the case above, the 
second and third group member contribute nothing and are therefore interested in a lower 
Tax or trust: A public goods game with enforceable and 
voluntary contributions 
17 
tax rate. Note that they nevertheless prefer a non-zero tax rate because they gain more by 
forcing each other to pay taxes than they cost themselves by having to pay them. 
Third, if all group members are free-riders, they will not contribute anything in stage 
2. Therefore the resulting equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium in TAX,  𝑣𝑖 = 16 for 
all group members (Table 3, line 4). 
In the previous cases, groups are dominated by a majority of a combination of strong 
cooperators and free-riders. As a result, all group members contribute either everything or 
nothing in stage 2. These cases predict a clear negative relationship between tax payments 
and contributions. From line 1 to 4 the tax payment goes up while the share of contributors 
and consequently the contributions go down. Counterintuitively, within a group, these 
cases predict a positive relationship between votes and contributions (lines 2 and 3).  
Finally, if the strong conditional cooperators form a majority, there can be many 
equilibria for each combination of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖. We can see this in lines 5 and 6. I will 
illustrate the intuition based on the case in line 6, where all group members are in the 
intermediate category. Because all group members contribute the same amount in stage 2, 
all members will get identical payoffs. Therefore, the maximization of the individual 
payoffs maximizes the utility. Now most possible tax payments can be supported as an 
equilibrium. Examples: 
If 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 𝑅𝐸 for all 𝑝, then 𝑝 = 0 is an equilibrium, 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = 𝑣3 = 0. 
If 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 𝑟, 𝑟 ∈ {16 − 𝑠, 16 − 𝑠 + 1, … , 25 − 𝑠} for all 𝑝 ≤ 𝑠 < 16 and 𝑐1 =
𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 0 all 𝑝 > 𝑠, 𝑝 = 𝑠 is an equilibrium, 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = 𝑣3 = 𝑠. 
If 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 0 for all 𝑝, then 𝑝 = 16 is an equilibrium, 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = 𝑣3 = 16. 
If 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 𝑅𝐸 for 𝑝 = 𝑛 and 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 0 for 𝑝 ≠ 𝑛 and 𝑛 ≤ 23, 𝑝 = 𝑛  is an 
equilibrium, 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = 𝑣3 = 𝑛. For all 𝑛 > 16, this type of equilibrium can be considered 
an impractical equilibrium, because it requires that a welfare loss in stage 1 is compensated 
by an increasing contribution in stage 2.13 
 
                                                 
13 In other words, lowering taxes while maintaining the contribution increase the welfare for everybody.  
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Table 3: Distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖 and resulting equilibria in TAX/VCM with Charness and 
Rabin (2002) preferences 
Line  Distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖 Resulting 
equilibria in 
stage 2 
(VCM) 
Resulting 
equilibria in 
stage 1 (TAX) 
Resulting tax 
payment 
1 𝜆1 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿1),  𝜆2 ≥ 1/(4 − 𝛿2), 
 𝜆3 ≥ 1/(4 −  𝛿3) 
𝑐1 = 𝑅𝐸, 
𝑐2 = 𝑅𝐸, 
𝑐3 = 𝑅𝐸 
𝑣1 = 0, 
𝑣2 = 0, 𝑣3 = 0 𝑝 = 0  
2 𝜆1 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿1),  𝜆2 ≥ 1/(4 − 𝛿2), 
  1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 
𝑐1 = 𝑅𝐸, 
𝑐2 = 𝑅𝐸, 
𝑐3 = 0 
𝑣1 = 5 − 8, 
𝑣2 = 5 − 11,  
𝑣3 = 0 − 0,  
𝑝 = 5 − 8  
3 𝜆1 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿1),  1/(4 − 𝛿2) >  𝜆2, 
  1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 
𝑐1 = 𝑅𝐸, 
𝑐2 = 0, 
𝑐3 = 0 
𝑣1 = 11 − 16, 
𝑣2 = 5 − 11, 
𝑣3 = 5 − 11 
𝑝 = 5 − 11  
4  1/(4 − 4 𝛿1) >  𝜆1,  1/(4 − 𝛿2) >  𝜆2, 
  1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 
𝑐1 = 0, 
𝑐2 = 0, 
𝑐3 = 0 
𝑣1 = 16, 
𝑣2 = 16, 
𝑣3 = 16 
𝑝 = 16  
5  1/(4 − 4 𝛿1) > 𝜆1 ≥ 1/(4 − 𝛿1), 
  1/(4 − 4 𝛿2) > 𝜆2 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿2),  
  1/(4 −  𝛿3) >  𝜆3 
𝑐1 = 𝑐2,  
𝑐3 = 0 𝑣1 = 0 − 23, 𝑣2 = 0 − 23, 
𝑣3 = 0 − 23, 
𝑝 = 0 − 23  
6  1/(4 − 4 𝛿1) > 𝜆1 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿1),  1/(4 − 4 𝛿2) > 𝜆2 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿2),   1/(4 − 4 𝛿3) > 𝜆3 ≥ 1(4 − 𝛿2),   
𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3  𝑣1 = 0 − 23, 
𝑣2 = 0 − 23, 
𝑣3 = 0 − 23, 
𝑝 = 0 − 23  
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Proposition 3. With Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences, in the VCM subject i is 
willing to contribute his full endowment if 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 1/(4 − 4 𝛿𝑖) and up to his full endowment 
based on the other group members if 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 1/(4 −  𝛿𝑖). In the TAX (𝑣𝑖 = 16 for all i) is the 
only equilibrium. In the TAX/VCM there are multiple equilibria, in stage 1 tax payments 
vary between 0 and 16, in stage 2 contribution vary between zero and the full remaining 
endowment. Tax payments in stage 1 and contributions in stage 2 tend to be negatively 
correlated, votes in stage 1 and contributions in stage 2 tend to be positively correlated. 
 
All models predict the same behavior for the TAX treatment, because by design the 
payoffs are equal for all group members and self-regarding and other-regarding 
preferences are perfectly correlated. For the VCM treatment, standard preferences predict 
contribution of zero but other-regarding preferences can support positive contributions. In 
this case the contribution of a single player can be influenced by the contribution of the 
other players. For the TAX/VCM treatment, standard preferences collapse into a simple 
combination of unrelated TAX (payoff maximization) and VCM (zero contribution) 
treatments. Other-regarding preferences can support different equilibria with lower tax 
payments and higher contribution compared to the standard preferences.  
 
1.3.2.3 A simple model of a basic TAX/VCM game 
With both Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences, 
there are several equilibria in which individuals want to contribute as much as other group 
members. For these conditional cooperators their contribution in the second stage crucially 
depends on their expectation of the other’s contributions. To shed some light on the 
possible impact of this feature let us look at a simplified model of the TAX/VCM game: 
Consider first a VCM game with three players. Each player simultaneously determines his 
contribution, either the high contribution c  or the low contribution c . There are two types 
of players. Both types are conditional coordinators, but they differ in their expectations on 
the behavior of other players. Players of type H expect other players to contribute c , while 
players of type L expect others to contribute c . Let p be the fraction of players from type 
H. The payoffs are identical for both types and are given by Table 4.  
It is obvious that the share of players who will contribute c  is p, the others (1-p) will 
contribute c . 
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Table 4: Payoffs in the basic game 
 
Contribution of others 
 
player 2 high high low low 
 
player 3 high low high low 
Own 
contribution 
high 3 0 0 0 
low 1 1 1 1 
 
Now consider an extension to a two stage game with three players. In stage 1, a 
majority decision determines one of two tax payments, either the high tax t  or the low tax 
t . In stage 2, the VCM game is played. If t  is chosen, all players get an additional payoff 
of 1 and have to choose c  in the VCM game, therefore everybody gets a payoff of 2. If t  
is chosen, the VCM game as described above is played in stage 2 and determines the 
payoffs.  
Players of type H expect a payoff of 3 from the VCM game and accordingly vote for t
; players of type L expect a payoff of 1 from the VCM game and accordingly vote for t . 
Let us further assume that players learn from the behavior of others and change their belief 
(and their type) if they observe that both other players act in accordance with the other 
belief. 
This setup leads to following results: The share of groups that go for t  and 
consequently contribute { c , c , c } is (
32 23 pp − ), the other groups choose t . The 
contribution in the groups is polarized, either all members contribute c  or everybody 
contributes c . The relation of contributions of c  between the VCM game and the 
TAX/VCM game depends on p. If 1 > p > 1/2, the introduction of the tax stage raises the 
share of contributions of c , if 1/2 > p > 0 the introduction of the tax stage lowers the share 
of contributions of c . 
In summary, this model predicts that if the share of votes for high taxes in the 
TAX/VCM is above 1/2, there are more low contributions in the TAX/VCM than in the 
VCM. If the share of votes for high taxes in the TAX/VCM is below 1/2, there are more 
high contributions in the TAX/VCM than in the VCM. Despite the global relationship 
between votes and contributions, the model also predicts that within a group the vote in 
stage 1 does not have predictive power for the contribution in stage 2. 
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1.4. Experimental results 
In Section 1.4.1 I start with a comparison of votes, tax payments, contributions and 
profits between the three treatments. Finally, analysis on the behavior on the individual 
level in the TAX/VCM is presented in Section 1.4.2. The analysis on the matching group 
level is discussed in the Appendix B.1. 
Let me define the variables discussed in this section. 
Vote: The preferred tax chosen by subject 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
Tax payment: The implemented tax in a group in period 𝑡. 
Contribution: The voluntary contribution by subject 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
Profit: The difference between the realized payoff for by subject 𝑖 and the endowment 
E in period 𝑡. 
Total expenditures: The sum of the implemented tax payment and the voluntary 
contribution by subject 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
 
1.4.1 Votes, tax payments, contributions and profits 
Let me start with a look at the aggregate result for votes, tax payments, contributions 
and profits in Table 5. The first two rows show the mean votes and the mean tax payments 
for TAX and VCM/TAX. The votes and tax payments in TAX/VCM are lower than in 
TAX. The difference is both large (more than 7 points on average) and highly significant 
(p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 16)14 for both votes and tax payments. The profits – 
defined as the total payoff minus the initial endowment – for both treatments are shown in 
the third row. The profits in the TAX/VCM are higher, again the difference is large (about 
4 points on average) and highly significant (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 16). The 
next two rows compare VCM and TAX/VCM. In row 5 you can see that the contributions 
are quite similar, the difference is just 0.22 on average and not significant (p = 0.46, Mann-
Whitney U-test, N = 16). The sixth  row shows that the profits in TAX/VCM are higher 
than in VCM by more than 4 points on average and that the difference is weakly significant 
(p < 0.1, Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 16). 
  
                                                 
14 All tests in this chapter are two-sided tests unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. 
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Table 5: Mean votes, tax payments, voluntary contributions and profits (in points) by 
treatment 
 VCM TAX TAX/VCM 
Votes - 16.11 8.96*** 
Tax payments - 16.03 8.40*** 
Profits - 7.82 11.74*** 
 Total expenditures - 16.03 15.51*** 
Voluntary contributions 7.32 - 7.10 
Profits 7.32 - 11.74* 
Total expenditures 7.32 - 15.51 
Note: Difference between TAX/VCM and other treatment significant at: *** 1% level; ** 
5% level; * 10% level.  
 
The fourth and last rows illuminate the causes of the higher profits in the TAX/VCM 
by listing the mean average total expenditure for the public good in all treatments. The 
total expenditure in the TAX/VCM is higher than in the VCM, as the former adds tax 
expenditures to the similar contributions. The total expenditure in the TAX/VCM is not 
significantly different (but a tad lower on average) from the total expenditure in TAX. 
However, nearly half of the total expenditure in TAX/VCM comes in the form of costless 
contributions that are more efficient than the additional costly tax expenditures in TAX.15 
Although the average profit in TAX is a little higher than in VCM, the significance of 
the difference to the average profit in TAX/VCM is way higher. This is caused by the fact 
that the variance in the profits for VCM (mean: 7.32, std. dev.: 3.50) is a lot higher than in 
TAX (mean: 7.82, std. dev.: 0.04) and the variance in TAX/VCM is also sizeable (mean: 
11.74, std. dev.: 3.61). 
The results for the size and significance of the differences in tax payments, 
contributions and profits between the treatments in the OLS regression in Tables 7, 8 and 9 
is similar to the non-parametric tests above. Model 1 in each Table shows a simple OLS 
regression that includes a dummy variable that is 1 for the TAX/VCM treatment and 0 for 
the respective other treatment. 
 
Result 1. Mean profits in TAX/VCM are significantly higher than in TAX and VCM. The 
total expenditures for TAX/VCM are higher than in VCM and more efficient than in TAX.  
                                                 
15 This effect is pronounced because the voluntary contributions effectively replace the very costly 
contributions just below the threshold of 16. 
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Table 6: Contributions in TAX/VCM (OLS regression) 
 Dependent variable: 
contribution 
 
 Model 1   
Tax up to 16 -0.766*** 
(0.047) 
  
Tax over 16 0.086 
(0.077) 
  
Constant 
 
13.180*** 
(0.565) 
  
# Observations 720   
R² 0.33   
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The average contribution in TAX/VCM is basically identical to the average 
contribution in VCM, the difference is just 0.22. The average tax payment in the 
TAX/VCM is 8.40, resulting in an average crowding out of below 3%. However, that does 
not mean that there is no marginal crowding out. Table 6 reports a simple regression for all 
720 individual contribution decisions in the TAX/VCM.  
I divide the tax payments into two variables. The first variables includes all tax 
payments up to 16, the second variable includes all tax payments over 16. Because tax 
payments over 16 are dominated by tax payments of 16 if contributions are constant, the 
effect of marginally increased tax rates above 16 might be different.  
The results show a highly significant negative marginal impact of the tax up to 16, 
resulting in a marginal crowding out of 77%. Tax rates over 16 do not have a significant 
effect on contributions. The contribution for a tax rate of zero (the constant in the 
regression) is 13.18, about 5.86 points higher than the average contribution in the VCM. 
This implies that there are two opposing effects. The existence of the tax mechanism 
increases contributions while taxation has a negative marginal effect on contributions. 
According to the regression result, a tax of 7.65 would result in a contribution of 7.32, the 
average in the VCM. The average tax rate in the TAX/VCM is a little higher – 8.40 – 
resulting in just a small net effect of taxation on contributions.  
A possible effect of the introduction of an additional tax mechanism is the creation of 
a focal point, a “clue to co-ordination”, following Schelling (1960). A natural focal point 
for the total expenditure is 16, the optimal tax rate in the TAX. 
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Figure 1: Frequency of total expenditures in TAX/VCM (720 total) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency of contributions in TAX/VCM and VCM (720 total each) 
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Figure 1 shows the frequency of total expenditures in the TAX/VCM. There is no 
strong focal point effect that leads to total expenditures of 16. (There seems to be a strong 
focal point effect for all numbers that are multiples of 5, see also Figure 2). 
We can also look at the distribution of contributions in the TAX/VCM and VCM. 
Figure 2 shows the frequency of different contributions. There are more zero contributions 
in the VCM (252 of 720) than in the TAX/VCM (217 of 720)16. The difference is 
significant (p < 0.05, Pearson’s chi-squared test). 
There are about three times as many contributions of the full remaining endowment in 
the TAX/VCM (122 of 720)17 as in the VCM (40 of 720). The difference is highly 
significant (p < 0.001, Pearson’s chi-squared test). Even if we restrict the analysis to the 
maximum possible contribution of 25, we can find more of them in the TAX/VCM (61 of 
720) than in the VCM (40 of 720), although there are only 147 instances of a tax of zero 
that permits a maximum contribution. The difference is significant (p < 0.05, Pearson’s 
chi-squared test). 
The tax mechanism in stage 1 leads to more full and maximum and less zero 
contributions. More than 75% and therefore substantially more than 1/2 of the total votes 
in stage 1 of the TAX/VAM are cast for a tax payment below 16. Therefore, the change in 
the contribution pattern in stage 2 is exactly as predicted by the simple model in 1.3.2.3. 
 
Result 2. The implementation of the additional tax mechanism results on average in just a 
negligible crowding out of voluntary contributions. This is caused by the combination of a 
positive level effect and a negative marginal effect of taxation. 
 
The next step is to analyze time trends in the different treatments. Figure 3 shows the 
mean tax payments for the TAX and TAX/VCM treatments over time. The graph for the 
TAX treatment is very flat at about 16, while the TAX/VCM graph is more volatile and 
hovers between 7 and 10, albeit without an obvious time trend. The regressions in Table 7 
support this conclusion. There is neither a general time trend (model 2) nor a difference 
between time trends between both treatments (model 3). 
                                                 
16 Note that there is one group that implements a tax of 25, resulting in zero remaining endowment in the 
contribution stage. I count these group members as contributing zero. 
17 Note that there is one group that implements a tax of 25, resulting in zero remaining endowment in the 
contribution stage. I do not count these group members as contributing the full remaining endowment. 
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Table 7: Tax payments in TAX and TAX/VCM (OLS regressions) 
 Dependent variable: tax 
payment 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
TAX/VCM dummy -7.621*** 
(1.955) 
-7.621*** 
(1.897) 
-7.199*** 
(2.410) 
Period 
 
- -0.059 
(0.073) 
-0.032 
(0.023) 
Period * TAX/VCM 
dummy 
- - -0.053 
(0.146) 
Constant 
 
16.025*** 
(0.072) 
16.495*** 
(0.583) 
16.284*** 
(0.148) 
# Observations 16 240 240 
R² 0.52 0.45 0.45 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group level for model 2 and 
3). 
 
 
Table 8: Contributions in VCM and TAX/VCM (OLS regressions) 
 Dependent variable: 
contribution 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
TAX/VCM dummy -0.218 
(2.343) 
-0.218 
(2.273) 
-1.545 
(3.028) 
Period 
 
- -0.267*** 
(0.089) 
-0.350** 
(0.128) 
Period * TAX/VCM 
dummy 
- - 0.166 
(0.173) 
Constant 
 
7.322*** 
(1.236) 
9.460*** 
(1.646) 
10.124*** 
(2.007) 
# Observations 16 240 240 
R² 0.00 0.05 0.05 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group level for model 2 and 
3). 
 
Figure 4 depicts the contribution in VCM and TAX/VCM over time. The two graphs 
are overlapping and show an obvious decreasing trend. The graphs start between 8 and 10 
in the first periods and fall to around 5 for the final periods. The regressions presented in 
Table 8 show that there is a highly significant time trend of about -0.3 points per period 
(model 2) and that there is no significant difference for the time trend between the 
treatments (model 3).  
 
Tax or trust: A public goods game with enforceable and 
voluntary contributions 
27 
Table 9: Profits in TAX, VCM and TAX/VCM (OLS regressions) 
 Dependent variable: 
profit 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
TAX/VCM dummy 3.926*** 
(1.225) 
3.926*** 
(1.226) 
5.666*** 
(1.385) 
5.666*** 
(1.385) 
VCM dummy -0.497 
(1.185) 
-0.497 
(1.186) 
2.307 
(1.986) 
2.307 
(1.986) 
Period 
 
- -0.189*** 
(0.056) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.217 
(0.065) 
Period * TAX/VCM 
dummy 
- - -0.218*** 
(0.065) 
- 
Period * VCM dummy - - -0.350** 
(0.126) 
-0.133 
(0.142) 
Period * TAX dummy - - - 0.218*** 
(0.065) 
Constant 
 
7.819*** 
(0.012) 
9.332*** 
(0.449) 
7.817*** 
(0.012) 
7.817*** 
(0.012) 
# Observations 360 360 360 360 
R² 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.32 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on matching group level for model 2 and 
3). 
 
The development of tax payments and contribution over time is reflected in the 
development of profits that you can see in Figure 5. The profits in TAX are flat while the 
profits for VCM and TAX/VCM are falling over time – parallel to the contributions in 
these treatments. Consequently, profits in TAX are better relative to the other two 
treatments in later periods. The profits in VCM are higher than in TAX in each of the first 
five periods and lower starting from period 6. The profits in TAX/VCM start more than 
five points higher than in TAX during the early rounds but are just one to three points 
above for the last rounds. The OLS regressions in Table 9 confirm these points. Profits fall 
on average (model 2). However, this result is entirely driven by decreasing profits in VCM 
and TAX/VCM (model 3), profits in TAX remain nearly constant over time. The 
difference between the negative time trends in VCM and TAX/VCM is not significant 
(Model 4). 
 
Result 3. Contributions decrease over time in both the VCM and TAX/VCM. Tax payments 
do not show a time trend in TAX and TAX/VCM. Correspondently, profits in VCM and 
TAX/VCM fall over time whereas profits in TAX are steady. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of mean tax payments in TAX and TAX/VCM 
  
 
Figure 4: Evolution of mean contributions in VCM and TAX/VCM 
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Figure 5: Evolution of mean profits in TAX, VCM and TAX/VCM 
    
 
1.4.2 Analyzing behavior in the TAX/VCM on the individual level 
To get a better idea what exactly is happening in the TAX/VCM, Table 10 presents 
analysis on the individual behavior of subjects. Subjects have to make two decisions per 
period, one about the vote and one about the contribution. The OLS regression considers 
the available information from the current and the preceding period.18 The regression is 
therefore limited to periods 2-15. 
The vote is significantly influenced by three variables: The vote in the previous round, 
the tax payment in the previous round and the contribution by the other group members in 
the previous round. The significantly positive impact of the own previous vote indicates 
that there are stable underlying preferences for the voting decision. The positive influence 
of the previous tax payment can be interpreted as an (Bayesian) adjustment to the 
(assumed) preferences of the other subjects. The negative impact of the average 
contribution of the other group members in the previous rounds supports the idea of 
strategic voting to give the other group members more or less room for their contributions. 
The regression does not show a significant time trend. 
                                                 
18 Considering additional preceding periods does not qualitatively change the results. 
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The contribution of a given period is influenced by both the preceding period and the 
results during stage 1 of the current period, as you can see in the second column of Table 
10. The largest impact comes from the own contribution of the previous period. This result 
is in line with the prediction from the Charness and Rabin (2002) model that stable 
underlying preferences strongly influence the decision making. The average contribution 
of the other group members and the tax payment in the previous period also have a highly 
significant positive effect on the contribution. This conforms to the notion of both weak 
conditional cooperators from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and the strong conditional 
cooperators from Charness and Rabin (2002), if one assumes that prior observed 
contributions of other group members positively influence the expectation of future 
contributions.  The results of stage 1 also impact the decision in stage 2. The tax payment – 
both for taxes up to 16 and for taxes above 16 – has a strong negative influence on the 
contribution, as predicted by Charness and Rabin (2002). The own vote does not have a 
direct statistical impact on the contribution, in accordance with the simple model but 
different from the prediction from the Charness and Rabin (2002) model.  
The most interesting result from a behavioral view is that subjects who cast the 
decisive vote in stage 1 contribute significantly more during stage 2.19  The effect is worth 
nearly a full point, as you can see in the first regression on the contribution in Table 10. 
There are several conceivable explanations for this effect. One reasonable explanation is 
that subjects increase their contribution to compensate for their responsibility for lower 
profits via the tax mechanism. This explanation is supported by the data. In the second 
contribution regression I have added the “difference to tax maximization” variable. This 
variable captures for all subjects with decisive votes the positive difference between their 
own vote and their hypothetical vote that would have resulted in the highest profit from the 
tax mechanism.20 You can find analysis of further conceivable explanations for this 
behavior in Appendix B.2. 
                                                 
19 This result is also in line with result 6 in Sutter at. al. (2010), p. 1557. 
20 Examples: 
If the own vote is 10 and the high vote of the other group members is 10, the difference to tax maximization 
is 0.  
If the own vote is 10 and the high vote of the other group members is 15, the difference to tax maximization 
is 5. 
If the own vote is 10 and the high vote of the other group members is 20, the difference to tax maximization 
is 6, because a tax of 16 maximizes the payoff from the tax mechanism.  
If the own vote is 20 and the high vote of the other group members is 25, the difference to tax maximization 
is 0.  
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Table 10: Votes and contributions in TAX/VCM (periods 2-15, OLS regressions) 
  Dependent variable:  
 Vote Contribution, 
Model 1 
Contribution, 
Model 2 
 
Period 
 
-0.030 
(0.048) 
-0.091* 
(0.045) 
-0.084* 
(0.045) 
 
Tax up to 16 - -0.419*** 
(0.068) 
-0.392*** 
(0.068) 
 
Tax over 16 - -0.442*** 
(0.142) 
-0.428*** 
(0.143) 
 
Vote 
 
- -0.015 
(0.043) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
 
Tax payment=Vote 
dummy 
- 0.926** 
(0.407) 
0.312 
(0.374) 
 
Difference to tax 
maximization 
- - 0.165** 
(0.070) 
 
Vote (t-1) 
 
0.545*** 
(0.060) 
- -  
Contribution (t-1) -0.072 
(0.044) 
0.591*** 
(0.061) 
0.596*** 
(0.060) 
 
Avg. contribution of 
other group members 
(t-1) 
-0.092** 
(0.046) 
0.249*** 
(0.055) 
0.251*** 
(0.056) 
 
Tax payment (t-1) 0.155** 
(0.071) 
0.356*** 
(0.081) 
0.348*** 
(0.080) 
 
Constant 
 
4.220*** 
(0.951) 
1.920 
(1.483) 
1.515 
(1.496) 
 
# Observations 672 672 672  
R² 0.52 0.64 0.65  
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on subject level). 
 
1.5. Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter I present a modified public goods game and analyze the results of the 
implementation in a laboratory setting. In the modified game, there are two funding 
mechanisms for a public account – a costly tax mechanism and a cost-free voluntary 
contribution mechanism. The tax mechanism is controlled by a voting of all group 
members. After the tax payment is established, each group member can voluntarily 
contribute to the public account. The public account is multiplied by an efficiency factor 
larger than one and distributed equally among all group members.  
I provide four main empirical results: First, the additional funding mechanism leads to 
higher average profits than in the appropriate control treatments in which there is only one 
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funding mechanism each. Second, the negative time trend that occurs in the standard 
voluntary contribution mechanism also exists in the modified game with two funding 
mechanisms. Third, the voting and contribution decisions are strongly influenced both by 
the behavior of group members in the current period and the experience with different 
group members in earlier periods. Fourth, subjects who cast the decisive vote in the first 
stage contribute more in the second stage. The results clearly refute predictions based on 
standard preferences. They are, however, largely in line with models of heterogeneous 
preferences inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or a combination of maximin-
preference and general efficiency concern (Charness and Rabin, 2002). 
A natural extension to this work is the explicit test for the impact of endogenous and 
exogenous choice of the tax payment. This could be achieved by running the TAX/VCM 
as described in this chapter in combination with a treatment that exogenously implements 
the same group composition and tax rate from the TAX/VCM treatment. 
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Appendix 
A. Experimental instructions (originally in German) 
 
A.1 Experimental instructions for the TAX/VCM treatment 
 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation! 
From now on, please do not talk to the other participants  
 
General information 
 
This experiment is done to study decision behavior. You can earn money. This money will be paid at the end 
of the experiment. 
During the experiment you (and the other participants) will be asked to make decisions. Your decisions as 
well as the decisions of the other participants determine the amount of money you earn. The exact rules will 
be explained in the following. 
The entire experiment will last about 90 minutes. If you have any questions or if anything is unclear to you, 
please raise your hand. One of the experimenter will get to you and answer your questions individually. 
For simplicity, we use only the masculine form to describe the experiment. The description is valid for both 
male and female participants. 
 
Anonymity 
 
During the experiment you will be matched with other participants into groups. You and the other 
participants will learn neither during nor after the experiment with whom you were matched in the respective 
periods. 
Unless explicitly specified in the following, the other participants will learn neither during nor after the 
experiment about your decisions. 
Unless explicitly specified in the following, the other participants will learn neither during nor after the 
experiment about your payoff. 
We analyze the data from the experiment only in aggregated form and never match names with the data from 
the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a receipt about your payoff. This is necessary 
for us to balance accounts with our funding agency. The funding agency does not receive data from the 
experiment 
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The experiment 
 
General 
 
The experiment is comprised of 15 periods. 
At the start of each period, you are randomly matched with two other participants. 
All periods are identical. In each period you (and the other members within your group) have to make two 
decisions. 
Your earnings in each period depend only on your decisions and the decisions of the other members of your 
group in the respective period. 
 
Experimental currency 
 
During the experiment you work with the experimental currency EC. At the end of the experiment your 
earnings in EC will be exchanged to Euro and paid out to you. The exchange rate is: 
40 EC = 1 Euro 
 
Schedule of a period 
 
In each period you start with a private endowment of 25 EC. During two stages, you can invest a fraction or 
all of your private funds into a joint project with the other two participants in your group. 
 
Stage I 
 
You and the other two group members determine via vote the mandatory contribution to the project that has 
to be paid by each group member. Each group member selects his preferred integer mandatory contribution 
between 0 and 25.  
The median (second highest) selected amount is implemented as mandatory contribution for all group 
members. 
You (and the other two group members) will be informed about the preferred amount of the other two group 
members and the resulting implemented mandatory contribution. 
 
This mandatory contribution has to be paid by all group members and is subtracted from the private funds of 
each group member. 
The collection of the mandatory contribution induces costs, therefore the project fund receives less than the 
sum of subtractions from the initial endowments.  
You can find the exact relationship in table 1. 
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Stage II 
 
After stage I you (and the two other group members) have a remaining endowment of 25 minus the 
mandatory contribution. 
From this remaining endowment, you (and the two other group members) can provide a voluntary 
contribution towards the project fund. 
The collection of the voluntary contribution does not induce costs. The project fund consequently receives 
the sum of voluntary contributions of all group members. 
 
Earnings of a period 
 
After stage II the project is carried out. The operation of the project creates a payment to the group members. 
The payment to you (and each of the two other group members) is 2/3 of the total project fund. 
Your earnings in each period is the sum of the remaining endowment after stage II (25 – mandatory 
contribution – your voluntary contribution) and the payment from the project (2/3 of the project fund after 
stage II). 
You can find an overview about possible earnings depending on stages I and II in table 2. 
 
Short overview about the schedule of a period: 
 
- Allocation of initial endowment of  25 EC 
- Selection of the mandatory contribution 
- Collection of the mandatory contribution from the private funds / inflow to the project fund 
- Selection of the voluntary contribution 
- Collection of the voluntary contribution from the private funds / inflow to the project fund 
- The project is carried out 
- Calculation of the earnings in the period 
 
Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be paid out to you in cash.  
The earnings of all 15 periods will be added. 
The exchange rate is: 
40 EC = 1 Euro 
Your earning will be rounded up to the nearest 10 cent and paid out to you. 
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Examples 
 
The two following examples illustrate the mechanics of the experiment: 
 
 Participant A B C 
Stage I 
Preferred mandatory contribution 4 23 7 
Selected mandatory contribution 7 
Inflow to the project fund 18.48 
Stage II 
Remaining private funds after stage I 18 18 18 
Individual voluntary contribution 18 0 9 
Inflow to the project fund 27 
Payment 
Total project fund 45.48 
Payment from the project 30.32 30.32 30.32 
Remaining private funds after stage II 0 18 9 
Earnings of the period 30.32 48.32 39.32 
     
     
 Participant A B C 
Stage I 
Preferred mandatory contribution 19 19 0 
Selected mandatory contribution 19 
Inflow to the project fund 39.90 
Stage II 
Remaining private funds after stage I 6 6 6 
Individual voluntary contribution 1 4 2 
Inflow to the project fund 9 
Payment 
Total project fund 48.90 
Payment from the project 32.60 32.60 32.60 
Remaining private funds after stage II 5 2 4 
Earnings of the period 37.60 34.60 36.60 
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Table 1 
 
Stage I Stage II 
Mandatory 
contribution 
Inflow to project 
fund Project fund per capita 
Change in project 
fund per capita Remaining private funds 
a) b) c) d) e) 
0 0.00 0.00 - 25 
1 2.91 0.97 0.97 24 
2 5.73 1.91 0.94 23 
3 8.46 2.82 0.91 22 
4 11.10 3.70 0.88 21 
5 13.65 4.55 0.85 20 
6 16.11 5.37 0.82 19 
7 18.48 6.16 0.79 18 
8 20.76 6.92 0.76 17 
9 22.95 7.65 0.73 16 
10 25.05 8.35 0.70 15 
11 27.06 9.02 0.67 14 
12 28.98 9.66 0.64 13 
13 30.81 10.27 0.61 12 
14 32.55 10.85 0.58 11 
15 34.20 11.40 0.55 10 
16 35.76 11.92 0.52 9 
17 37.23 12.41 0.49 8 
18 38.61 12.87 0.46 7 
19 39.90 13.30 0.43 6 
20 41.10 13.70 0.40 5 
21 42.21 14.07 0.37 4 
22 43.23 14.41 0.34 3 
23 44.16 14.72 0.31 2 
24 45.00 15.00 0.28 1 
25 45.75 15.25 0.25 0 
     Explanation of the respective columns 
  a) Amount of the mandatory contribution 
  b) Inflow to project fund 
  c) Project fund per capita 
  d) Change of c) compared to a mandatory contribution that is one point lower 
e) Remaining private funds 
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Table 2 
 
Earnings based on 
    voluntary contribution of the two other 
group members 
minimum maximum minimum maximum 
and own voluntary contribution minimum maximum maximum minimum 
Mandatory contribution         
a) b) c) d) e) 
0 25.00 50.00 16.67 58.33 
1 25.94 49.94 17.94 57.94 
2 26.82 49.82 19.15 57.49 
3 27.64 49.64 20.31 56.97 
4 28.40 49.40 21.40 56.40 
5 29.10 49.10 22.43 55.77 
6 29.74 48.74 23.41 55.07 
7 30.32 48.32 24.32 54.32 
8 30.84 47.84 25.17 53.51 
9 31.30 47.30 25.97 52.63 
10 31.70 46.70 26.70 51.70 
11 32.04 46.04 27.37 50.71 
12 32.32 45.32 27.99 49.65 
13 32.54 44.54 28.54 48.54 
14 32.70 43.70 29.03 47.37 
15 32.80 42.80 29.47 46.13 
16 32.84 41.84 29.84 44.84 
17 32.82 40.82 30.15 43.49 
18 32.74 39.74 30.41 42.07 
19 32.60 38.60 30.60 40.60 
20 32.40 37.40 30.73 39.07 
21 32.14 36.14 30.81 37.47 
22 31.82 34.82 30.82 35.82 
23 31.44 33.44 30.77 34.11 
24 31.00 32.00 30.67 32.33 
25 30.50 30.50 30.50 30.50 
     Explanation of the respective columns 
   a) Amount of the mandatory contribution 
   b) Earnings if all group members choose the minimum (0) voluntary contribution 
c) Earnings if all group members choose the maximum voluntary contribution 
d) Earnings if the other two group members choose the minimum voluntary contribution and you choose the 
maximum voluntary contribution 
e) Earnings if the other two group members choose the maximum voluntary contribution and you choose the 
minimum voluntary contribution 
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A.2 Experimental instructions for the TAX treatment 
 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation! 
From now on, please do not talk to the other participants  
 
General information 
 
This experiment is done to study decision behavior. You can earn money. This money will be paid at the end 
of the experiment. 
During the experiment you (and the other participants) will be asked to make decisions. Your decisions as 
well as the decisions of the other participants determine the amount of money you earn. The exact rules will 
be explained in the following. 
The entire experiment will last about 90 minutes. If you have any questions or if anything is unclear to you, 
please raise your hand. One of the experimenter will get to you and answer your questions individually. 
For simplicity, we use only the masculine form to describe the experiment. The description is valid for both 
male and female participants. 
 
Anonymity 
 
During the experiment you will be matched with other participants into groups. You and the other 
participants will learn neither during nor after the experiment with whom you were matched in the respective 
periods. 
Unless explicitly specified in the following, the other participants will learn neither during nor after the 
experiment about your decisions. 
Unless explicitly specified in the following, the other participants will learn neither during nor after the 
experiment about your payoff. 
We analyze the data from the experiment only in aggregated form and never match names with the data from 
the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a receipt about your payoff. This is necessary 
for us to balance accounts with our funding agency. The funding agency does not receive data from the 
experiment 
 
The experiment 
 
General 
 
The experiment is comprised of 15 periods. 
At the start of each period, you are randomly matched with two other participants. 
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All periods are identical. In each period you (and the other members within your group) have to make one 
decision. 
Your earnings in each period depend only on your decision and the decisions of the other members of your 
group in the respective period. 
 
Experimental currency 
 
During the experiment you work with the experimental currency EC. At the end of the experiment your 
earnings in EC will be exchanged to Euro and paid out to you. The exchange rate is: 
40 EC = 1 Euro 
 
Schedule of a period 
 
In each period you start with a private endowment of 25 EC. You can invest a fraction or all of your private 
funds into a joint project with the other two participants in your group. 
 
You and the other two group members determine via vote the mandatory contribution to the project that has 
to be paid by each group member. Each group member selects his preferred integer mandatory contribution 
between 0 and 25.  
The median (second highest) selected amount is implemented as mandatory contribution for all group 
members. 
You (and the other two group members) will be informed about the preferred amount of the other two group 
members and the resulting implemented mandatory contribution. 
This mandatory contribution has to be paid by all group members and is subtracted from the private funds of 
each group member. 
The collection of the mandatory contribution induces costs, therefore the project fund receives less than the 
sum of subtractions from the initial endowments.  
You can find the exact relationship in table 1. 
 
Earnings of a period 
 
After collection of the mandatory contribution the project is carried out. The operation of the project creates a 
payment to the group members. The payment to you (and each of the two other group members) is 2/3 of the 
total project fund. 
Your earnings in each period is the sum of the remaining endowment after stage II (25 – mandatory 
contribution) and the payment from the project (2/3 of the project fund after stage II). 
You can find an overview about possible earnings depending on the decisions in table 2. 
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Short overview about the schedule of a period: 
 
- Allocation of initial endowment of  25 EC 
- Selection of the mandatory contribution 
- Collection of the mandatory contribution from the private funds / inflow to the project fund 
- The project is carried out 
- Calculation of the earnings in the period 
 
Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be paid out to you in cash.  
The earnings of all 15 periods will be added. 
The exchange rate is: 
40 EC = 1 Euro 
Your earning will be rounded up to the nearest 10 cent and paid out to you. 
 
Examples 
 
The two following examples illustrate the mechanics of the experiment: 
 
 Participant A B C 
Decision 
Preferred mandatory contribution 4 23 7 
Selected mandatory contribution 7 
Inflow to the project fund 18.48 
Payment 
Total project fund 18.48 
Payment from the project 12.32 12.32 12.32 
Remaining private funds 18 18 18 
Earnings of the period 30.32 30.32 30.32 
     
     
 Participant A B C 
Decision 
Preferred mandatory contribution 19 19 0 
Selected mandatory contribution 19 
Inflow to the project fund 39.90 
Payment 
Total project fund 39.90 
Payment from the project 26.60 26.60 26.60 
Remaining private funds 6 6 6 
Earnings of the period 32.60 32.60 32.60 
 
 
Tax or trust: A public goods game with enforceable and 
voluntary contributions 
42 
Table 1: 
 
Mandatory 
contribution 
Inflow to project 
fund Project fund per capita 
Change in project 
fund per capita Remaining private funds 
a) b) c) d) e) 
0 0.00 0.00 - 25 
1 2.91 0.97 0.97 24 
2 5.73 1.91 0.94 23 
3 8.46 2.82 0.91 22 
4 11.10 3.70 0.88 21 
5 13.65 4.55 0.85 20 
6 16.11 5.37 0.82 19 
7 18.48 6.16 0.79 18 
8 20.76 6.92 0.76 17 
9 22.95 7.65 0.73 16 
10 25.05 8.35 0.70 15 
11 27.06 9.02 0.67 14 
12 28.98 9.66 0.64 13 
13 30.81 10.27 0.61 12 
14 32.55 10.85 0.58 11 
15 34.20 11.40 0.55 10 
16 35.76 11.92 0.52 9 
17 37.23 12.41 0.49 8 
18 38.61 12.87 0.46 7 
19 39.90 13.30 0.43 6 
20 41.10 13.70 0.40 5 
21 42.21 14.07 0.37 4 
22 43.23 14.41 0.34 3 
23 44.16 14.72 0.31 2 
24 45.00 15.00 0.28 1 
25 45.75 15.25 0.25 0 
     Explanation of the respective columns 
  a) Amount of the mandatory contribution 
  b) Inflow to project fund 
   c) Project fund per capita 
   d) Change of c) compared to a mandatory contribution that is one point lower 
e) Remaining private funds 
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Table 2: 
 
Mandatory contribution Earnings 
a) b) 
0 25.00 
1 25.94 
2 26.82 
3 27.64 
4 28.40 
5 29.10 
6 29.74 
7 30.32 
8 30.84 
9 31.30 
10 31.70 
11 32.04 
12 32.32 
13 32.54 
14 32.70 
15 32.80 
16 32.84 
17 32.82 
18 32.74 
19 32.60 
20 32.40 
21 32.14 
22 31.82 
23 31.44 
24 31.00 
25 30.50 
  Explanation of the respective columns 
a) Amount of the mandatory contribution 
b) Earnings 
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A.3 Experimental instructions for the VCM treatment 
 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you very much for your participation! 
From now on, please do not talk to the other participants  
 
General information 
 
This experiment is done to study decision behavior. You can earn money. This money will be paid at the end 
of the experiment. 
During the experiment you (and the other participants) will be asked to make decisions. Your decisions as 
well as the decisions of the other participants determine the amount of money you earn. The exact rules will 
be explained in the following. 
The entire experiment will last about 90 minutes. If you have any questions or if anything is unclear to you, 
please raise your hand. One of the experimenter will get to you and answer your questions individually. 
For simplicity, we use only the masculine form to describe the experiment. The description is valid for both 
male and female participants. 
 
Anonymity 
 
During the experiment you will be matched with other participants into groups. You and the other 
participants will learn neither during nor after the experiment with whom you were matched in the respective 
periods. 
Unless explicitly specified in the following, the other participants will learn neither during nor after the 
experiment about your decisions. 
Unless explicitly specified in the following, the other participants will learn neither during nor after the 
experiment about your payoff. 
We analyze the data from the experiment only in aggregated form and never match names with the data from 
the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a receipt about your payoff. This is necessary 
for us to balance accounts with our funding agency. The funding agency does not receive data from the 
experiment 
 
The experiment 
 
General 
 
The experiment is comprised of 15 periods. 
At the start of each period, you are randomly matched with two other participants. 
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All periods are identical. In each period you (and the other members within your group) have to make one 
decision. 
Your earnings in each period depend only on your decision and the decisions of the other members of your 
group in the respective period. 
 
Experimental currency 
 
During the experiment you work with the experimental currency EC. At the end of the experiment your 
earnings in EC will be exchanged to Euro and paid out to you. The exchange rate is: 
40 EC = 1 Euro 
 
Schedule of a period 
 
In each period you start with a private endowment of 25 EC. You can invest a fraction or all of your private 
funds into a joint project with the other two participants in your group. 
 
From this endowment, you (and the two other group members) can provide a voluntary contribution towards 
the project fund. 
The collection of the voluntary contribution does not induce costs. The project fund consequently receives 
the sum of voluntary contributions of all group members. 
 
Earnings of a period 
 
After collection of the voluntary contributions the project is carried out. The operation of the project creates a 
payment to the group members. The payment to you (and each of the two other group members) is 2/3 of the 
total project fund. 
Your earnings in each period is the sum of the remaining endowment after stage II (25 –your voluntary 
contribution) and the payment from the project (2/3 of the project fund after stage II). 
You can find an overview about possible earnings depending on the decisions in table 1. 
Short overview about the schedule of a period: 
 
- Allocation of initial endowment of  25 EC 
- Selection of the voluntary contribution 
- Collection of the voluntary contribution from the private funds / inflow to the project fund 
- The project is carried out 
- Calculation of the earnings in the period 
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Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be paid out to you in cash.  
The earnings of all 15 periods will be added. 
The exchange rate is: 
40 EC = 1 Euro 
Your earning will be rounded up to the nearest 10 cent and paid out to you. 
 
Examples 
 
The two following examples illustrate the mechanics of the experiment: 
 
 Participant A B C 
Decision 
Initial private endowment 25 25 25 
Individual voluntary contribution 25 0 12 
Inflow to the project fund 37 
Paymen 
Total project fund 37 
Payment from the project 24.67 24.67 24.67 
Remaining private funds 0 25 13 
Earnings of the period 24.67 49.67 37.67 
     
     
 Participant A B C 
Decision 
Initial private endowment 25 25 25 
Individual voluntary contribution 3 4 2 
Inflow to the project fund 9 
Paymen 
Total project fund 9 
Payment from the project 6 6 6 
Remaining private funds 22 21 23 
Earnings of the period 28 27 29 
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Table 1: 
 
Earnings based on 
    voluntary contribution of other group 
member 1 
minimum maximum minimum maximum 
and voluntary contribution of other 
group member 2 
minimum maximum maximum minimum 
Own voluntary contribution         
a) b) c) d) e) 
0 25.00 58.33 41.67 41.67 
1 24.67 58.00 41.33 41.33 
2 24.33 57.67 41.00 41.00 
3 24.00 57.33 40.67 40.67 
4 23.67 57.00 40.33 40.33 
5 23.33 56.67 40.00 40.00 
6 23.00 56.33 39.67 39.67 
7 22.67 56.00 39.33 39.33 
8 22.33 55.67 39.00 39.00 
9 22.00 55.33 38.67 38.67 
10 21.67 55.00 38.33 38.33 
11 21.33 54.67 38.00 38.00 
12 21.00 54.33 37.67 37.67 
13 20.67 54.00 37.33 37.33 
14 20.33 53.67 37.00 37.00 
15 20.00 53.33 36.67 36.67 
16 19.67 53.00 36.33 36.33 
17 19.33 52.67 36.00 36.00 
18 19.00 52.33 35.67 35.67 
19 18.67 52.00 35.33 35.33 
20 18.33 51.67 35.00 35.00 
21 18.00 51.33 34.67 34.67 
22 17.67 51.00 34.33 34.33 
23 17.33 50.67 34.00 34.00 
24 17.00 50.33 33.67 33.67 
25 16.67 50.00 33.33 33.33 
     Explanation of the respective columns 
  a) Amount of the own voluntary contribution 
  b) Earnings if both other group members choose the minimum (0) voluntary contribution 
c) Earnings if both other group members choose the maximum (25) voluntary contribution 
d) Earnings if the first of the other group members chooses the minimum (0) voluntary contribution and the second 
other group member chooses the maximum (25) voluntary contribution 
e) Earnings if the first of the other group members chooses the maximum (25) voluntary contribution and the 
second other group member chooses the minimum (0) voluntary contribution 
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B. Further analysis 
 
B.1 Behavior on the matching group level 
Figure 6 presents the average tax payment for all matching groups in TAX. The 
graphs for all matching groups are flat at 16 with only minor fluctuations (four of the 
graphs are even completely flat without any fluctuation).  
- The results in VCM are more heterogeneous, as you can see in Figure 7. The 
matching groups can be categorized into three different types:Steady downward 
trend from the first to the last period (602, 603) 
- Double-peaked with an initial increase from the first to second or third period, 
decrease until the middle periods, a short upward trend to the second peak followed 
by a downward trend until the end (502, 503, 504). 
- Seemingly random fluctuation without a clear time trend (501, 601, 604). 
. 
 
For the TAX/VCM it is necessary to look at both at the tax payment and the 
contribution as shown in Figure 8. There are a few matching groups with a clear pattern: 
- Matching group 104 exhibits steadily increasing tax payments and decreasing 
contributions. 
- Matching group 203 moves to a no tax payment / maximum contribution state and 
stays there for several periods before the contributions decay for the later periods. 
However, most matching groups do not follow a readily apparent pattern. 
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Figure 6: Average tax payment in TAX over time by matching group 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Average contribution in VCM over time by matching group 
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Figure 8: Average tax payment and contribution in TAX/VCM over time by matching 
group 
 
 
B.2 Further analysis of the decisive vote effect 
In this section I present additional analysis of the ‘decisive vote’ effect discussed in 
1.4.2. In 1.4.2 I argued that the difference of the own vote to the tax maximizing vote 
matters because the ‘vote winner’ wants to compensate the loss of profit through the tax 
mechanism. The same motive could also be captured by the explanatory variable ‘loss of 
tax profits’ of the ‘vote winner’, where the tax profit is defined as the payoff from the 
public account minus the tax payment (d – p) for one group member. The loss of tax profits 
is the difference between the tax profit from the tax maximizing vote and the realized tax 
rate. The idea about the connection is basically the same, but with an emphasis on 
differences for low tax payments that have a larger potential efficiency loss. 
Running the regression with the loss of tax profits (Model 3) yields similar results to 
Model 2, the loss of tax profits variable is positive and weakly significant, the tax 
payment=vote dummy loses half its value and the significance. 
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Table 11: Votes and contributions in TAX/VCM (periods 2-15, OLS regressions) 
  Dependent variable:  
 Contribution,  
Model 3 
Contribution, 
Model 4 
Contribution, 
Model 5 
 
Period 
 
-0.082* 
(0.045) 
-0.086* 
(0.045) 
-0.085* 
(0.044) 
 
Tax up to 16 -0.390*** 
(0.066) 
-0.394*** 
(0.065) 
-0.419*** 
(0.068) 
 
Tax over 16 -0.455*** 
(0.140) 
-0.418*** 
(0.133) 
-0.452*** 
(0.133) 
 
Vote 
 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
-0.017 
(0.043) 
 
Tax payment=Vote 
dummy 
0.465 
(0.362) 
0.293 
(0.403) 
0.844** 
(0.415) 
 
Majority dummy - - 0.428 
(0.742) 
 
Consensus dummy - - -0.907 
(0.930) 
 
     
Difference to tax 
maximization 
- 0.217 
(0.264) 
-  
Loss of tax profits 0.294* 
(0.164) 
-0.113 
(0.585) 
-  
Contribution (t-1) 0.597*** 
(0.061) 
0.596*** 
(0.060) 
0.595*** 
(0.062) 
 
Avg. contribution of 
other group members 
(t-1) 
0.248*** 
(0.056) 
0.252*** 
(0.059) 
0.254*** 
(0.057) 
 
Tax payment (t-1) 0.355*** 
(0.081) 
0.346*** 
(0.077) 
0.358*** 
(0.081) 
 
Constant 
 
1.441 
(1.441) 
1.570 
(1.370) 
1.819 
(1.443) 
 
# Observations 672 672 672  
R² 0.64 0.65 0.64  
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on subject level). 
 
When I include both difference to tax maximization and loss of tax profits as variables 
(Model 4), they both lose their significance. However, the difference to tax maximization 
variable remains positive while the loss of tax profits variable turns negative. The former 
variable seems to be a better fit to describe the effect. 
Two further reasonable explanations are not supported by the data. First, there could 
be a homogeneity effect, meaning that subjects contribute more if other group members 
vote the same (thus ensuring that the voted tax is implemented). Second, ‘winning’ the 
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voting process could bring an utility gain which the winner wants to balance through a 
higher monetary payoff for the other group members.21 Both these models imply that the 
number of subjects who have the winning vote in a group matters for the effect. The 
homogeneity effect would mean that there is only an effect if at least two subjects cast the 
same vote and that the effect is strongest when all three subjects choose the same vote. The 
‘balanced utility’ would mean that the effect decreases if two subjects cast the same vote 
and vanishes when all three subject choose the same vote, because then there is nothing to 
balance. Model 5 includes a majority dummy for subjects who cast the same vote as at 
least one of their other group members and the consensus dummy for subjects who cast the 
same vote as both of their other group members. The variable for the ‘vote winner’ is again 
significant. The majority and the consensus dummies are both insignificant and they have 
different signs, providing no support for any of these explanations. 
 
 
                                                 
21 This could be motivated with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences with the 
winning of the vote represented as an additional payoff for the winner. 
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Chapter 2: The team allocator game: 
Allocation power in public goods games 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Consider a team work setting with a straightforward hierarchy. There is one team 
member that, although contributing to the team effort, has some discretionary power to 
allocate gains from team production to all team members. Individual effort levels in the 
team are observable, but not verifiable. Hence, contracts on effort are infeasible, and the 
team faces a modified social dilemma: it is individually rational for a selfish ordinary team 
member to withhold effort, even though it would be socially optimal to provide effort. The 
incentives for the team member with allocation power, henceforth denoted team allocator, 
could be different; we shall return to this issue momentarily. In real life, we often find 
teams with a natural or exogenously imposed hierarchical structure that gives one team 
member (a team leader or manager) property rights over team output: small work teams, 
for instance, in consulting companies, sports teams, music bands, military units, or families 
readily come to mind. However, also political parties with a designated leader have a 
similar incentive structure when effort contributions to an election campaign are 
considered to have a social dilemma component.22 
This work is the first that provides a rigorous empirical test of the (behavioral) 
incentive effects of such a team structure. We analyze a modified public goods game 
theoretically and implement it experimentally in the laboratory. From the several 
conceivable implementations of allocation power of a team member, we chose the most 
parsimonious one. In our team allocator game (TAG), each team member – regardless of 
whether the member is an ordinary team member or the team allocator – can contribute to 
a public account. The sum of contributions is multiplied by an efficiency factor larger than 
one, but – in contrast to the standard public goods game – not distributed equally among all 
team members. Rather, the team allocator receives the entire amount in the public account 
and has full discretionary power over the allocation of the revenues from the account 
                                                 
22 All these examples have in common that the team output is not a pure public good but unequally dividable 
among the team members. A pure public good, of course, entails no allocation power. 
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within the team. More precisely, she can implement any distribution of the benefits from 
the public account over the ordinary team members and herself. 
It is straightforward to show that in such a setting, ordinary team members with 
standard preferences have no incentive whatsoever to contribute to the public account, 
whereas the team allocator will contribute her entire endowment if the public goods 
mechanism is linear. Our experimental results, however, interestingly show that the level 
of contributions in the team allocator game is significantly higher than in an appropriate 
control treatment in which there is no team allocator, i.e. there is an equal split of the 
public account, but one team member is forced to contribute her entire endowment. In 
other words, giving one team member dictator or allocation power leads to much higher 
levels of cooperation than expected. We show that team allocators’ distribution behavior 
influences, together with the time horizon of the team interaction, the pattern of 
contributions. Although there is some heterogeneity in the behavior of team allocators, we 
find that they predominantly use the reward channel in case of high contributions, i.e. they 
allocate large shares of the public account to cooperating ordinary team members, but they 
also tend to punish non-contributors by excluding them from the benefits from the public 
account. Overall, the returned amounts to contributors are astonishingly high and generate 
strong contribution incentives for ordinary team members. We provide theoretical evidence 
that such a generous behavior of team allocators could be caused by other-regarding 
preferences such as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or maximin-orientation 
(Charness and Rabin, 2002), but the repeated-game aspect plays a role as well. 
In general, it seems that teams with a straightforward hierarchy – with a team member 
that dominates the allocation process – have an advantage over teams with members of 
equal standing and an automatic equal distribution of the team benefits. They are more 
likely to overcome the social dilemma inherent to public good provision, i.e. team effort 
provision. Our result is the more remarkable since the described mechanism can be 
implemented without any monetary costs. Other mechanisms to sustain cooperation that 
have been studied extensively in the literature – the most prominent one is an informal 
sanctioning mechanism (starting with the seminal paper by Fehr and Gächter, 2000b) – 
bring about substantial costs. While, for instance, an informal punishment option increases 
contributions dramatically, its efficiency balance depends very much on the length of the 
interaction among the team members (Gächter et al., 2008). On the contrary, an informal 
reward option can be more efficient but is typically less effective in sustaining high 
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contribution levels. Thus, from an efficiency perspective, the implementation of hierarchy 
in teams seems especially positive when compared to other mechanisms. 
Our work is related to the huge literature of institutional provisions in social 
dilemmas. This literature has, for instance, studied the effects of punishment (e.g., 
Yamagishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Masclet et al., 2003; 
Casari, 2005; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 
2007a; Denant-Boemont, et al., 2007; Sefton et al., 2007; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Gächter et 
al., 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008; Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; 
Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Casari and Luini, 2009; Ule et al., 2009; Nikiforakis, 
2010; Gächter and Herrmann, 2011), the effects of reward (e.g., Andreoni et al., 2003; 
Sefton et al., 2007), the effects of communication before the contribution decision (e.g., 
Isaac and Walker, 1988; Ostrom et al., 1994; Cason and Khan, 1999; Brosig et al., 2003; 
Bochet et al., 2006; Bochet and Putterman, 2009), the effects of an expulsion option from 
the benefits of the public good (e.g., Cinyabuguma et al., 2005), or the effects of voluntary 
association (e.g., Page et al., 2005; Charness and Yang, 2008) on contribution levels in and 
the resulting efficiency of social dilemmas. There is also a literature on the formal 
implementation of institutions in social dilemmas, usually by a voting mechanism (e.g., 
Kroll et al., 2007; Kosfeld et al., 2009). 
All related papers on institutional provisions mentioned above share the feature that 
team members are equal in their personal endowments and options to implement and use 
the institutional mechanism. In other words, there is no hierarchy within the team. 
Examples of papers that study cooperation-fostering institutions with unequal team 
members are rare.23 One exception that we are aware of is Reuben and Riedl (2009). The 
paper is, however, only loosely related to ours, because they analyze the effects of 
endowment differences in a public goods game on norm enforcement. Another exception, 
Cárdenas et al. (2009), is related more closely. They analyze a specific problem in 
collective water management that is modeled as a public good with asymmetric access. 
More precisely, in their setup there is sequential access of the team members to the benefits 
from the public good. The idea of sequential access is intended to capture the situation of a 
collective water supply with the natural feature that upstream users (farmers) can 
appropriate benefits from the public good before downstream users. Their main finding in 
                                                 
23 There is a large literature on asymmetries in standard public goods games in the absence of norm-
enforcement devices. For reasons of succinctness, we do not discuss this literature here. 
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terms of cooperation is that asymmetric appropriation leads to lower levels of cooperation 
than the usual symmetric appropriation in the standard linear public goods game (voluntary 
contribution mechanism).24 
Another way of looking at our mechanism is in relation to the seminal trust game 
(Berg et al., 1995). Our mechanism can be viewed as a collective trust game in which the 
amount that can be returned by the trustee (the team allocator) depends on the collective 
level of trust by the trustors (the ordinary team members). Trust games with more than one 
trustor are for example studied in Cassar and Rigdon (2011). However, their trustees are 
more restricted in their allocation power as they cannot allocate benefits from one trustor’s 
investments to another trustor.25 
In reality, the allocation power of the team allocator is sometimes limited by law or 
contract, or allocation power is shared by several team members. Analytically, it makes 
nevertheless sense to start with a comparison of the two extremes: full allocation power by 
one team member versus an automatic equal distribution of the team benefits (with one 
team member being forced to contribute the entire endowment to keep incentives constant 
across the two conditions). Our study thus intends to provide a benchmark for a 
hierarchical social dilemma setting with allocation power. Future studies should address 
different contractual limitations associated with allocation power. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our 
experimental design and describe the procedures of the experiment. Section 3 derives 
theoretical predictions. Section 4 reports the experimental results, and Section 5 discusses 
our findings and concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2. Experimental design and procedures 
In the following we describe the basic experimental setup (Section 2.1) and the details 
of the experimental procedure (Section 2.2). 
 
                                                 
24 Finally, our research is also related, at least loosely, to recent contributions on leadership in public goods 
games. See, for instance, Güth et al. (2007), Levati et al. (2007), Rivas and Sutter (2011), or Gächter et al. 
(2010). 
25 For a recent meta-analysis of trust games, see Johnson and Mislin (2011). 
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2.2.1 Basic setup of the team allocator game 
Let 𝐼 = {1, 2, … , 𝑛} denote a team of 𝑛 subjects who interact in 𝑇 periods with subject 
1 being called the team allocator (TA) and subjects 2, … , 𝑛 called the ordinary team 
members (OTMs). Each period 𝑡 ∈ {1, 2, … ,𝑇} consists of two stages. In stage 1, each 
individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 receives an endowment 𝐸 which can be allocated either to her private 
account or to a public account. The contribution of individual 𝑖 to the public account in 
period 𝑡, denoted 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, must satisfy 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐸. Let 𝐶𝑡 be the sum of all team members’ 
contributions in period 𝑡 (i.e. 𝐶𝑡 = ∑ 𝑐𝑗,𝑡𝑛𝑗=1 ). In order to retain the public goods nature 𝐶𝑡 
is multiplied by a factor 𝛾, which satisfies 1 < 𝛾 < 𝑛. 26 
In the second stage, the TA can freely distribute the amount 𝛾𝐶𝑡 among the team 
members (the OTMs and herself), following only two restrictions for the returned amount. 
Every team member has to get a non-negative amount that cannot be greater than 𝛾𝐶𝑡, and 
the sum of all returned amounts has to be equal to 𝛾𝐶𝑡. Formally, the returned amount is 
denoted by 𝑑𝑖,𝑡, with 𝑖 being the receiving team member:                                         0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾𝐶𝑡 ∀𝑖,   �𝑑𝑗,𝑡𝑛
𝑗=1
= 𝛾𝐶𝑡                                                     (1) 
Individual team member 𝑖’s payoff from the TAG in period 𝑡 is then given by                                                           𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖,𝑡.                                                               (2) 
 
2.2.2 Experimental procedures 
The experiment implements two treatments: (i) treatment TAG and (ii) treatment 
VCM+. TAG is a treatment according to the setup laid out in Section 2.1 with the 
following parameters: team size 𝑛 = 4, endowment per period 𝐸 = 20 points (the 
experimental currency unit)27, 𝛾 = 1.6, and the number of periods 𝑇 = 10. Returned 
amounts 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 can have up to one decimal.28 Experimental participants are matched 
randomly in teams at the beginning of the experiment and one randomly chosen team 
                                                 
26 Indeed, 𝛾 could also be smaller than 1 or larger than 𝑛 in the TAG without changing the incentives for 
OTMs. In contrast to the standard public goods game, there is no individual incentive to contribute to the 
public account, no matter how high 𝛾  is. The condition is just imposed to keep the setup comparable to the 
standard voluntary contribution mechanism. A 𝛾 < 1 changes, however, the incentives for the TA. 
27 At the end of the experiment earned points from all periods are summed up and converted into euro using 
the following exchange rate: 1 point = 4 euro-cent. 
28 Note that we allow for one decimal place to ensure that the entire amount of 𝛾𝐶𝑡 can be distributed to the 
team members. This also gives TAs the ability to return exactly 1.6 times the invested amount to each OTM. 
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member is assigned the role of TA. We use a partner design with fixed subject IDs that 
allows building reputation because a one-shot interaction in a team with hierarchy seems 
less realistic. Roles are kept over the course of the experiment. Since we are not interested 
in studying irrational behavior or potentially complicated signaling through contributions 
by the TA that are below the full endowment, we automatically enforce full contributions 
for a TA, i.e., 𝑐1,𝑡 = 𝐸. This is innocuous because both a completely selfish and an other-
regarding TA would want to contribute the highest possible amount.29 All details of the 
setup and all parameters are common knowledge. 
VCM+ is the appropriate control treatment for TAG. It is a standard voluntary 
contribution mechanism with identical parameters and provisions as in TAG. In order to 
align incentives, however, we need to randomly select one team member that is forced to 
contribute her entire endowment to the public account – hence, the plus in the notation.30 
The team member who is forced to contribute the entire endowment is the same in every 
period of the experiment and will be denoted, analogous to the denomination of the TA in 
the TAG, as subject 1. Note that the benefit from the public account in VCM+, 𝛾𝐶𝑡, is 
distributed equally among all team members, just as in a standard VCM.31 
Information conditions are as follows: In the TAG treatment, the TA receives the full 
vector of individual contributions within her team before deciding about the returned 
amounts to each team member in stage two of the game. In both treatments at the end of 
each period, all team members are informed about the vector of contributions within their 
teams, the resulting benefit from the public account, the distribution of this benefit among 
the team members (either equally in the VCM+ or according to the allocation decision of 
the TA in the TAG), and the final individual profits from this period. Hence, information 
conditions are identical across the two treatments. 
                                                 
29 An anti-social TA would not necessarily want to contribute the highest possible amount. However, we will 
show later on that we do not have any anti-social TA in our experiment. 
30 Partial coercion does not change contribution incentives for unforced contributors compared to a standard 
VCM. This is shown in a recent study by Cettolin and Riedl (2011). They implement two coercion treatments 
(low and high) in which they force one randomly selected group member to contribute at least a minimum 
amount (approximately 25% and 75% of the endowment, respectively). The authors show that partial 
coercion has no influence on average contributions beyond the pure coercion effect, i.e. non-coerced subjects 
do not contribute significantly different amounts than subjects in a control VCM. Cettolin and Riedl argue 
that the lack of a cooperative intention may prevent unforced conditional cooperators from increasing their 
contributions. 
31 For the control treatment VCM+, the condition 1 < 𝛾 < 𝑛 ensures that we have a social dilemma. See 
footnote 5 for a brief discussion. 
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An experimental session consisted of two parts (instructions can be found in Appendix 
A) in which the second part was either the TAG or the VCM+ treatment. In the first part 
we used a social value orientation questionnaire (henceforth referred to as ring test) to 
obtain an independent measure of an individual’s social motivation (i.e. her generalized 
other-regarding preferences).32 The measure from the ring test helps us to assess one of our 
main research questions, namely to what extent the behavior of TAs is driven by an 
intrinsic motivation or by opportunistic maximization behavior. 
In the ring test, individuals choose 24 times between two possible pairs of payoffs for 
themselves and another person (see Appendix B for details). The recipient remains the 
same throughout the entire test and answers herself the same set of tasks (thereby, vice 
versa, influencing the first person’s payoff). The test is fully incentivized since all 24 
selected pairs are payoff relevant. However, the profit from the ring test is not revealed 
before the end of the second part (the VCM+ or the TAG, respectively) in order to avoid 
any income spill-over effects within the ring test or from the ring test to the VCM+/TAG.33 
By calculating the sum of all 24 selected pairs, one can determine the overall amount 
of money allocated to the person herself (𝑋) and the other person (𝑌). The ratio 𝑌 𝑋⁄  
determines then a vector 𝐴 and thus a certain angle in an 𝑋- 𝑌-coordinate system. 
Dependent on this angle, subjects can be sorted into eight behavioral types (individualism, 
cooperation, altruism, martyrdom, masochism, sadomasochism, aggression and 
competition; see Figure 16 in Appendix B) which reflect their social orientation. With the 
24 choices one can also measure a participant’s consistency in her payoff choices. When 
using the data from the ring test in our analysis, we focus only on TAs with a consistency 
measure of at least 2/3.34 Moreover, we concentrate on two behavioral types, 
individualistic and cooperative types, as there is no single TA that is classified differently 
by the mechanism. This is not unusual because behavioral types that consistently follow 
other motivations are very rare. 
                                                 
32 Van Lange et al. (1997) provide a review on the use of the ring test in the psychological literature. 
Economic applications of this measure can, for example, be found in Offerman et al. (1996), Park (2000), 
Brosig (2002), van Dijk et al. (2002) or very recently in Sutter et al. (2010). 
33 A subject’s recipient in the ring test could by chance be also a member of the same team in the second part 
of the experiment, as we used an unrestricted random draw mechanism. However, this does not create any 
problems, since no feedback was provided before completion of the second part. 
34 Note that there exists no standard consistency threshold in the literature. While Park (2000) classifies only 
subjects with a consistency measure of 75% or more, Brosig (2002) uses a remarkably low threshold of 25%. 
We decided to implement a relatively high threshold. However, shifting this value downwards or even 
including all TAs does not yield different results. 
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Before the start of the first part, our subjects received written instructions only for the 
ring test, but they knew that there would be a second part in the experiment and that this 
part would be unrelated to the first part. Upon completion of the ring test, subjects received 
instructions for the second part: either the TAG or the VCM+. Instructions of both parts 
were read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the rules, and subjects were given plenty 
of time to ask questions in private before the start of each part. 
At the end of the experiment, before private cash payment, subjects finally answered a 
couple of questions about their decisions in the experiment and a post-experimental 
questionnaire, including questions regarding socio-economic variables such as gender, age 
and major. The computer-based sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory 
MELESSA of the University of Munich between July 2010 and September 2010 using the 
experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software Orsee 
(Greiner, 2004). A total of 144 undergraduate students from all disciplines participated in 
six sessions with 24 participants each. Three sessions implemented treatment TAG, three 
sessions treatment VCM+. The six sessions provide us with 18 statistically independent 
observations for each of the two treatments. The sessions lasted up to 90 minutes including 
everything from the instructions to final payments, and the average earnings were 19.08 
EUR, including a show-up payment of 4.00 EUR. No participant was allowed to take part 
in more than one session, and the assignment of subjects into treatments was random. 
Decisions were taken anonymously in cubicles, and communication among participants 
was prohibited. 
 
2.3. Theoretical predictions 
In the following, we formulate theoretical predictions for our two treatments. We start 
with straightforward hypotheses based on the assumptions of purely selfish and rational 
decision makers (“standard preferences”). In a next step, we then move to hypotheses 
based on two prominent models taking other-regarding preferences into account. Finally, 
we take care of the repeated interaction in our experiment by focusing on reputation 
formation. 
 
2.3.1 Predictions based on standard preferences (homo oeconomicus model) 
Our two treatments are finitely repeated games of perfect information. Assuming 
common knowledge of rationality and selfishness and using backward induction it is clear 
The Team Allocator Game: Allocation Power in Public 
Goods Games 
61 
that in the TAG the TA will not return any positive amount to the OTMs in the second 
stage of period 10. Therefore, OTMs will not contribute anything to the public account in 
period 10 because any contribution would be “lost”. The same rationale holds for all prior 
periods. Consequently, contributing nothing to the public account is a dominant strategy 
for all OTMs, i.e. 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ∀𝑖 ≠ 1 and 𝑡. The TA herself is forced to contribute 𝑐1,𝑡 = 𝐸 =20 in all periods, but she would have an incentive to do so anyway because 𝛾 > 1. 
Regarding the distribution of the public account we have 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ∀𝑖 ≠ 1 and 𝑡 whereas the 
TA receives in each period 𝑑1,𝑡 = 𝛾𝐶𝑡 = 32. 
For treatment VCM+ the standard logic of the public goods game applies. Since 1 < 𝛾 < 𝑛, the marginal per capita return from investing into the public account is smaller 
than one. Hence, it is a dominant strategy for OTMs to contribute nothing to the public 
account, i.e. 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ∀𝑖 ≠ 1 and 𝑡. The forced contributor, on the other hand, has to 
contribute 𝑐1,𝑡 = 𝐸 = 20 in each period, and the automatic equal distribution of the public 
account yields 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝐶𝑡 𝑛⁄ = 8 ∀𝑖,. 
 
Proposition 1. Under standard preferences, OTMs contribute zero in each period, 
irrespective of treatment. The TA in the TAG always allocates the entire public account to 
herself. 
 
2.3.2 Predictions based on other-regarding preferences 
We focus on two prominent models that both belong to the class of outcome-based 
social preference models (at least in the way we model them): the inequity aversion model 
by Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and the welfare-oriented model by 
Charness and Rabin (Charness and Rabin, 2002). 
 
2.3.2.1 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences 
The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumes that subjects suffer from inequity 
within their reference group. More precisely, a subject 𝑖 benefits from her own payoff 𝜋𝑖 
but compares it with the payoff of the 𝑛 − 1 other members in her reference group. The 
corresponding utility function is the following:             𝑈𝑖(𝜋) = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 1𝑛 − 1�max�𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖 , 0�
𝑗≠𝑖
− 𝛽𝑖
1
𝑛 − 1�max�𝜋𝑖 − 𝜋𝑗 , 0�             (3)
𝑗≠𝑖
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The vector 𝜋 = (𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) denotes the monetary payoffs and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent 
subject 𝑖’s individual attitude towards inequity. The two weights are restricted to 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 
and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. They control for the impact of utility losses from disadvantageous 
inequity (𝛼𝑖) and advantageous inequity (𝛽𝑖), respectively.
35 
If we assume that the TA in the TAG is inequity-averse and the team is the relevant 
reference group, then a TA might be willing to reduce payoff differences within the team 
by returning positive amounts to the OTMs. Note that the weight 𝛼𝑖 does not play any role 
here, because the TA will never reduce the amount allotted to herself below the level of 
full payoff equalization as this reduces her own payoff and increases inequity. Thus, only 
the weight 𝛽𝑖 matters for TA’s decisions. If the TA distributes one point from the public 
account to an OTM instead of putting it into her own pocket, she will reduce her own 
payoff by 1 and decrease inequity, on average, by 4/3 (regarding the receiving OTM by 
two points and regarding both other OTMs by one point). Thus, returning positive amounts 
is optimal if −1 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 4 3⁄ ≥ 0 or 𝛽1 ≥ 0.75. 
This yields the following equilibria in the one-shot game: If 𝛽1 < 0.75, the TA takes 
the entire public account for herself, which implies zero contributions of OTMs 
irrespective of whether they are selfish or whether they are other-regarding, i.e. 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 =0 ∀𝑖 ≠ 1 and 𝑑1 = 𝛾𝐶 = 32. If 𝛽1 > 0.75, the TA returns positive amounts to fully 
equalize period payoffs. All OTMs, therefore, have an incentive to contribute their full 
endowment, even when they are completely selfish and rational, and of course, the more so 
if they are other-regarding. Hence, we have 𝑐𝑖 = 𝐸 = 20 ∀𝑖 ≠ 1, and 𝑑𝑖 = 32 ∀𝑖 as the 
only subgame-perfect equilibrium. If 𝛽1 = 0.75, the TA is indifferent in the way she 
allocates the public account (as long as she is not worse off than one of the other team 
members). Hence, multiple equilibria exist in this case and cooperation between some or 
all team members may occur. Thus, TAs that are sufficiently averse to advantageous 
inequity (𝛽1 ≥ 0.75) can generate full cooperation and payoff equalization in the one-shot 
version of the TAG. Regarding potential repeated game effects and reputation building, 
Section 3.2.3 will discuss details. 
It is noteworthy that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences can predict full cooperation 
in our VCM+ treatment. Using Proposition 4 of Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 839) it is, 
however, obvious that for our parameter values cooperation can only be achieved if all 
                                                 
35 Note that for 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 = 0 the model collapses into the case of standard preferences. 
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OTMs are sufficiently averse to advantageous inequity, i.e. 𝛾 𝑛⁄ + 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 1 or 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0.6 ∀𝑖 ≠1. Asymmetric equilibria in the one-shot game do not exist for our setup. According to the 
parameter distribution given in Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 844), the probability of having 
three OTMs with 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0.6 in one team is 0.43 = 6.4%. As Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do 
not provide data for a threshold of 0.75, we cannot infer the probability of meeting a TA 
with 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0.75 from their paper. From all calibration results that are available, it is clear 
that the probability of meeting a TA with sufficiently high 𝛽𝑖 in order to induce full 
cooperation is higher than the 6.4%. Hence, full cooperation in the one-shot TAG 
treatment is expected to be more prevalent than in the VCM+ treatment. Again, the 
discussion of repeated game effects is relegated to Section 3.2.3. 
 
Proposition 2. With Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences, the TA in the TAG is willing to 
distribute positive amounts to OTMs if 𝛽1 ≥ 0.75, i.e. if she is sufficiently averse to 
advantageous inequity. Full cooperation and full payoff equalization within the team is an 
equilibrium in this case. If 𝛽1 < 0.75, in the one-shot game the TA will take the entire 
benefit from the public account for herself, and no OTM has an incentive to contribute. 
Full cooperation can also be an equilibrium in the VCM+ treatment; however, it requires 
𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0.6 for all OTMs. 
 
2.3.2.2 Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences 
Charness and Rabin (2002) assume that subjects care about social welfare. Their 
model includes a subject’s own payoff and, additionally, two components of social 
welfare: the minimum payoff in a group (the “Rawlsian” motive) and the sum of all group 
members’ payoffs (the efficiency concern). More precisely, the utility function in their 
general model (see their Appendix 1) with only outcome-based components looks as 
follows:36            𝑈𝑖(𝜋) = (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜋𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖[𝛿𝑖 min(𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) + (1 − 𝛿𝑖)(𝜋1 + 𝜋2 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝑛)]         (4) 
The vector 𝜋 = (𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) denotes the monetary payoffs within the group of 𝑛 
subjects and 𝜆𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖 are individual weights (i.e. 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛿𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]). The first weight, 𝜆𝑖, 
                                                 
36 Note that we consider here only the outcome-based version of the model and neglect the role of intentions 
as the more complex model with intentions does not seem suitable for deriving specific predictions in our 
setup. 
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captures how much an individual cares for social welfare relative to her own payoff.37 The 
second weight, 𝛿𝑖, controls for the influence of the “maximin”-aspect relative to the 
general efficiency concern. 
Again, we first look at the one-shot game and relegate any discussion regarding 
repeated interaction to Section 3.2.3. As a TA’s choice in the TAG is purely distributional, 
i.e. the sum of team members’ payoffs is not affected by her decision, only the “Rawlsian” 
motive of social welfare matters for a TA’s decision. TAs compare the utility loss from a 
reduction in own payoff, 1 − 𝜆1, with the utility gain from increasing the minimum payoff 
in the team (𝜆1𝛿1). This implies that TAs never return amounts to OTMs beyond the level 
of full payoff equalization. Note further that the number of subjects 𝑠 that lie at the 
minimum payoff matters, because it determines by how much the minimum can be raised 
with one point. If there is more than one individual at the minimum, each point has to be 
split equally among all affected subjects to obtain the maximum increase in the minimum 
payoff. Thus, returning positive amounts to OTMs is optimal for a TA as long as 1 − 𝜆1 ≤
𝜆1𝛿1 ⋅ 1 𝑠⁄  or 𝛿1 ≥ 𝑠 ⋅ (1 − 𝜆1) 𝜆1⁄ . 
As 𝑠 cannot be smaller than 1, 0.5 ≤ 𝜆1 ≤ 1 is a necessary condition to ensure 
reasonable values of 𝛿1. However, 𝜆1 ≥ 0.5 (and 𝛿1 sufficiently large) makes positive 
returned amounts to OTMs optimal, only as long as there is a single OTM with minimum 
earnings. Once the minimum is raised to the level of the second-lowest payoff or once 
there are two subjects with the same minimum earnings, the condition tightens to 𝜆1 ≥2 3⁄  (and 𝛿1 appropriately). Thus, in contrast to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Charness and 
Rabin (2002) preferences can lead to a partial equalization of profits. Full payoff 
equalization in equilibrium will only obtain if 𝜆1 is large enough to make redistribution 
profitable in the case the points have to be split among all three OTMs, i.e. 𝜆1 ≥ 0.75 (and 
𝛿1 appropriately). 
This implies the following: If 𝜆1 ≥ 0.75 (and 𝛿1 appropriately), there is an 
equilibrium in which all OTMs contribute their full endowment even if they are completely 
selfish and rational and the more so if they are other-regarding, i.e. 𝑐𝑖 = 𝐸 = 20 ∀𝑖 ≠ 1, 
and 𝑑𝑖 = 32 ∀𝑖.38 If 𝜆1 < 0.5, selfish OTMs choose 𝑐𝑖 = 0, while 𝐸 = 20 is contributed 
by OTMs who care sufficiently about efficiency (requiring 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0.625 and 𝛿𝑖 sufficiently 
                                                 
37 For 𝜆𝑖 = 0, the Charness and Rabin (2002) model nests standard preferences. 
38 There is, of course, indifference of the TA between distributions in case of 𝜆1 = 0.75. This leads to 
multiple equilibria sustaining also contribution levels below 20. 
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low39). If 0.5 ≤ 𝜆1 < 0.75, full cooperation will not be obtained with selfish and rational 
OTMs. However, partial cooperation with one or two OTMs contributing positive amounts 
is possible (the latter only for 𝜆1 ≥ 2 3⁄ ). Again, if all OTMs care sufficiently about 
efficiency, full cooperation will arise. 
In the VCM+ treatment, OTMs have to care sufficiently for social welfare to have an 
incentive to contribute to the public account. Note that an increase in the contribution level 
decreases an OTM’s own payoff by 1 − 𝛾 𝑛⁄ , increases the minimum payoff in the team by 
𝛾 𝑛⁄  and increases the sum of all team members’ payoffs by 𝛾 − 1. Hence, contributing 
positive amounts is optimal if (1 − 𝜆𝑖)(1 − 𝛾 𝑛⁄ ) ≤ 𝜆𝑖𝛿𝑖 ⋅ 𝛾 𝑛⁄ + 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝛿𝑖)(𝛾 − 1) or 
𝛿𝑖 ≤ 6 − 3 𝜆𝑖⁄ . For 𝛿𝑖 to be non-negative, this requires 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0.5. Full cooperation by all 
group members will therefore only arise if all OTMs fulfill 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0.5 (and 𝛿𝑖 appropriately). 
 
Proposition 3. With Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences, the TA in the TAG might be 
willing to return positive amounts to OTMs if 𝜆1 ≥ 0.5 (and 𝛿1 sufficiently high), i.e. if she 
is sufficiently “maximin”-oriented. However, full payoff equalization can only be achieved 
if 𝜆1 ≥ 0.75 (and 𝛿1 appropriately). Full cooperation is also possible if all OTMs care 
sufficiently about efficiency. In the VCM+ treatment, full cooperation will only arise if all 
OTMs fulfill 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0.5 (and 𝛿𝑖 appropriately). 
 
To sum up, in contrast to the case of standard preferences both models of other-
regarding preferences predict (for appropriate parameter values) that TAs in the TAG 
return positive amounts to OTMs. Moreover, such behavior can induce full cooperation 
and payoff equalization within the team. Both models can also explain full cooperation in 
the VCM+ treatment. However, an equilibrium with full cooperation in the VCM+ requires 
that all OTMs have sufficiently strong other-regarding preferences, whereas in the TAG it 
is sufficient that the TA has strong enough other-regarding preferences. One noteworthy 
difference between the two discussed models is that in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model 
according to our parameterization, there are no asymmetric equilibria, whereas there are 
such equilibria for the Charness and Rabin (2002) model in both treatments. 
                                                 
39 To see this, note that if a single OTM contributes one point to the public account, both the OTM’s payoff 
and the minimum payoff is reduced by 1, whereas the sum of payoffs increases by 𝛾 − 1. Thus, contributing 
is advantageous if (1 − 𝜆𝑖) + 𝜆𝑖𝛿𝑖 ≤ 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝛿𝑖)(𝛾 − 1) or 𝛿𝑖 ≤ 1 − 1 (1.6𝜆𝑖)⁄ . This implies 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0.625 
(and 𝛿𝑖 appropriately). Note that the restriction on 𝛿𝑖 becomes weaker for further OTMs contributing one 
point (without changing the requirement on 𝜆𝑖) as their contributions do not decrease the minimum anymore. 
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2.3.2.3 Heterogeneous social preferences and repeated interaction (reputation model) 
In a repeated game with heterogeneous social preferences, the argument that TAs 
return positive amounts to OTMs holds a fortiori. With repeated interaction, additionally, 
selfish TAs have an incentive to act as if they were other-regarding, because the future 
stream of income created by mimicking is larger than the costs of acting non-selfishly in a 
specific period.40 This is true until the ultimate or until the pen-ultimate period, in which 
the opportunistic TAs that mimic other-regarding TAs start appropriating the benefits from 
the public account. By returning positive amounts to OTMs until the last or the second-to-
last period, TAs induce higher contributions by the OTMs in future periods that the TA can 
subsequently pocket for herself. The argument holds only for the TAG treatment and not 
for the VCM+ treatment, but depending on the model there might also be additional 
contribution incentives in the latter treatment. We refrain from characterizing all equilibria 
in the repeated game because the argument has been used and formalized straightforwardly 
in connection with trust contracts (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 2007). 
Note finally that both the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and the Charness and Rabin (2002) 
model, taken literally, would yield a very high number of either zero or full contributions 
and no intermediate contribution amounts. 
 
Proposition 4. With heterogeneous social preferences and repeated interaction, the TA in 
the TAG might change behavior across periods to profit from reputation effects. There is 
an incentive for completely selfish TAs to mimic the behavior of other-regarding TAs until 
the ultimate or the pen-ultimate period of the game. 
 
2.4. Experimental results 
We start with a comparison of contributions and profits in the TAG and the VCM+ 
treatment in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 decomposes contribution behavior in the TAG further, 
and Section 4.3 analyzes the details of the TA’s behavior as well as OTMs’ optimal 
replies. 
 
                                                 
40 We implicitly assume in this argument that players are not entirely sure about their opponent’s type, i.e. we 
relax the common knowledge assumption. 
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Table 12: Mean contributions and profits (in points) by treatment 
  VCM+ TAG 
Mean contribution 
OTMs 9.88** 14.95** 
Forced contributors/TAs 20 20 
All members 12.41** 16.21** 
Mean profit 
OTMs 29.98*** 26.54*** 
Forced contributors/TAs 19.86*** 39.30*** 
All members 27.45** 29.73** 
Note: Difference between VCM+ and TAG significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 
10% level. 
 
2.4.1 Contributions and profits in TAG and VCM+ 
Table 12 provides a first upshot of our main results regarding average contribution 
levels and average profits. It is immediately apparent that the TAG elicits higher 
contribution levels and, hence, leads to higher profits than the control treatment VCM+. 
Since there is always one team member that is forced to contribute the entire endowment, 
the difference between the treatments is solely driven by the contributions of the OTMs. 
The first row of Table 12 shows that mean contribution levels of OTMs differ by five 
points or 25% of the endowment. This difference is clearly significant (p < 0.05, Mann-
Whitney U-test, N = 36).41  
 
Significance can also be shown by an OLS regression on contributions (cf. model 1 in 
Table 13) where only the treatment dummy TAG is included (p < 0.01, standard errors 
clustered on the team level).42 The significant difference in OTMs’ contributions, by the 
nature of the game, translates into a significant difference in overall profits. In contrast to 
the prediction based on standard preferences, the TAG is thus more efficient than the 
VCM+. 
  
                                                 
41 All non-parametric tests that we use in this chapter are two-sided tests. 
42 Note that we present OLS rather than tobit regressions for contributions because they are more 
straightforward to interpret and they avoid the difficulties associated with interpreting interaction effects in 
nonlinear models (see Ai and Norton, 2003). Qualitatively, tobit regressions yield the same results. 
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Table 13: Contributions of OTMs (OLS regressions) 
 Dependent variable: Contributions of OTMs 
 Model 1 Model 2 
TAG dummy 5.069*** 
(1.834) 
-0.520 
(1.727) 
Period 
 
- 0.404 
(0.529) 
Period² 
 
- -0.107** 
(0.044) 
Period * TAG - 2.096*** 
(0.757) 
Period² * TAG - -0.154** 
(0.064) 
Constant 
 
9.881*** 
(1.501) 
11.786*** 
(1.284) 
# Observations 1080 1080 
R² 0.088 0.158 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on team level). 
 
By looking at profits in more detail (see Table 12, rows 4-5), distributional issues 
become apparent. TAs in the TAG earn about 1/3 more than OTMs. However, OTM’s 
average profit of 26.54 lies clearly above the endowment level, indicating that profits are 
more balanced than one might have expected according to standard theory. On the 
contrary, in the VCM+ treatment OTMs earn about 1/3 more than the forced contributors 
who only roughly earn their endowment level. A comparison between treatments, not 
surprisingly, shows that TAs in the TAG earn significantly more than forced contributors 
in the VCM+ (indeed, twice as much) (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 36). In 
contrast to this, OTMs in the TAG earn significantly less than OTMs in the VCM+ (p < 
0.01, Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 36). However, this does not tell the entire story. Without 
any voluntary cooperation, OTMs would earn 20 in the TAG and 28 in the VCM+. We 
therefore can compare the profits to this baseline and get the actual gains by cooperation in 
the different treatments. The OTMs’ gains of cooperation are, on average, 6.54 in the TAG 
and 1.98 in the VCM+, the difference is significant (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 
36). 
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Result 1. Mean contributions and profits are significantly higher in treatment TAG than in 
VCM+. In the TAG, TAs earn about 1/3 more than OTMs. OTMs’ earnings lie clearly 
above the endowment level and the gains of cooperation are significantly higher than in 
VCM+. 
 
Figure 9 delineates average contributions of OTMs over time for both treatments. 
While average contributions are around 12 points and roughly the same in period 1 in the 
two treatments, from period 2 on, the difference between the two treatments becomes 
apparent. In the TAG, average contributions increase until they reach a level of almost 18 
in period 4. Afterwards, average contributions decline slowly and remain still at a level of 
14 in period 9, before they finally drop to 9 in period 10 due to a strong endgame effect. 
On the contrary, in the VCM+ average contributions decline almost linearly over time and 
end at a level of 4.5 in period 10.43 This pattern suggests that TAs win OTMs’ trust quickly 
by implementing appropriate first period decisions. They seem to be able to stabilize 
contributions on a high level in contrast to the VCM+, in which cooperation decays over 
time just as it is usually observed in standard VCMs. 
In the regression of model 2 in Table 13 we not only include the variable TAG but add 
four variables capturing time trend differences between the two treatments. In addition to 
Period and Period² we use the two interaction terms Period * TAG and Period² * TAG. 
Results show that the treatment dummy becomes completely insignificant once we control 
for the time trend. For VCM+, we observe Period to be insignificant while Period² has a 
significantly negative sign. Hence, there is no evidence for a quadratic time trend in the 
VCM+ treatment. However, if we run a regression for VCM+ using Period only, this 
variable is highly significant (p < 0.01), indicating a clear decrease in cooperation over 
time. For the TAG, we have to consider the joint effect with the interaction terms. Note 
that both of them are significant. By adding up Period and Period * TAG as well as 
Period² and Period² * TAG we get the expected signs of a quadratic specification. 
Moreover, if we test for the combined effects to be zero, both null hypotheses can clearly 
be rejected (Wald tests, p < 0.01 in both cases). This confirms that treatment differences 
rely on differences in the time trend of contributions. 
                                                 
43 A Mann-Whitney U-test shows that contribution differences in period 1 are indeed not significant (p = 
0.54, N = 108). Significant differences, however, exist for periods 3-9 (p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney U-tests, N = 
36). 
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Figure 9: Evolution of OTMs’ average contributions across treatments 
 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of the number of teams with full cooperation across treatments 
 
 
Result 2. There is no significant difference in contributions between the two treatments in 
period 1. But from period 2 on, contributions in the two treatments develop differently. 
While contributions decline almost linearly in the VCM+ treatment, there is a quadratic 
time trend in the TAG that leads to higher contributions in all subsequent periods. 
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Figure 10 compares the number of teams with full cooperation in both treatments over 
time. It is clearly visible from period 2 on that the number of fully cooperating teams is 
roughly twice as high in the TAG than in the VCM+. This confirms the prediction from the 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model that full cooperation is easier to achieve in the TAG 
treatment. In fact, up to 2/3 of all teams manage to cooperate completely in intermediate 
periods of the TAG. 
 
2.4.2 Explaining contribution behavior in the TAG 
The OLS regressions in Table 14 concentrate on the TAG treatment and provide 
deeper insights into the dynamics that drive cooperative behavior of OTMs. All models 
contain only the periods 2-10, because first period contributions are not influenced by TA’s 
decisions.44 
In model 1 we include Period and Period² and add both individual 𝑖’s contribution in 
the previous period 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 (Contribution (t-1)) and the amount returned to 𝑖 by the 
respective TA in the previous period 𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 (Returned amount (t-1)). Both lagged variables 
are highly significant and show a positive effect on next period’s contributions. Especially, 
higher returned amounts, holding contributions constant, yield higher contributions in the 
subsequent period. This means that a more generous distribution decision by TAs increases 
future cooperation of OTMs. Interestingly, the quadratic time trend observed in Table 13 is 
not significant in this model and its coefficients are close to zero. We can show that this is 
not caused by the exclusion of period 1 as both time variables are large and highly 
significant (p < 0.05 each) in the absence of further covariates. Hence, we add model 2 in 
which we replace the quadratic trend by a linear one. Results reveal that contributions 
significantly decrease by about 0.5 points per period. Controlling for the lagged variables, 
therefore, turns the quadratic time trend into a linear one. This suggests that previous 
decisions by the TA cause the initial increase in contributions in the TAG. 
Model 3 takes care of the fact that OTMs are not only informed about their own 
returned amount but also about the contributions and the returned amount of their team 
members. We control for social information by adding the lagged average contribution of 
the two other OTMs within the team (Avg. contribution other OTMs (t-1)) and the lagged 
average returned amount to these OTMs (Avg. returned amount other OTMs (t-1)). Results 
                                                 
44 Tobit and random effects specifications yield very similar results. 
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show that the latter variable has a significantly positive effect indicating that OTMs do not 
only take into account their own returned amount but also what TAs return to the other two 
team members. 
From the specifications of models 1-3 we can conclude that contribution changes in 
the TAG depend on two main aspects: previous period’s return behavior of the TA and the 
respective period. While the former carries information about the TA’s type the latter 
seems to reflect a general belief about a slightly decreasing trustworthiness of TAs towards 
the end of the interaction, which could be explained by an anticipation of mimicking 
behavior of opportunistic TAs.45 
 
Result 3. Contributions of OTMs in the TAG depend negatively on period and positively 
on TA’s previous period’s returning behavior. 
 
Finally, we present an alternative approach by only focusing on subjects that 
contribute positive amounts to the public account to be able to apply a relative measure of 
the benefits from an investment. Figure 11 shows mean contribution levels in period 𝑡 + 1 
for different categories of the individual return rate by the TA in period 𝑡. Note that the 
individual return rate 𝑟 is defined as 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 𝑐𝑖,𝑡⁄ . Not surprisingly, we find that OTMs 
contribute little in period 𝑡 + 1 if they do not get any return in the preceding period 𝑡. 
Increasing the returned amount to a rate of 1.6 clearly raises subsequent average 
contributions of OTMs and a return rate of 1.6 is nearly always followed by an OTM 
contributing the entire endowment. Interestingly, we find a negative effect for return rates 
larger than 1.6. Extraordinarily high relative returns, i.e. returns that exceed the amount 
generated by the respective investment, tend to decrease contribution levels in the 
subsequent period.46 Such “over-generous” behavior seems to raise OTM’s suspicion 
regarding the TA, but the number of observations is comparatively low. 
 
                                                 
45 Note that both Period and the TA’s previous period’s return behavior stay highly significant once we 
include higher lags into the models. Significant effects can also be obtained by a fixed effects estimation. 
Finally, note that we also tried a linear, dynamic panel-data estimation method (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
This method has the drawback that we cannot cluster on the team level and that we lose one further period. 
Nevertheless, we also find a significant influence of the two main aspects mentioned above. 
46 A significant negative effect can also be shown by inserting a squared expression for the lagged returned 
amount in model 2 of Table 14. However, due to the small number of observations the decreasing effect is 
less robust when we introduce such a variable in estimation approaches such as fixed effects or the Arellano-
Bond estimator. 
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Table 14: Contributions of OTMs in TAG (OLS regressions) 
 Dependent variable: Contribution of OTMs in 
TAG, 
periods 2-10 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Period 
 
0.035 
(0.663) 
-0.568*** 
(0.100) 
-0.534*** 
(0.088) 
Period² 
 
-0.050 
(0.057) 
- - 
Contribution (t-1) 
 
0.205** 
(0.073) 
0.208*** 
(0.071) 
0.271*** 
(0.061) 
Returned amount (t-1) 
 
0.325*** 
(0.047) 
0.329*** 
(0.046) 
0.186*** 
(0.025) 
Avg. contribution other OTMs (t-1) - - -0.075 
(0.109) 
Avg. returned amount other OTMs (t-
1) 
- - 0.239*** 
(0.043) 
Constant 
 
6.531*** 
(2.166) 
7.898*** 
(1.703) 
5.685*** 
(1.366) 
# Observations 486 486 486 
R² 0.557 0.556 0.611 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on team level). 
 
 
Figure 11: Contributions in the next period for different categories of the individual return 
rate 
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Result 4. For maximizing contributions in the subsequent period, it is the best strategy to 
return exactly 1.6 times the contributed amount. Higher individual return rates tend to 
decline contributions in the next period. 
 
2.4.3 Behavior of the TA and consequences for OTMs 
Figure 12 gives a descriptive overview of the dynamics within each team in the TAG. 
It displays the average contribution levels of OTMs alongside with TAs’ average returns to 
the team members.47 The abbreviation on top of each panel indicates session (1-3), team 
(a-f) and provides information on the behavioral type of the TA according to the ring test 
in parentheses. The letter “I” indicates an individualistic TA, “C” represents a cooperative 
TA, and an “X” is displayed whenever the TA cannot be categorized by the ring test 
because of failing to meet the consistency standard. We have twelve individualistic, four 
cooperative and two non-classifiable TAs.48 
As it can be discerned easily from Figure 12, no team starts with full cooperation in 
the TAG. OTMs seem to contribute cautiously in period 1, testing the reaction of their 
respective TA. However, first period behavior of TAs already leads to full cooperation in 
period 2 in eight out of 18 teams (44.44%). This number increases even a bit further and 
stays around 50-60% until period 8. While seven teams still cooperate fully in period 9, 
three teams even manage to cooperate fully until period 10 (see also Figure 10). 
Remarkably, only three teams (1e, 2b, 2c) never reach full cooperation in any of the ten 
periods. 
We classify the teams in high contribution teams (1a, 1b, 2a, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 3a, 3b, 3d, 
3e), low contribution teams (1c, 1e, 3c, 3f), and mixed contribution teams (1d, 1f, 2b). 
High contribution teams are teams that show either average contribution levels of OTMs 
above ten (50% of the endowment) in each intermediate period 2-9 or that have a 
significantly increasing contribution pattern ending above 50% in period 9 (spearman rank 
correlation coefficient, p < 0.05). Low contribution teams are obtained by reversing the 
classification, while mixed contribution is the remaining category.49 
                                                 
47 Appendix C provides a similar graph showing average contribution levels of OTMs in the VCM+ 
treatment. 
48 The ring test provides evidence that there is no anti-social TA in our experiment. Hence, forcing the TA to 
contribute her full endowment is innocuous, in line with the discussion in Section 2.2 (see footnote 8).  
49 Note that we observe only few teams in the low contribution category. This is different from what we 
usually observe in standard public goods games and also different from VCM+. Appendix C shows that the 
frequency of categories is significantly different between TAG and VCM+. 
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Do TAs in high contribution teams behave differently than TAs in the other 
categories? If we look at average returns of TAs (consider the squared lines in Figure 12), 
it is obvious that the returned amounts in high contribution teams are indeed very high and 
a closer look at the data reveals that in almost all cases full cooperation goes along with 
equal profits for all team members. Six out of these eleven TAs (1a, 2a, 2d, 2e, 3b, 3e) 
return in each period, on average, more than the invested amount to their OTMs. 
Moreover, there is one TA (in team 2f) who does the same in all periods 1-9 but faces a 
zero average contribution of OTMs in period 10.50 The other four TAs (1b, 2c, 3a, 3d) also 
return large amounts but appropriate the entire public account in the last or a late period. 
On the contrary, TAs in teams with low or mixed contribution levels return either 
relatively low amounts in general (1c, 1e, 2b) or they return large amounts in the 
beginning, until full cooperation is achieved, but then take a large share of the public 
account for themselves already around period 5, thereby destroying cooperation in the 
subsequent period (1d, 1f, 3c, 3f). Interestingly, three of the latter TAs (1d, 3c, 3f) return 
large amounts in the following periods, presumably in order to re-increase OTMs’ 
contributions. 
All three of them, finally, take the chance to appropriate a large share of the 
cooperation benefits a second time. Hence, TAs in high contribution teams allocate indeed 
differently than TAs in the other teams. 
To sum up, four types of TAs appear in our data: TAs returning large amounts in each 
period (type 1), TAs returning large amounts except for a late period (or periods) where 
they take the entire public account for themselves (type 2), TAs taking a large share of the 
public account twice, precisely in a period around period 5 and a late period (type 3) and 
TAs returning small amounts in general (type 4). While the first two types generate high 
and stable levels of cooperation, the third type creates ups and downs in contribution levels 
and the fourth type generates a decrease in contributions, just as we usually observe in 
standard public goods games. 
  
                                                 
50 Hence, we do not know whether this TA would also have returned more than the invested amount in the 
last period. We therefore carefully sort her into the category of type 2 in Figure 13 (see below), although she 
could also be of type 1. 
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Figure 12: Average contributions of and returns to OTMs in TAG over time by team 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Types of TAs in TAG 
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Note that both type 2 and type 3 behavior is in line with mimicking strategies of 
selfish TAs (see our theoretic arguments in Section 3.2.3), while type 4 is selfish without 
mimicking cooperativeness. Figure 13 shows the distribution of types that we observe in 
our experiment.51 Six of our 18 TAs belong to type 1. 
Looking at mean profits of TAs, the TA in team 1d performs best (an average of 50.6 
points per period), followed by the TAs in teams 3c (47.5), 3d (46.8), 1f (45.6), and 1e 
(45.1). It is apparent that both TAs in teams 1d and 3c are of the third type. Thus, the 
strategy of appropriating the entire public account twice and returning large amounts in the 
other periods seems to be the most successful one in terms of maximizing the TA’s profit. 
The TAs in teams 3d and 1f take the public account only once. Interestingly, the TA in 
team 1e, who returns almost nothing over all ten periods, earns the fifth largest amount, but 
nevertheless five points less, on average, than the best performing TA. However, if we 
compare overall team profits, team 1e clearly performs poorest with an average profit of 
only 24.5 points per team member. On the contrary, in the best performing teams 3b, 3d 
and 3e, team members earn, on average, 31.7 points per period. The latter teams have in 
common that their TAs are either of type 1 or 2. 
 
Result 5. Heterogeneity between teams in terms of OTMs’ contribution levels is caused by 
TAs’ returning behavior. Most of the teams show high levels of cooperation because of the 
large fraction of TAs being either of type 1 or 2, i.e. returning large amounts until (almost) 
the end of the interaction. This is remarkable since it is not a TA’s profit maximizing 
strategy from an ex post perspective. 
 
Can we explain the heterogeneity between TAs by social orientation? If we consider 
our ring test classification, it becomes obvious that only one of our four cooperative TAs 
(3b) resists the temptation of taking the entire public account until the end of the 
interaction. Thus, we cannot claim that being cooperative as a TA is a good indicator for 
non-exploitation of team members’ trust. In addition, four of the six TAs returning more 
than invested in each period are classified as individualistic. Hence, there are 
individualistic TAs that are not just mimicking cooperative TAs but that become in fact 
trustworthy when put in the role of the TA. In line with this, the aggregated return rate for 
                                                 
51 Note that the TA in team 1f is of type 2, although she creates only a mixed contribution pattern, according 
to the contribution classification of teams. 
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OTMs, defined as ?̅?𝑂𝑇𝑀,𝑡 = 13 ∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡4𝑖=2 13 ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡4𝑖=2� P51F52P, is, on average, even slightly higher if 
the TA is individualistic than if she is cooperative (1.42, N = 112 vs. 1.35, N = 38) and this 
holds also for the last period. Hence, we do not find any descriptive evidence for a more 
trustworthy behavior of cooperative TAs. This result is confirmed by a cluster-robust OLS 
regression explaining a TA’s relative appropriation of the public account by her social 
motivation as it yields insignificant results for the ring test dummy, both over all periods 
and for the last period.53 This confirms that social orientation, surprisingly, does not matter 
for TA’s decisions. 
 
Result 6. Surprisingly, heterogeneity in TA’s distribution behavior cannot be explained by 
social orientation. Many individualistic TAs behave cooperatively even in the last period 
once they are responsible for the distribution of the public account. 
 
Overall, the average aggregated return rate is 1.42. This value is astonishingly high 
compared to predictions based on standard theory. Figure 14 shows that the mean of the 
aggregated return rate varies over time and, especially, decreases in the last three periods. 
However, even in period 10, it is slightly above one, indicating that TAs return more, on 
average, than OTMs contribute. Combining Figure 14 with the regression results in Tables 
13 and 14, we can finally explain why we find a significant quadratic time trend in 
contributions in the TAG:  
While the increase in cooperation in the first half of the ten periods is caused by TAs’ 
high and even increasing return rates, the decrease is due to a decrease in aggregated return 
rates from period 8 on (see Figure 14) and due to OTMs’ beliefs about a decreasing 
trustworthiness of TAs (see the significant influence of Period in Table 14). 
 
                                                 
52 Note that the aggregated return rate is a weighted average of OTMs’ individual return rates with the weight 
being a single OTM’s relative contribution, i.e. 𝑐𝑖 ∑ 𝑐𝑖4𝑖=2⁄ . 
53 This holds irrespective of whether we control for the size of the public account or not. Using the exact 
angles of the vectors as obtained out of the ring test does not change the result either. 
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Figure 14: Evolution of the average aggregated return rate 
 
 
If we look at the distribution of aggregated return rates, see row 1 of Table 1554, it 
becomes obvious that TAs return, on average, exactly 1.6 times the contributed amount in 
more than 50% of the cases. Moreover, in about 30% of the cases, TAs implicitly reward 
OTMs for contributing but do not return the full benefit generated by OTMs’ contributions. 
Interestingly, it is not predominantly the case within this category that TAs return only the 
investment plus an increment to barely motivate contributions in the subsequent period. 
Indeed, aggregated return rates between 1 and 1.3 are rare and appear only eight times. 
More frequently, in 13 cases, we observe aggregated return rates that are even larger than 
1.6, implying that TAs sacrifice parts of their own share. Overall, positive reciprocity is 
obtained in 151 out of the 170 cases (88.8%) where OTMs, on average, contribute positive 
amounts to the public account. Furthermore, the level of implicit reward is quite 
substantial. Implicit punishment, on the contrary, is seen rarely. Partial punishment is 
almost not existent and there are only 17 cases in which TAs take the entire share of the 
public account if mean contributions of OTMs are positive (plus nine cases in which the 
mean contribution is zero). 
Concerning the distribution of profits within a team, it is noticeable that in 62 out of 
the 170 cases (36.47%) full payoff equalization across all team members (including the 
                                                 
54 Row 1 excludes ten cases in which no OTM in the team contributes positive amounts because the 
aggregated return rate is not defined. Not surprisingly, TAs do usually not return positive amounts to OTMs 
in such a case. 
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TA) is achieved. All of these cases exhibit full cooperation and a return rate of 1.6 to 
everybody. Remember that full payoff equalization was the central prediction for certain 
parameter values of a TA’s utility function (𝛽1 ≥ 0.75, 𝜆1 ≥ 0.75) in both the Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999)- and the Charness and Rabin (2002) model. However, if contributions 
between team members differ, full payoff equalization is not observed.55 TAs 
overwhelmingly ensure by their returning behavior that low contributors earn less than 
high contributors. This happens either by returning the same individual return rate to each 
OTM or by raising the return rate with higher OTMs’ contributions. Thus, TAs seem to 
follow a norm of effort-based inequity or maximin orientation once contributions differ, as 
the two theories predict implicitly. 
 
Result 7. The average aggregated return rate is relatively high but decreases from period 
8 onwards. Thus, there are two reasons for the decrease in cooperation in the second half 
of the experiment: Subjects’ beliefs about a reduced trustworthiness of TAs and an actual 
decrease in the aggregated return rate. 
 
Row 2 of Table 15 presents the individual return rates to OTMs in the TAG (defined 
as 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 𝑐𝑖,𝑡⁄ ). Again, we focus here on observations in which OTMs contribute 
positive amounts. In addition, there are 86 cases in which the contribution of an OTM is 
zero. However, in almost all of these cases (actually, 78), a zero contribution results in a 
zero return by the TA. 
 
                                                 
55 Note that in case of unequal contributions full payoff equalization would sometimes require the usage of 
two decimal places for the returned amount. However, there is no single observation in our data in which 
payoffs are equalized except for a remainder which cannot be split equally (having size 0.2). Moreover, this 
design issue should not matter in later periods as an almost equalization of profits already generates strong 
contribution incentives and, hence, full cooperation should appear in subsequent periods. 
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Table 15: Frequency of return rates to OTMs on aggregated and individual level 
 rate = 0 0 < rate < 1 1 ≤ rate < 1.6 rate = 1.6 rate > 1.6 Sum 
 Full Punishment 
Partial 
Punishment 
Partial 
Reward 
Full 
Reward 
Excessive 
Reward  
aggregated 
return rate 17 2 48 90 13 170 
individual 
return rate 45 13 103 244 49 454 
Notes: The aggregated return rate is defined as ?̅?𝑂𝑇𝑀,𝑡 = 13∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡4𝑖=2 13∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡4𝑖=2� , the individual 
return rate as 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 𝑐𝑖,𝑡⁄ . 
 
In contrast, OTMs contributing positive amounts are predominantly faced by TAs 
rewarding their contribution behavior. In 293 cases (64.65%) the respective OTM receives 
the whole benefit generated by her investment or even more than that. Furthermore, if one 
adds the 103 observations which are below 1.6 but above or equal to 1, it turns out that the 
investment is profitable in about 87% of the cases. Hence, OTMs manage to benefit from 
their investments in almost every case. If we additionally account for the cases in which 
OTMs contribute zero and assume that this mistrust is justified then we find OTMs to 
benefit from an investment into the public account in 73% of cases. Thus, in the large 
majority of cases, it pays off for OTMs to contribute to the public account. 
If we concentrate only on teams in which at the same time some OTMs contribute 
zero and others positive amounts we find the same picture again. TAs exclude free-riders 
from the benefits from cooperation since in 51 out of 56 cases they get a zero return. Thus, 
OTMs contributing zero cannot free-ride on their team members’ contributions. At the 
same time, TAs implicitly reward the contributing OTMs by allocating to them a share 
larger than their investment (true in 82.09% of cases, N = 67). Hence, the same TAs use 
implicit punishment and implicit reward simultaneously when faced with different 
contributions. 
 
Result 8. In most of the cases, trust pays off for OTMs in the TAG. While non-contributors 
are excluded from the benefits from the public account, contributing positive amounts is 
profitable. 
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Figure 15: Mean return and mean contribution for each OTM in the TAG 
 
 
Finally, Figure 15 shows a scatter plot comparing mean returns and mean 
contributions for each OTM in the TAG over all ten periods. Two reference lines are 
added. The 1.0-line captures points where the mean return equals mean contribution. 
Subjects on this line therefore receive on average exactly the amount they invested into the 
public account. In contrast, the 1.6-line consists of all points where subjects, on average, 
receive 1.6 times their invested amount. In particular, if a TA returns to an OTM the 
complete amount generated by the respective contribution in all periods, the resulting dot 
will lie on the 1.6-line. The figure shows that only two observations lie clearly below the 
1.0-line. For these OTMs it did not pay to trust the TA. Moreover, there a few points on or 
near to the 1.0-line. Those subjects do not profit from their investments into the public 
account but they do not lose substantial amounts either. Interestingly, there is only a single 
observation in the origin of the graph, i.e. complete free riding is a very rare event in the 
TAG. In general, most of the points lie in the upper right corner near, on, or even slightly 
above the 1.6-line. This shows again that over the whole course of the experiment almost 
all OTMs manage to gain large benefits from their investments into the public account and 
hence contribute large amounts. 
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Result 9. Over the course of the experiment, nearly all OTMs manage to profit from 
investing into the public account. As a large fraction of TAs returns large amounts, many 
OTMs contribute, on average, almost their full endowment level. 
 
2.5. Discussion and conclusion 
We have analyzed a modified public goods game and implemented it experimentally 
in the laboratory. In our team allocator game, each team member – regardless of whether 
the member is an ordinary team member or the team allocator – can contribute to a public 
account. The sum of contributions is multiplied by an efficiency factor larger than one, but 
– in contrast to the standard public goods game – the public account is not distributed 
equally among all team members. Rather, the team allocator receives the entire amount and 
has full discretionary power over the allocation of the revenues from the account within the 
team. More precisely, she can implement any distribution of the benefits from the public 
account over the ordinary team members and herself. 
We provide three main empirical results: First, in contrast to theoretical predictions 
from standard preferences, we find that the level of contributions in the team allocator 
game is significantly higher than in an appropriate control treatment in which there is no 
team allocator, but one team member is forced to contribute her entire endowment. Second, 
we find that it is the team allocator’s distribution behavior that influences together with the 
time horizon of the team interaction the development of contributions. Contributions 
increase in the returned amount, i.e. the reward channel is most effective in sustaining high 
levels of cooperation. Third, although there is some heterogeneity among the team 
allocators, on average, team allocators return remarkably high amounts to ordinary team 
members that invest into the public account. Non-contributors, however, are excluded from 
the benefits from cooperation. Hence, team allocators generate strong contribution 
incentives. Our results clearly refute predictions based on standard preferences. They are, 
however, largely in line with models of heterogeneous preferences and repeated 
interactions such as (effort-based) inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or a 
maximin-preference (Charness and Rabin, 2002). 
The general implication of our results is that teams with a straightforward hierarchy 
can have an advantage over teams with equal members. They are more likely to overcome 
the social dilemma inherent to public good provision, i.e. team effort provision. This is the 
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more remarkable since the described mechanism is costless: Implicit reward (and, to a 
much lesser degree, implicit punishment) works through the allocation process and does 
not bear any monetary costs such as formal or informal sanctions that have been studied 
widely. Allocation power in teams can, thus, be considered as a potential alternative of a 
sanctioning regime, because the latter is often much more efficiency-damaging. 
However, it is difficult to predict how easily such a mechanism can really be 
implemented in a social dilemma environment. Thus, a natural extension of our setup is to 
implement an endogenous treatment in which subjects can vote on whether they want to 
have a team allocator or not. Another obvious extension would be to let subjects elect their 
team allocator. Recent literature on the impact of elected vs. randomly chosen leaders (e.g. 
Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011; Levy et al., 2011) suggests that legitimate authorities 
enhance team cooperation. As many real-life situations involve voting decisions on group 
leaders, our experiment most probably underestimates the true gain of endogenously 
formed hierarchies. 
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Appendix 
A. Experimental instructions (originally in German)56 
 
A warm welcome to an experiment on decision making! 
Thank you for participating! 
 
During the experiment you and all other participants will be asked to make decisions. Your decisions as well 
as the decisions of the participants you are matched with determine your earnings from the experiment 
according to the following rules. 
 
Please stop talking to other participants from now on. If you have any questions after going through the 
instructions or while the experiment is taking place, please raise your hand, and one of the experimenters will 
come to you and answer your questions privately. In case the question is relevant for all participants, its 
answer is repeated aloud. 
 
The whole experiment is computerized and will last approximately 90 minutes. All your decisions and 
answers remain anonymous. You will not find out with whom you are matched in each of the experiment’s 
parts and how much each of the other participants earns. We evaluate data from the experiment on aggregate 
level only and never link names to data from the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked 
to sign a receipt for your earnings. This has accounting purposes only. 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. At the beginning of each part, you will receive the corresponding 
instructions for this part. The instructions will be read out loud and you will get time to ask questions. Please, 
do not hesitate to ask if anything is unclear to you. Your decisions in Part I of the experiment do not have 
any effects on Part II. In the interest of clarity, we will only use male terms in the instructions. They should 
be interpreted as being gender-neutral. For means of help, you will find a pen on your table. 
 
While taking your decisions at the PC, there will be a clock counting down in the right upper corner of the 
screen. The clock serves as a guide for how much time you should need. You may exceed the time. The input 
screens will not be turned off when time has run out. However, the information screens on which no decision 
is required to be taken will be turned off when time has run out. Once you have taken a decision or have read 
through a screen, please confirm by clicking on the “OK” button. 
 
Your earnings in the experiment will be calculated in “points”. At the end of the experiment, the “points” get 
converted into euro at the exchange rate announced in the respective part. In addition, you receive 4 euro for 
your arrival on time. Your total earnings from the experiment will be paid out to you privately and in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
                                                 
56 Baseline instructions describe treatment TAG. Differences in VCM+ are indicated by [VCM+]. 
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Part I 
 
In Part I of the experiment all participants are randomly assigned into groups of two. Nobody will find out 
with whom he forms a group – not during the experiment and not after the experiment either. 
You have to take 24 decisions in this part of the experiment. In each decision you can choose between 2 
options, A and B. Each option allocates a positive or negative payoff (earning) in points to you and to the 
other person in your group. The other person answers exactly the same questions. Your total payoff from Part 
I depends on your decisions and on the decisions taken by the other person in your group. 
 
A decision example: 
 Option A Option B 
Your payoff 10.00 7.00 
Other’s payoff -5.00 4.00 
 
- If you choose Option A you receive 10 points, and the other person loses 5 points. If the other 
person also chooses Option A, he, too, receives 10 points and you lose 5 points. In total, you 
therefore earn 5 points (10 points from your choice minus 5 points from the other person’s choice). 
The other person earns 5 points (10 points – 5 points), too. 
- In case you choose Option B and the other person chooses Option A, you earn 2 points (7 points 
from your choice minus 5 points from the other person’s decision). The other person earns 14 points 
(10 points + 4 points). 
- The remaining combinations (you choose A and the other person chooses B, or both persons choose 
B) are analogous to these two examples. 
 
Overall you take 24 decisions like the one described above. Your total payoff is computed as follows: The 24 
values for “your payoff” are summed up over your decisions. The 24 values for “other’s payoff” are summed 
up over the other person’s decisions. The sum of these two sums determines your total payoff from this part 
and is converted into euro at the end of the experiment as follows: 25 points = 3 euro (1 point = 12 cent). 
This exchange rate is valid only for Part I of the experiment. 
 
Note that you are not receiving information on each single decision taken by the other person in your group. 
Rather, you will find out only the sum of your decisions for “your payoff”, the sum of the other person’s 
decisions for “other’s payoff” and your total payoff from Part I at the very end of the experiment. Note that 
you do not get any feedback immediately after Part I. 
 
If there are any questions, please raise your hand now. We will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
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Part II 
 
The points earned in Part II are converted into euro at the exchange rate of 25 points = 1 euro (1 point = 4 
cent) at the end of the experiment. 
 
At the beginning of Part II, all participants are randomly assigned into groups of four. Nobody will find out 
with whom he forms a group – not during the experiment and not after the experiment either. Part II consists 
of 10 identical periods and you remain matched with the same persons throughout the entire Part II. 
 
Each participant is randomly given an individual name which, too, remains the same across all 10 periods, 
and which allows you to keep track of the behavior of your group members throughout the periods. The 
names are: Person 1, Person 2, Person 3 and Person 4. 
Furthermore, a member type is assigned to each group member (A or B).  Within each group there is one 
group member of type A and three group members of type B. The group members of type A and B differ in 
their decision possibilities. The type of each group member is publicly announced within the group and 
remains the same throughout the 10 periods. 
 
The group member of type A is randomly determined. The probability of being of type A is 25 % for each 
group member. The remaining three group members are of type B. 
 
Endowment and alternatives in each period 
Each period consists of two stages, a contribution stage and a distribution stage 
 
Contribution stage: 
 
Each participant receives an initial endowment of 20 points at the beginning of the contribution stage in each 
period. The 20 points are allocated to two alternatives, a group account and a private account, depending on 
the participant’s type: 
 
The group member of type A is obliged to put all of the 20 points into the group account. Thus, the group 
member of type A takes no decision during the contribution stage.  
Group members of type B can freely choose how many points to contribute to the group account and how 
many points to contribute to the private account. 
 
The group account: 
Contributions to the group account from all group members are summed up. The sum is multiplied with 1.6 
and distributed among the group members during the distribution stage (s.b.). For example, if the sum of all 
contributed points to the group account is 60, there are 60*1.6=96 points from the group account to be 
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distributed to the group members in the distribution stage. If the sum of contributed points to the group 
account is 20, there are 20*1.6=32 points from the group account to be distributed in the distribution stage. 
 
The private account: 
The contribution of a group member to the private account turns solely and one-to-one into direct earning of 
the respective individual. For example, if a group member puts 6 points into the private account, he receives 
exactly 6 points from the private account to his earnings. If the contribution to the private account is 17, the 
group member earns exactly 17 points from the private account. The other group members do not receive 
anything in each case. 
 
Distribution stage: 
 
During the distribution stage, the group account gets divided among the four group members. 
The group member of type A is in charge of the division. He distributes the group account among himself 
and the other group members. Group members of type B do not have any influence. Values with at 
maximum one decimal place are allowed for the distribution (please use a dot to separate digits). 
[VCM+: The distribution is done automatically. Each group member receives 25% of the group account.] 
The following table is exemplary and shows several distributions for the case that there are 60 points to be 
distributed. The first three distribution settings are possible. The fourth one is not possible as there are too 
few points (29) that are distributed. The fifth setting is not possible either as there are too many points (120) 
that are distributed. 
 
 Distribution 1 Distribution 2 Distribution 3 Distribution 4 Distribution 5 
Person 1 12.6 0 15 5 45 
Person 2 10 0 15 8 15 
Person 3 21 60 15 2 15 
Person 4 16.4 0 15 14 45 
 Possible Possible Possible Too few points Too many points 
 
Naturally, the actual distribution chosen by the group member of type A can look completely different to the 
exemplary distributions 1–3. Any combination of numbers that adds up to the sum to be distributed is 
possible. 
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[VCM+: The following table is exemplary and shows the distribution for the case that there are 60 points to 
be distributed. 
 
 Distribution 
Person 1 15 
Person 2 15 
Person 3 15 
Person 4 15 
 
] 
 
Earnings in one period: 
 
Your earnings per period are the sum of the amount of your private account and the amount allocated to you 
from the group account. 
 
Procedure: 
 
On the first screen you get told about your individual name (Person 1, Person 2, Person 3 or Person 4) and 
which Person is of type A. The other group members are automatically of type B. Afterwards, all group 
members of type B get asked about how much of the 20 points they would like to contribute to the group 
account. The remainder is automatically allocated to the private account. Saving points for later periods is 
thus not possible. Only integer numbers between 0 and 20 (whereby 0 and 20 are possible choices, too) can 
be entered. The group member of type A is obliged to contribute 20 points to the group account and, 
consequently, does not get an input screen. 
Afterwards, all group members get informed about contributions to the group account of all group members 
and the resulting sum to be distributed. 
The group member of type A is then asked how he wants to divide the group account among the group 
members. The Windows Calculator can be used to help with calculations. It can be found by clicking on the 
calculator symbol on the screen. 
[VCM+: Thereafter, the group account is divided among the group members.] 
At the end of the period, all group members are informed about the contributions to the group account, the 
allocation from the group account, the contributions to the private account as well as the earnings of all group 
members in this period. Subsequently, the next period starts. 
 
This part of the experiment is finished after 10 periods. The results from all periods are summed up and 
converted into euro. 
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Afterwards we will ask you to fill in a short questionnaire on the PC. The questions on individual persons 
relate to the names of Part II. There are reply options given for most of the questions. Free text entry is 
required by some questions. For free text entry questions, please write your answers in the corresponding 
blue text box on the PC screen, and confirm your entry by clicking the enter button. Your text will then 
appear above the blue text box. 
 
You get told your feedback from Part I after you have filled in the questionnaire. After that, payment of your 
total earnings in the experiment takes place. 
 
If there are any questions, please raise your hand now. We will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
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B. Social value orientation questionnaire (ring test) 
The social value orientation questionnaire consists of 24 different allocation tasks. In 
each task, a subject chooses among two payoff allocations, called options A and B (see 
Table 16). Each option allocates money, in experimental currency units, to the subject 
herself (own payoff 𝑥) and an anonymous recipient (other’s payoff 𝑦). The recipient stays 
the same in all 24 allocation tasks and answers herself the same set of questions (thereby, 
vice versa, influencing the first person’s payoff). It is common knowledge that both 
persons receive the same set of tasks. No feedback about the other person’s decisions is 
given during the questionnaire to avoid any strategic considerations. 
All used payoff allocations lie, equally distributed, on a circle with radius 𝑟 = 15 that 
is centered at the origin of an 𝑥- 𝑦-coordinate system, i.e. 𝑟2 = 152 = 𝑥2 + 𝑦2 holds. Note 
that it is possible to represent these allocations by vectors in a Cartesian plane. Tasks are 
designed such that subjects always decide between two adjacent payoff allocations. By 
assuming that subjects have a preferred motivational vector 𝑀��⃑  somewhere in the Cartesian 
plane, it is optimal for them to always choose the allocation that is closer to 𝑀��⃑ . 
Adding up subject’s 𝑥 and 𝑦 separately across all decisions yields a total sum of 
money allocated to the subject herself (𝑋) and to the recipient (𝑌). The point (𝑋, 𝑌) 
determines the vector 𝐴 which is used to estimate a subject’s social orientation. This is 
done by computing the angle 𝛼 between 𝐴 and the 𝑥-axis using tan𝛼 = 𝑌 𝑋⁄ . The size of 
the angle specifies in which out of eight behavioral types a subject is sorted (see Figure 
16). Subjects with an angle 𝛼 between 337.5° and 22.5° are classified as individualistic, 
subjects with an angle between 22.5° and 67.5° as cooperative. The other categories are: 
altruism (between 67.5° and 112.5°), martyrdom (between 112.5° and 157.5°), masochism 
(between 157.5° and 202.5°), sadomasochism (between 202.5° and 247.5°), aggression 
(between 247.5° and 292.5°), and competition (between 292.5° and 337.5°). 
Additionally, the length of vector 𝐴 can be used as a consistency measure. If a subject 
decides consistently over all 24 allocation tasks, the length will be 30 while perfect random 
choice will result in a vector of zero length. The greater the length of the vector the more 
consistent is a subject’s decision. The questionnaire is fully incentivized since subject’s 
earnings are determined by the sum of her decisions for your payoff and the sum of the 
recipient’s decisions for other’s payoff. 
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Table 16: The 24 allocation tasks 
 Option A Option B 
Question 
number 
your payoff 
(𝑥) 
other’s payoff 
(𝑦) 
your payoff 
(𝑥) 
other’s payoff 
(𝑦) 
1 15 0 14.5 -3.9 
2 13 7.5 14.5 3.9 
3 7.5 -13 3.9 -14.5 
4 -13 -7.5 -14.5 -3.9 
5 -7.5 13 -3.9 14.5 
6 -10.6 -10.6 -13 -7.5 
7 3.9 14.5 7.5 13 
8 -14.5 -3.9 -15 0 
9 10.6 10.6 13 7.5 
10 14.5 -3.9 13 -7.5 
11 3.9 -14.5 0 -15 
12 14.5 3.9 15 0 
13 7.5 13 10.6 10.6 
14 -14.5 3.9 -13 7.5 
15 0 -15 -3.9 -14.5 
16 -10.6 10.6 -7.5 13 
17 -3.9 -14.5 -7.5 -13 
18 13 -7.5 10.6 -10.6 
19 0 15 3.9 14.5 
20 -15 0 -14.5 3.9 
21 -7.5 -13 -10.6 -10.6 
22 -13 7.5 -10.6 10.6 
23 -3.9 14.5 0 15 
24 10.6 -10.6 7.5 -13 
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Figure 16: Classification of behavioral types 
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C. Further results 
Figure 17: Average contributions of OTMs in VCM+ over time by team 
 
 
Figure 17 shows the analogous to Figure 12 for the VCM+ treatment (sessions 4-6). 
Team 4a characterizes team a in session 4, etc. In this treatment, only five teams (4a, 4d, 
4f, 5c, 5f) can be classified as high contribution teams. As usual in standard public goods 
games, the low contribution teams dominate. 9 out of the 18 teams (4e, 5a, 5b, 5d, 5e, 6a, 
6b, 6d, 6f) fall into this category. The four remaining teams (4b, 4c, 6c, 6e) form the mixed 
contribution category. Table 17 shows frequency of categories for the VCM+ and the TAG 
treatment (numbers for TAG as described in Section 4.3). Frequencies in the first two 
columns are significantly different using a χ² test (p < 0.05).57 
 
Table 17: Frequency of teams by category and treatment 
 High 
contribution 
Low 
contribution 
Mixed 
contribution 
TAG 11 4 3 
VCM+ 5 9 4 
H0: No difference between high 
contribution and low contribution (χ² 
test (p-value)) 
< 0.05  
                                                 
57 A Fisher’s exact test yields p = 0.06. 
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Chapter 3: How to make people generous 
and credulous: Religious and pro-social 
primes in a public goods game 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyzes and compares the effect of religious and pro-social primes on 
voluntary contribution decisions in a public goods setting. Before the start of a standard 
one-shot public goods game, participants are asked to solve an unscrambling task. They get 
ten five-word sentences and have to drop one superfluous word in each sentence to form 
grammatically correct four-word sentences. There are five identical “neutral” sentences in 
all treatments. The five other sentences include one religious, pro-social or neutral 
keyword each. 
This work adds to a growing literature on experimental tests of links between religious 
primes and cooperative behavior. To my best knowledge it is the first that (i) provides a 
public goods game with a comparison of a religious prime with both a neutral and a pro-
social prime and (ii) rigorously tests whether the prime works through changes in 
selfishness and altruism, changes in the expectation of others’ behavior or through the 
activation of a desire to act morally correct. 
I find three main empirical results: First, both the religious and the pro-social prime 
increase the average contribution in the public goods game. Second, both altruism and the 
expectation of others’ cooperation increase the own contribution. Third, both the religious 
and the pro-social prime increase altruism, the pro-social prime also increases the 
expectation of cooperation. These changes in motives and expectations explain about two 
thirds of the increased contributions in the religious and pro-social prime settings. 
Questions about the role of religiousness for economic decision making have a long 
history and have gotten increased attention in the last years. Weber (1920) postulated that 
protestant ethics are closely related to the spirit of capitalism. Barro and McCleary (2003) 
find in a cross-country panel that religious beliefs increase but church attendance decreases 
How to make people generous and credulous: Religious 
and pro-social primes in a public goods game 
96 
economic growth. Gheyssens and Günter (2012) get the experimental result that in poor 
rural Benin people with strong religious faith tend to be extremely risk-seeking.  
This chapter is closely related to an emerging body of literature on the behavioral 
impact of religious concepts in experimental settings. Ahmed and Salas (2008) compare 
the results of religious priming and neutral priming in a dictator game and a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. They find that the religious priming increases contributions in the dictator 
game and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game for both self-described religious and 
non-religious participants. Anderson and Mellor (2009) run a repeated public goods 
experiment and compare the behavior of religious and non-religious participants. The 
average contribution does not differ between the two groups, but the decline of 
contributions over time is significantly smaller for religious participants.  Benjamin et. al. 
(2010) test the effect of religious priming and neutral priming in several settings – 
including a public goods game, a dictator game and a labor market gift-exchange game. 
Their results show that religious priming for Protestants increases contributions to the 
public good, for Catholics decreases contributions to the public good but increases 
expectations of others’ contributions to the public good, and for Jews increases labor 
market reciprocity. Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) find that compared to a no-prime 
treatment a religious prime increases contributions in a dictator game for both self-
described theists and atheists. In a further experiment they compare treatments with 
religious priming, secular priming and neutral priming in a dictator game. Both the 
religious and the secular prime increase the contributions of theists and atheists, the effect 
of the religious priming on the theists is close to being significantly stronger. Rand et. al 
(2012) test the effects of an explicit prime on a diverse population in an online prisoner’s 
dilemma game. They compare a neutral, a christian, a hinduistic and a secular prime for 
Christians, Hindus and atheists. Relative to the neutral prime the only effect they find is a 
positive influence of the christian prime on the cooperation behavior of Christians. Akay 
et. al. (2011) analyze the effect of a “societal” prime by comparing the behavior of 
muslims in a public goods game on the most religious day during Ramadan with the 
behavior on a normal day. They find significantly less contributions during the religious 
day and attribute this to the observed decreased expectation of the others’ contribution. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2 I present the 
experimental design and describe the procedures of the experiment. Section 3 derives 
theoretical predictions based on different theories. Section 4 reports the experimental 
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results and compares them to the theoretical predictions. Finally, Section 5 discusses the 
results and concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2. Experimental design and procedures 
In this section I describe the basic experimental setup (Section 2.1) and the details of 
the experimental procedure (Section 2.2). 
 
3.2.1 Basic setup of the game 
Let 𝐼 = {1, 2, … , 𝑛} denote 𝑛 subjects who interact in one period. First, each 
individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 has “to unscramble 10 five-word sentences dropping an extraneous word 
from each to create a grammatical four-word sentence“58. Then, each individual receives 
an endowment 𝐸. Each individual can allocate the endowment either to her own private 
account or to the public account. The contribution of individual 𝑖 to the public account, 
denoted 𝑐𝑖, must satisfy 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝐸. Let 𝐶 be the sum of all team members’ contributions 
(i.e. 𝐶 = ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 ). In order to retain the public goods nature 𝐶 is multiplied by a factor 𝛾, 
which satisfies 1 < 𝛾 < 𝑛.  
At the end of each period the amount 𝛾𝐶 is automatically distributed evenly among 
the team members. Formally, the returned amount is denoted by 𝑑𝑖 =  𝛾𝐶 / 𝑛. 
Individual team member 𝑖’s payoff,  𝜋𝑖, is then given by the sum of his remaining 
endowment and his share of the public good                                                                  𝜋𝑖 = 𝐸 − 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖.                                                    (1) 
After the contribution decision, subjects are asked to estimate the sum of the 
contributions of the other members in their group. A correct estimate is rewarded by a 
payoff,  𝑟𝑖. 
 
3.2.2 Experimental procedures 
The experiment is organized is six stages. In stage 1, subjects are primed with a 
scrambled sentence test. In stage 2, the public goods game is played. In stage 3, subjects 
fill out a questionnaire regarding their motives and expectations in the public goods game. 
In stage 4, subjects solve another scrambled sentence test. In stage 5, subjects fill out a 
questionnaire regarding some of their personal characteristics, including questions 
                                                 
58 Shariff and Norenzayan (2007),  p. 804 
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regarding their religiousness. In stage 6, subjects are informed about the results of the 
public goods game and their resulting payoff.  
The experiment implements six treatments: (i) treatment PRI/REL, (ii) treatment 
PUB/REL, (iii) treatment PRI/SOC, (iv) treatment PUB/SOC, (v) treatment PRI/NEU and 
(vi) treatment PUB/NEU. All treatments are according to the setup laid out in Section 2.1 
with the following parameters: number of subjects 𝑛 = 3, endowment per period 𝐸 = 20 
points (the experimental currency unit)59, revenue multiplier 𝛾 = 1.5, and reward 𝑟 = 4. In 
each session 15 subjects were randomly matched into five groups to assure anonymity.60 
The treatments differ in two dimensions. The first dimension is the information 
condition regarding the contribution 𝑐𝑖. In treatments (i), (iii) and (v) the information about 
𝑐𝑖 is private – hence the treatments are denoted PRI. In treatments (ii), (iv) and (vi) the 
information about 𝑐𝑖 and the cubicle number of subject 𝑖 is displayed to three other 
participants, who can consequently identify 𝑖 but are not in the same group as 𝑖 and 
therefore not affected by his decision. The information is public – the treatments are 
denoted PUB. The second dimension is the content of half the sentences in stage 1. There 
are five identical “neutral” sentences in all treatments. In treatments (i) and (ii) the other 
five sentences each include one religious keyword – these treatments are denoted REL.61 
Treatments (iii) and (iv) implement five sentences with one pro-social keyword each – 
these treatments are denoted SOC.62 In treatments (v) and (vi) all ten sentences are 
“neutral” – these treatments are denoted NEU. 
In stage 4, all sentences are “neutral” to “erase” the different primes of stage 1. 
Information conditions are as follows: In stage 6, each individual is informed about 
the contribution 𝑐𝑖 of the other two members within his group, his remaining endowment 
𝐸 − 𝑐𝑖, his returned amount from the public good 𝑑𝑖, his payoff 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 and his reward  𝑟𝑖. No 
further information about decisions63 of other players or results of other groups is given to 
the subjects. 
The experimental sessions started with general instructions on the experiments (the 
full text is in Appendix A). Before each stage, instructions regarding this stage were given. 
                                                 
59 At the end of the experiment earned points from all periods are summed up and converted into euro using 
the following exchange rate: 1 point = 2.5 euro cent. 
60 In two sessions twelve participants were matched into four groups. This was due to a high number of no-
shows. 
61 The religious keywords are: pilgrim, fasting period (Fastenzeit in german), holy, god, prophets 
62 The pro-social keywords are: friend, team, helps, together, allies 
63 With the exception described for the PUB-treatments 
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The instructions gave complete information about the basic setup of the game and the 
relevant parameters. Instructions were always read aloud to ensure common knowledge of 
the rules, and subjects were given plenty of time to ask questions in private before the start 
of each stage. 
The computer-based sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory 
MELESSA of the University of Munich in December 2010 using the experimental 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 
2004). A total of 264 students from all disciplines participated in 18 sessions with 15 
participants64 each. Three sessions each implemented treatments PRI/REL, PUB/REL, 
PRI/SOC, PUB/SOC, PRI//NEU and PUB/NEU. The three sessions provide me with 42 or 
45 statistically independent observations for each of the six treatments. The sessions lasted 
up to 45 minutes including everything from the instructions to final payments, and the 
average earnings were 10.17 EUR, including a show-up payment of 4.00 EUR. No 
participant was allowed to take part in more than one session, and the assignment of 
subjects into treatments was random. Decisions were taken anonymously65 in cubicles, and 
communication among participants was prohibited. 
 
3.3. Theoretical predictions 
In this section, I present theoretical predictions for all treatments. First, I take a look at 
the model based on choice norms by Benjamin et. al. (2010b). Second, I present theoretical 
predictions for two well-known models that include other-regarding preferences, namely 
models based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002),with a special 
emphasis on the role of expectations in these models. Third, I discuss theoretical 
predictions for the impact of public decisions on the contribution decision. 
 
3.3.1 Predictions based on choice norms 
Benjamin et. al. (2010a) offer the following interpretation of the priming mechanism: 
“[E]ach person belongs to multiple social categories, such as religion, gender, and 
occupation, which each has its own set of norms. Behavior in a given moment is more 
powerfully affected by the norms of categories that are salient than the norms of categories 
                                                 
64 Due to a high number of no-shows, two sessions – one for PUB/REL and one for PUB/NEU – were 
conducted with just 12 participants. 
65 With the exception described for the PUB-treatments. 
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that are not salient. If an environmental cue, or a “prime,” makes a certain category 
temporarily more salient, behavior shifts towards the salient category’s norm.” 
Benjamin et. al. (2010b) develop a decision model in which an individual wants to 
conform with two preferred choices – the choice in absence of identity considerations 𝑥0 
and the choice norm for the category C, 𝑥𝑐. If category C is made salient, the individual 
puts more weight on conforming with 𝑥𝑐. The resulting utility function is                   𝑈 = −�1 − 𝑤(𝑠)�(𝑥 − 𝑥0)2 − 𝑤(𝑠)(𝑥 − 𝑥𝑐)2,             (2) 
in which x is the action choice, 0 ≤ 𝑤(𝑠) ≤ 1 is the weight placed on the norm for 
social category C. It is assumed that 𝑤(0) = 0, 𝑤𝑖′(𝑠) > 0 and that s has a steady state 
value s* but can be temporarily increased to s* + ε, with  ε > 0. 
 
Proposition 1. Religious and pro-social primes increase contributions in the public goods 
game by strengthening the willingness to conform to a high-contribution choice norm. 
 
 
3.3.2 Predictions based on other-regarding preferences 
I focus on two prominent models that both belong to the class of outcome-based social 
preference models: the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999) and the welfare-oriented model by Charness and Rabin (Charness and Rabin, 2002). 
 
3.3.2.1 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences 
The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumes that subjects suffer from inequity 
within their reference group. More precisely, a subject 𝑖 benefits from his own payoff 𝜋𝑖 
but compares it with the payoff of the 𝑛 − 1 other members in his reference group. The 
corresponding utility function is the following:           𝑈𝑖(𝜋) = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 1𝑛 − 1�max�𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖 , 0�
𝑗≠𝑖
− 𝛽𝑖
1
𝑛 − 1�max�𝜋𝑖 − 𝜋𝑗 , 0�             (3)
𝑗≠𝑖
 
The vector 𝜋 = (𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) denotes the monetary payoffs and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent 
subject 𝑖’s individual attitude towards inequity. The two weights are restricted to 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 
and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. They control for the impact of utility losses from disadvantageous 
inequity (𝛼𝑖) and advantageous inequity (𝛽𝑖), respectively.
66 There are two types of 
                                                 
66 Note that for 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 = 0 the model collapses into the case of standard preferences. 
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equilibria in the discussed public goods game: If  1/2 ≤ 𝛽𝑖  holds for all group members, 
then every combination of identical contributions (𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all i) is an equilibrium. If 
𝛽𝑖 < 1/2 holds for at least one group member, the only equilibrium is the contribution of 
zero by all group members (𝑐𝑖 = 0 for all i). 
The monetary loss of a positive contribution is 1/2 per contributed point. If the 
maximum utility loss by advantageous inequality represented by 𝛽𝑖 is below this threshold, 
a contribution of zero is maximizing utility. If this utility loss is above the threshold, 
subject 𝑖 can increase his utility by contributing positive amounts up to the minimum 
contribution of the other team members. However, he will never want to contribute more 
than this minimum, because the gain of decreasing advantageous inequality with the high 
contributor will at least be canceled out by the loss of increasing disadvantageous 
inequality with the low contributor (𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖). 
 
Proposition 2. With Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences, subject i is willing to contribute 
positive amounts if 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 1/2. If 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 1/2 for all group members identical contributions 
(𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐 for all i) is an equilibrium, else 𝑐𝑖 = 0 for all i is the only equilibrium. An increase 
of advantageous inequality aversion from 𝛽𝑖 < 1/2 to 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 1/2 increases contributions. 
 
3.3.2.2 Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences 
Charness and Rabin (2002) assume that subjects care about their own individual well-
being and about social welfare. Their model includes a subject’s own payoff and, 
additionally, two components of social welfare: the minimum payoff in a group (the 
“Rawlsian” motive) and the sum of all group members’ payoffs (the efficiency concern). 
More precisely, the utility function in their general model (see their Appendix 1) with only 
outcome-based components looks as follows:               𝑈𝑖(𝜋) = (1 − 𝜆𝑖)𝜋𝑖+ 𝜆𝑖[𝛿𝑖 min(𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) + (1 − 𝛿𝑖)(𝜋1 + 𝜋2 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝑛)]            (4) 
The vector 𝜋 = (𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) denotes the monetary payoffs within the group of 𝑛 
subjects and 𝜆𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖 are individual weights (i.e. 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛿𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]). The first weight, 𝜆𝑖, 
captures how much an individual cares for social welfare relative to his own payoff.67 The 
                                                 
67 For 𝜆𝑖 = 0, the Charness and Rabin (2002) model nests standard homo oeconomicus preferences. 
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second weight, 𝛿𝑖, controls for the influence of the “maximin”-aspect relative to the 
general efficiency concern. 
In my setting, the optimal contribution for subject 𝑖 depends on 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖. If subject 𝑖 
strongly cares about general efficiency and 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 1/(2 − 2 𝛿𝑖) he wants to contribute 
everything. If subject 𝑖 strongly cares about the maximin-aspects and 1/(2 − 2 𝛿𝑖) >  𝜆𝑖 ≥1/2 he wants to contribute as much as the higher contribution of the other two team 
members. If he cares mostly about his own payoff and 1/2 > 𝜆𝑖, subject 𝑖 wants to 
contribute nothing. Intuitively, an increase of 𝑐𝑖 by 1 decreases 𝜋𝑖 by 1/2, increases (𝜋1 + 𝜋2 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝑛) by 1/2, and increases min(𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) by 1/2 if another team members 
contributes more but decreases min(𝜋1, … ,𝜋𝑛) by 1/2 if no other team member contributes 
more. 
As a result, there are different equilibria based on the distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖. All 
possible equilibria are shown in Table 18.  
 
Proposition 3. With Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences, subject i is willing to 
contribute his full endowment if 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 1/(2 − 2 𝛿𝑖) and up to his full endowment based on 
the contributions of the other team members if 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 1/2.  
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Table 18: Distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖 and resulting equilibria in VCM with Charness and 
Rabin (2002) preferences68 
Distribution of 𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿𝑖 Resulting equilibria 
𝜆1 ≥ 1/(2 − 2 𝛿1),  𝜆2 ≥ 1/2, 
 1/2 >  𝜆3 𝑐1 = 𝐸, 𝑐2 = 𝐸, 𝑐3 = 0 
𝜆1 ≥ 1/(2 − 2 𝛿1),  𝜆2 ≥ 1/2, 
 𝜆3 ≥ 1/2 𝑐1 = 𝐸, 𝑐2 = 𝐸, 𝑐3 = 𝐸 
𝜆1 ≥ 1/(2 − 2 𝛿1), 1/2 >  𝜆2, 
 1/2 >  𝜆3 𝑐1 = 𝐸, 𝑐2 = 0, 𝑐3 = 0  1/(2 − 2 𝛿1) >  𝜆1, 1/2 >  𝜆2, 
 1/2 >  𝜆3 𝑐1 = 0, 𝑐2 = 0, 𝑐3 = 0  1/(2 − 2 𝛿1) >  𝜆1 ≥ 1/2, 
  1/(2 − 2 𝛿2) >  𝜆2 ≥ 1/2,  
 1/2 >  𝜆3 
𝑐1 = 𝑐2, 𝑐3 = 0 
 1/(2 − 2 𝛿1) >  𝜆1 ≥ 1/2, 
  1/(2 − 2 𝛿2) >  𝜆2 ≥ 1/2 , 
  1/(2 − 2 𝛿3) >  𝜆3 ≥ 1/2,   
𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3  
 
 
3.3.2.3 Expectations 
With both Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) preferences, the 
optimal contribution depends on the contributions of the other group members. With 
simultaneous decisions, the choice of the own contribution has to be positively based on 
the expectation of the other group members’ contributions. Therefore, a change in the 
expectation leads to a change in the contribution decision. Such a change in expectations 
can improve or worsen the utility of the subject, depending on whether the new expectation 
is closer to the realized contribution of the other group members or farther away from it.  
 
Proposition 4. The religious and the pro-social prime can increase the contributions via 
an increase in the expectation of other group members’ contribution.  
                                                 
68 I assume that 𝜆1  ≥ 𝜆2 ≥ 𝜆3 without loss of generality. 
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3.3.3 The impact of public decisions 
The impact of public decision making in a public goods experiment was prominently 
explored by Rege and Telle (2004). They implement a standard public goods game in 
which all subjects write their own contribution on a blackboard. The blackboard is visible 
for all participants, making all contributions public. This treatment has a strong impact on 
the subjects’ contribution decisions, full contribution is the observed mean.69 The authors 
argue that participants who make high contributions receive social approval from the other 
participants because they conform to the social norm of giving.   
The observed effect of the activation of religious concepts has previously explained by 
the idea that participants act differently because they are watched and judged by a god. 
Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) even named their article “God is Watching You”.  
Because the social approval and the divine approval are both based on “observe and 
judge” by third parties, it is reasonable to expect a crowding out effect, meaning the effect 
of a religious prime should be weaker in a setting with public decisions. 
 
Proposition 5. Public decisions increase contributions. The effect of the religious prime is 
weaker in a setting with public decisions than in a setting with private decisions.  
 
3.4. Experimental results 
In Section 4.1 I present the main treatment effects. Section 4.2 shows the 
independence of the religiousness variables from the primes. 
 
3.4.1 Main results 
I will start with a short analysis of the average contributions by treatment. The mean 
contribution by treatment range from a low of 5.93 in the PRI/NEU to a high of 10.02 in 
the PUB/SOC (see the first row of Table 19). The benchmark treatment for my analysis in 
the PRI/NEU treatment, as it represents the standard voluntary contribution mechanism 
used in a huge number of prior experiments. As expected, the other treatments result in 
higher contributions than the benchmark case. 
                                                 
69 This effect would be too strong for the analysis in this chapter. Rege and Telle (2004) tested a second 
treatment variable for framing, but could not find a significant effect of the framing with public decisions. 
They explain this with a ‘ceiling effect’: The public decision pushes most contribution to 100%, leaving no 
room for further treatment effects. To avoid this fate, I use a weaker form of the public decision as presented 
in 2.2. 
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Table 19: Mean contributions (in points) by treatment 
 Av. Con. Diff. to PRI/NEU Mann-Whitney Lin. Reg. 
PRI/REL 9.02 3.09 YES** YES** 
PUB/REL 8.67 2.73 YES* YES* 
PRI/SOC 10.00 4.07 YES*** YES*** 
PUB/SOC 10.02 4.09 YES** YES*** 
PRI/NEU 5.93 - - - 
PUB/NEU 7.81 1.88 NO NO 
Note: Difference between treatment and PRI/NEU significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% 
level; * 10% level.  
 
The differences in the mean contributions are quite large – around four points (or 20% 
of the endowment) for the SOC treatments, around three points for the REL treatments and 
around two points for the PUB/NEU treatment. I test the significance of the differences 
with two methods. First, I compare the distribution of contributions in the PRI/NEU with 
the distribution of contributions in each of the other treatment. Second, I run a linear 
regression on the contributions with just the five non-PRI/NEU treatment dummies as 
independent variables. You can see the results in the last two columns of Table 19. Both 
methods show highly significant differences for the PRI/REL, PRI/SOC and PUB/SOC 
treatments, a somewhat significant difference for the PUB/REL and no significant 
difference for the PUB/NEU treatment. 
After establishing that the religious prime does have an effect on the contribution, we 
can now take look at the cause of this effect. Table 20 depicts the average contribution per 
treatment for two measures of religiosity. The first measure is membership in an 
Abrahamic religious community in columns 2 and 3. In total, 160 of 264 participants 
belong to an Abrahamic religious community – 150 Christians, 1 Jew and 9 Muslims.  
The second measure is self-reported religiousness measured on a seven-point Likert 
scale, shown in columns 4-6 of the Table. The participants are grouped into three groups of 
about equal size. Of the 264 participants, 82 are classified as low (1 on the Likert scale), 
100 are classified as medium (2 and 3 on the Likert scale) and 82 are classified as high (4-7 
on the Likert scale). 
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Table 20: Mean contributions (in points) by treatment 
 
Average 
Contri-
bution 
Abrahamic 
Religion: 
Yes 
 
Abrahamic 
Religion: 
No 
Self-
Religion: 
High 
Self-
Religion: 
Medium 
Self-
Religion: 
Low 
PRI/REL 9.02 8.04 (28) 
 
 
10.65 (17) 8.45 (20) 9.57 (7) 9.44 (18) 
PUB/REL 8.67 8.56 (27) 8.87 (15) 9.33 (12) 6.56 (18) 11.17 (12) 
PRI/SOC 10.00 9.33 (24) 10.76 (21) 10.80 (10) 10.35 (23) 8.67 (12) 
PUB/SOC 10.02 10.23 (26) 9.74 (19) 8.00 (10) 11.61 (18) 9.53 (17) 
PRI/NEU 5.93 5.86 (28) 6.06 (17) 6.86 (14) 6.61 (18) 4.00 (13) 
PUB/NEU 7.81 7.37 (27) 8.60 (15) 7.94 (16) 6.75 (16) 9.30 (10) 
 All treatments 8.58 8.18 (160) 9.20 (104) 8.44 (82) 8.59 (100) 8.72 (82) 
 Note: Number of observations in parentheses.  
 
The results do not show a clear relationship between religiousness and the impact of 
the different priming conditions. In both treatments with religious primes, the participants 
with a membership in an Abrahamic religious community show a lower average 
contribution than the participants who are not members. Also in both treatments the 
participants who self-identify as the lowest possible level of religiousness contribute more 
on average than the subjects with medium or high self-reported religiousness. 
This observation is backed up by the regression analysis shown in Table 21. 
Contributions in the REL and SOC treatments are significantly higher compared to the 
baseline treatment NEU (Model 1). However, the addition of measures of religiousness 
does not yield explanatory power. The contributions of members of an Abrahamic 
religious community do not differ significantly from others (Model 2) and the interaction 
effect with the religious prime is also insignificant. The same result is obtained by using 
the self-reported religiousness as independent variable. Again, the interaction effects of 
high and medium self-reported religiousness with the religious prime are both negative, in 
the case of the medium religiousness the effect is even somewhat significant.70 
 
Result 1. Mean contributions are significantly higher for REL and SOC treatments than in 
the baseline treatment. The increase in the REL treatments cannot be explained by broad 
measures of religiosity.  
 
                                                 
70 Running the regressions with treatment dummies does not qualitatively change the results, see Appendix 
B, Table 25. 
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Table 21: Contributions dependent on treatment and religiousness (OLS regressions) 
Dependent variable: contribution 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
REL dummy 2.011* 
(1.101) 
2.011* 
(1.100) 
2.616 
(1.646) 
2.001* 
(1.112) 
4.093** 
(1.695) 
SOC dummy 3.163*** 
(1.097) 
3.095*** 
(1.104) 
3.119*** 
(1.109) 
3.173*** 
(1.104) 
3.184*** 
(1.107) 
PUB dummy 
 
0.508 
(0.889) 
0.534 
(0.891) 
0.532 
(0.893) 
0.514 
(0.892) 
0.739 
(0.891) 
Abrahamic 
dummy 
- 
 
-0.885 
(0.926) 
-0.577 
(1.161) 
- - 
Abrahamic * rel. 
prime dummy  
- 
 
- 
 
-0.957 
(1.912) 
- - 
Self-Religion: 
High 
- - - 0.025 
(1.139) 
0.818 
(1.473) 
Self-Religion: 
High * rel. prime 
dummy 
- - - - -2.151 
(2.311) 
Self-Religion: 
Medium 
- - - -0.099 
(1.090) 
1.167 
(1.350) 
Self-Religion: 
Medium * rel. 
prime dummy 
- - - - -4.136* 
(2.260) 
Constant 
 
6.594*** 
(0.859) 
7.141*** 
(1.075) 
6.947*** 
(1.181) 
6.621*** 
(1.109) 
5.745*** 
(1.253) 
# Observations 264 264 264 264 264 
R² 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The 10000 feet view at the results shows a highly significant effect of the religious 
prime. However, it does not really explain the mechanism behind this effect and most of 
the variation between contributions is not captured – the the R² is around just 0.05 for all 
models. 
To add explanatory power to the statistical analysis, I asked the subjects about their 
motives and expectations. These questions immediately followed the contribution decision 
to ensure salience of the prime condition. Subjects were asked to indicate whether there 
exists a “morally correct” contribution decision, if “yes”, what amount is the “morally 
correct” contribution, how important the payoff of other group members is to them, how 
important their own payoff is to them, their expectation of the average contribution of the 
other group members. 
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Out of the 264 participants, 137 said that a “morally correct” contribution decision 
exists. More than half of these participants (71) agree that a full contribution is morally 
correct, the average amount chosen is 15.23. The importance of the other’s and the own 
payoff are measured on a seven-point Likert-scale (1 = lowest importance, 7 = highest 
importance). The mean result for the other’s payoff is 3.48, the mean for the own payoff is 
6.13. The average expectation for the other’s contribution is 9.50, about one point higher 
than the actual average contribution.  
Table 22 shows linear regressions that include the motives and expectations as 
independent variable.71 Two of the four new variables are large and highly significant – the 
importance of the other’s payoff and the expectation of the other’s contribution. An 
increase of the importance of the other’s payoff by 1 increases the own contribution by 
about one point, so going from the low end to the high end increases the contribution by 
about 30% of the initial endowment. An increase in the expectation of the other group 
members’ contribution by one point increases the own contribution by about 0.8 points. 
Both the importance of the own payoff and the view that a “morally correct” decision 
exists do not influence the contribution. 
Both the dummies for the religious and the social prime lose about 60% of their value 
compared to the regressions in Table 21 and become insignificant. This result suggests that 
the effect religious and social priming works through the concern for the others’ well-being 
and – via the willingness to conditionally cooperate – the expectation that others will 
cooperate. 
We can see the impact of the religious and the social prime on the motives and 
expectations in Table 23. I show a probit regression for the existence of a “morally correct” 
decision and tobit regressions for the importance of the own payoff and the others’ payoff 
as well as the expectation of the average contribution of the other group members.72 Both 
the religious prime and the social prime significantly increase the importance of the others’ 
payoff, both by about ¾ of a point on the Likert scale. The social prime additionally 
significantly increases the expectation by nearly two full points. The religious prime also 
increases the expectation by nearly one point, however, this increase is not significant.  
 
                                                 
71 I also tested for an effect of age and gender on the contribution decisions, both variables turn out to be 
insignificant. 
72 Linear regressions show similar results, see Appendix B, Table 26. 
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Table 22: Contributions dependent on treatment, motives and expectations (OLS 
regressions) 
Dependent variable: contribution 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
REL dummy 0.762 
(0.657) 
0.778 
(0.654) 
0.850 
(0.675) 
0.714 
(0.663) 
 
SOC dummy 1.166 
(0.765) 
1.121 
(0.756) 
1.113 
(0.755) 
1.210 
(0.763) 
 
PUB dummy 
 
0.383 
(0.560) 
0.414 
(0.563) 
0.345 
(0.564) 
0.387 
(0.560) 
 
Moral dummy -0.225 
(0.165) 
-0.198 
(0.173) 
-0.229 
(0.167) 
-  
Importance 
Other’s Payoff  
0.992*** 
(0.202) 
0.967*** 
(0.201) 
0.989*** 
(0.201) 
1.007*** 
(0.199) 
 
Importance Own 
Payoff 
-0.085 
(0.227) 
-0.109 
(0.227) 
-0.119 
(0.227) 
-  
Expectation 
Other’s 
Contribution 
0.786*** 
(0.058) 
0.792*** 
(0.058) 
0.791*** 
(0.057) 
0.781*** 
(0.060) 
 
Abrahamic 
dummy 
- 
 
-0.883 
(0.613) 
- -  
Self-Religion: 
High 
- - -0.066 
(0.771) 
-  
Self-Religion: 
Medium 
- - 0.766 
(0.704) 
-  
Constant 
 
-2.283 
(1.841) 
-1.611 
(1.827) 
-2.373 
(1.779) 
-3.166*** 
(0.691) 
 
# Observations 264 264 264 264  
R² 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61  
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Both the existence of a “morally correct” decision and the importance of the own 
payoff are not significantly affected by the treatment conditions. 
 
Result 2. The subjective importance of the other group members’ payoff and the 
expectation of the other group members’ contribution significantly increase contributions. 
The social prime significantly increases both these characteristics, the religious prime 
significantly increases the subjective importance of the other group members’ payoff.  
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Table 23: Impact of treatments on motives and expectations (probit and tobit regressions) 
Dependent variable: 
 Moral 
Dummy 
Importance 
Other’s 
Payoff 
Importance 
Own Payoff 
Expectation 
Other’s 
Contribution 
 
 Probit Tobit Tobit Tobit  
REL dummy 0.116 
(0.191) 
0.747* 
(0.423) 
0.581 
(0.507) 
0.916 
(1.077) 
 
SOC dummy -0.100 
(0.189) 
0.771* 
(0.420) 
0.677 
(0.503) 
1.926* 
(1.064) 
 
PUB dummy 
 
0.043 
(0.155) 
0.448 
(0.343) 
-0.050 
(0.413) 
-0.228 
(0.874) 
 
Constant 
 
0.023 
(0.154) 
2.559*** 
(0.346) 
7.149*** 
(0.427) 
8.730*** 
(0.867) 
 
# Observations 264 264 264 264  
Pseudo R² 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
The effect of the public decision on the contribution is small and insignificant in all 
regression models. This fact indicates that the social “observe and judge” effect of my 
implementation of the public decision is quite weak. Not surprisingly, the test for a 
crowding out of social approval and divine approval does not yield significant results (the 
full regression results are in Appendix B, Table 27). However, the interaction effect has the 
expected negative sign and is not far away from statistical significance.  
 
3.4.2 Test for independence of the religiousness variables 
The questions for the data collection of the religiousness variables are asked after the 
contribution decision in the public goods game. This sequence is necessary to avoid a 
religious prime for all participants. This approach carries the risk that the primes not only 
effect the contribution decision but also the answers to the religiousness questions, 
rendering a statistical analysis futile. Therefore the participants had to solve a further 
neutral scrambled sentence task between the public goods game and the questionnaire to 
“erase” the priming effect. This approach was effective, there is no relationship between 
the measures for religiousness and the treatments, as you can see in Table 24. 
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Table 24: Impact of treatments on self-reported religiousness (probit and tobit regressions) 
Dependent variable: 
 Abrahamic 
dummy 
Self-
Religion    
 Probit Tobit    
REL dummy 0.000 
(0.194) 
-0.047 
(0.360) 
   
SOC dummy -0.199 
(0.191) 
-0.516 
(0.359) 
   
PUB dummy 
 
0.075 
(0.157) 
0.002 
(0.293) 
   
Constant 
 
0.302* 
(0.156) 
2.486*** 
(0.291) 
   
# Observations 264 264    
Pseudo R² 0.00 0.00    
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
3.5. Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter presents a standard public goods game with religious, pro-social and 
neutral primes and analyzes the results of the implementation in a laboratory setting. 
Participants solve a scrambled sentence task – they have to form a four-word sentence out 
of five given words – filled with religious, pro-social or neutral keywords, before making 
decisions in a standard public goods game. 
I provide three main empirical results: First, both the religious and the pro-social 
prime increase the average contribution in the public goods game. Second, the subjective 
importance of the other group members’ payoff and the expectation of the other group 
members’ contribution positively influence the own contribution. Third, both the religious 
and the pro-social prime increase the subjective importance of the other group members’ 
payoff, the pro-social prime also increases the expectation of the other group members’ 
contribution. 
I do not find statistical significant support for the hypothesis that social approval 
based on observation by other participants crowds out a divine approval effect of the 
religious prime. However, both a weak form of a public decision and relatively few 
observations for the PUB/REL treatment might play a role in the lack of statistical 
significance. Further research in this direction might be fruitful.  
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Appendix 
 
A. Experimental instructions (originally in German)73 
 
Instructions 
 
Welcome to the experiment! 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
During the experiment you and all other participants will be asked to solve tasks, to make decisions and to 
answer questions. Your decisions as well as the decisions of the participants you are matched with determine 
your earnings from the experiment according to the following rules. 
Please stop talking to other participants from now on. If you have any questions after going through the 
instructions or while the experiment is taking place, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will come 
to you and answer your questions privately. In case the question is relevant for all participants, its answer is 
repeated aloud. 
The whole experiment is computerized and will last approximately 45 minutes. All your decisions and 
answers remain anonymous. You will not find out with whom you are matched in each of the experiment’s 
parts and how much each of the other participants earns. 
The experiment consists of six parts. At the beginning of each part, you will receive the corresponding 
instructions for this part. The instructions will be read out loud and you will get time to ask questions. Please, 
do not hesitate to ask if anything is unclear to you. Your decisions in one part of the experiment do not have 
any effects on other parts, exceptions will be clearly stated in the instructions. In the interest of clarity, we 
will only use male terms in the instructions. They should be interpreted as being gender-neutral. For means of 
help, you will find a pen on your table. 
While taking your decisions at the PC, there will be a clock counting down in the right upper corner of the 
screen. The clock serves as a guide for how much time you should need. You may exceed the time. The input 
screens will not be turned off when time has run out. However, the information screens on which no decision 
is required to be taken will be turned off when time has run out. Once you have taken a decision or have read 
through a screen, please confirm by clicking on the “OK” button. 
Your earnings in the experiment will be calculated in “points”. You can earn points in several parts of the 
experiment. How you can earn points is explained in the instructions for the respective parts. At the end of 
the experiment, the “points” get converted into euro at the exchange rate 4 points = 1 € (1 point= 25 cents). 
In addition, you receive 4 euro for your arrival on time. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. I will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
                                                 
73 Baseline instructions describe treatment PRI. Differences in PUB are indicated by [PUB]. 
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Part I 
In the first part of the experiment you solve linguistical tasks. These tasks take all the same form: Five words 
are displayed on the screen. From these five words you have to form a complete and grammatically correct 
four-word sentence. Please enter this sentence on the screen.  
 
At first you get one practice task, subsequently you solve ten of these tasks. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. I will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
 
 
Part II 
 
At the start of part II, everybody in the room will be randomly assigned to a group of three. You and the other 
participants will learn neither during nor after the experiment with whom you were matched in this part. 
 
Part II consists of two stages, the contribution stage and the distribution stage. 
 
Contribution stage: 
At the start of the contribution stage all participants receive a private endowment of 20 points. These points 
are distributed by each participant between two alternatives, the group account and the private account. All 
group members can discretionary decide how to distribute the points between the group account and the 
private account. 
 
The group account: 
The contributions of all group members are added up. The sum is multiplied by 1.5 und distributed to all 
group members in the distribution stage (see below). Examples: If the sum of the contributed points is 50, 
then there are 50*1.5=75 points to be distributed in the distribution stage. If the sum of the contributed points 
is 10, then there are 10*1.5=15 points to be distributed in the distribution stage. 
 
The private account: 
The contribution of a group member to his private account is the difference between his private endowment 
and the contribution to the group account. The contribution to the private account goes point for point into 
the earnings of the respective person. Examples: If a group member contributes 6 points to the group account, 
he receives 14(=20-6) points for his private account. If a group member contributes 17 points to the group 
account he receives 3(=20-17) points for his private account. The other group members receive nothing from 
the private account of the respective person. 
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Distribution stage: 
In the distribution stage the group account is equally divided between the three group members. Each group 
member receives 1/3 of the group account. 
 
Earnings: 
Your earnings are the sum of your distributed share from the group account and your private account. 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will be informed about the contributions of the other group members to the 
group account, the distribution from the group account, your private account and your earnings in part II. 
Directly following part II you will not receive any feedback. 
[PUB: At the end of the experiment you will also be informed about the contribution to the group account of 
three randomly selected participants. At the same time three randomly selected participants will be informed 
about your contribution to the group account. All participants will be informed only about other participants 
who are not in their own group. 
The information is displayed in the following way: 
The contribution of participants on seat [seat number of the selected participant] is [contribution to the group 
account of the selected participant].] 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. I will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
 
 
Part III 
In part III you are asked to answer a questionnaire at your computer. The questions refer to part II. 
 
The first question is: „Estimate the sum of the contributions of the other group members to the group account 
(minimum 0, maximum 40).“ If your estimation is correct, you earn 4 points. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be informed whether your estimation was correct. 
 
Additional questions follow. Most questions offer answer options, some questions require text answers. In 
the latter case enter your answer into the blue box on screen and confirm by pressing the enter key. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. I will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
 
 
Part IV 
 
Part IV is analogous to part I.  
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You solve ten new tasks. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. I will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
 
 
Part V 
In part V you are asked to answer a questionnaire at your computer. 
 
Most questions offer answer options, some questions require text answers. In the latter case enter your 
answer into the blue box on screen and confirm by pressing the enter key. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. I will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
 
 
Part VI 
In part VI you are informed about the results from part III and part IV. After that, payment of your total 
earnings in the experiment takes place. 
 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now. I will come to you and answer your questions 
privately. 
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B. Further Analysis 
Table 25: Contributions dependent on treatment dummies and religiousness (OLS 
regressions) 
Dependent variable: contribution 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
PRI/REL dummy 3.089** 
(1.446) 
3.089** 
(1.443) 
3.671** 
(1.849) 
3.080** 
(1.455) 
4.790*** 
(1.854) 
PUB/REL dummy 
 
2.733* 
(1.463) 
2.752* 
(1.466) 
3.346* 
(1.898) 
2.734* 
(1.468) 
4.984** 
(1.988) 
PRI/SOC dummy 4.067*** 
(1.357) 
3.988*** 
(1.361) 
4.015*** 
(1.366) 
4.069*** 
(1.365) 
4.009*** 
(1.359) 
PUB/SOC dummy 
 
4.089*** 
(1.536) 
4.050*** 
(1.543) 
4.063*** 
(1.544) 
4.085*** 
(1.541) 
4.154*** 
(1.535) 
PUB/NEU dummy 
 
1.876 
(1.618) 
1.894 
(1.621) 
1.888 
(1.625) 
1.878 
(1.628) 
1.846 
(1.639) 
Abrahamic 
dummy 
- 
 
-0.881 
(0.926) 
-0.579 
(1.163) 
- - 
Abrahamic * rel. 
prime dummy  
- 
 
- 
 
-0.935 
(1.914) 
- - 
Self-Religion: 
High 
- - - -0.045 
(1.140) 
0.731 
(1.475) 
Self-Religion: 
High * rel. prime 
dummy 
- - - - -2.078 
(2.318) 
Self-Religion: 
Medium 
- - - -0.061 
(1.095) 
1.101 
(1.354) 
Self-Religion: 
Medium * rel. 
prime dummy 
- - - - -3.896* 
(2.276) 
Constant 
 
5.933*** 
(0.988) 
6.482*** 
(1.173) 
6.294*** 
(1.265) 
5.972*** 
(1.204) 
5.266*** 
(1.307) 
# Observations 264 264 264 264 264 
R² 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 26: Impact of treatments on motives and expectations (OLS regressions) 
Dependent variable: 
 Moral 
Dummy 
Importance 
Other’s 
Payoff 
Importance 
Own Payoff 
Expectation 
Other’s 
Contribution 
 
REL dummy 0.092 
(0.314) 
0.621** 
(0.298) 
0.276 
(0.231) 
0.862 
(0.897) 
 
SOC dummy -0.334 
(0.297) 
0.593** 
(0.292) 
0.382* 
(0.223) 
1.738** 
(0.815) 
 
PUB dummy 
 
-0.012 
(0.244) 
0.260 
(0.243) 
-0.074 
(0.176) 
-0.180 
(0.706) 
 
Constant 
 
1.695 
(0.259) 
2.944 
(0.217) 
5.944 
(0.192) 
8.707 
(0.661) 
 
# Observations 264 264 264 264  
R² 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02  
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 27: Test for crowding out of social approval and divine approval (OLS regressions) 
Dependent variable: contribution 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
REL dummy 1.325 
(0.826) 
1.351 
(0.824) 
1.585* 
(0.861) 
1.231 
(0.842) 
 
SOC dummy 1.161 
(0.766) 
1.117 
(0.757) 
1.110 
(0.756) 
1.207 
(0.764) 
 
PUB dummy 
 
0.766 
(0.742) 
0.805 
(0.743) 
0.830 
(0.736) 
0.740 
(0.746) 
 
Moral dummy -0.232 
(0.166) 
-0.205 
(0.173) 
-0.238 
(0.168) 
-  
Importance 
Other’s Payoff  
0.976*** 
(0.201) 
0.950*** 
(0.201) 
0.968*** 
(0.201) 
0.992*** 
(0.198) 
 
Importance Own 
Payoff 
-0.087 
(0.227) 
-0.112 
(0.227) 
-0.126 
(0.224) 
-  
Expectation 
Other’s 
Contribution 
0.790*** 
(0.058) 
0.795*** 
(0.058) 
0.797*** 
(0.057) 
0.784*** 
(0.061) 
 
Abrahamic 
dummy 
- 
 
-0.889 
(0.615) 
- -  
Self-Religion: 
High 
- - -0.076 
(0.773) 
-  
Self-Religion: 
Medium 
- - 0.885 
(0.706) 
-  
PUB * REL 
dummy 
-1.150 
(1.074) 
-1.170 
(1.082) 
-1.472 
(1.090) 
-1.057 
(1.083) 
 
Constant 
 
-2.427 
(1.865) 
-1.753 
(1.846) 
-2.571 
(1.790) 
-3.318 
(0.739) 
 
# Observations 264 264 264 264  
R² 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.61  
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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